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BANKING LAW
I. CASE LAW
A. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY
1. Business Judgment Rule
N FDIC v. Benson' the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas affirmed its holding in FDIC v. Brown2 and held
that the Texas business judgment rule3 bars claims for ordinary negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty against former disinterested directors
of failed financial institutions. In Benson, the FDIC argued that the busi-
ness judgment rule functions only as a defense to a negligence or breach
of duty action brought by shareholders against a bank officer or director.4
The court, relying upon Brown, disagreed with the FDIC and found
that "the Texas business judgment rule does not function simply as a de-
fense to claims of negligence or breach of fiduciary duty by corporate
directors."'5 The court stated that "the Texas business judgment rule is a
substantive rule of law that requires of the FDIC both pleading and proof
to avoid its reach."'6 The court rejected the FDIC's argument that the
business judgment rule applies only to suits brought against bank officers
and directors on behalf of the shareholders in their own interest.7 In con-
clusion, the court found that the business judgment rule precluded any of
the FDIC's claims for simple negligence that were not already barred by
the statute of limitations.8
In FDIC v. Harrington9 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas also followed the reasoning of Brown in its assess-
ment of the business judgment rule under Texas law. The plaintiffs,
relying on FDIC v. Wheat,'0 argued that the defendants were liable for
common law acts of simple negligence. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument.'" Specifically, the Harrington court refused to adopt an inter-
pretation of the Wheat case that would, in effect, overrule the Gearhart
decision.12
The court in Harrington addressed the inherit tension between the duty
of care and the protection afforded by the business judgment rule, citing
the Fifth Circuit's statement in Gearhart: "Texas courts to this day will not
1. 867 F. Supp. 512, 521 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
2. 812 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
3. The business judgment rule is defined in Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc.,
741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) as "a corporate director who acts in good faith and with-
out corrupt motive will not be held liable for mistakes of business judgment that damage
corporate interests."
4. Benson, 867 F. Supp. at 521.
5. It (citing Brown, 812 F.Supp. at 724).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. I& at 522.
9. 844 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
10. 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
11. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. at 305.
12. Id. at 307.
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impose liability upon a noninterested corporate director unless the chal-
lenged action is ultra vires or tainted by fraud."'1 3 The Harrington court
"believes Gearhart provides the more accurate statement of Texas law
regarding officer and director liability" than does Wheat.14 The Harring-
ton court reviewed the relationship between the fiduciary duties owed by
officers and directors and the business judgment rule. According to Har-
rington, the officers and directors have three fiduciary duties: 1) the duty
of obedience, 2) the duty of loyalty, and 3) the duty of care.15 The duty of
obedience forbids ultra vires acts (acts outside the scope of corporate
power).16 The duty of loyalty requires that officers and directors act in
good faith, and forbids them from engaging in "interested" transactions.
17
Lastly, the duty of care requires directors and officers to manage corpo-
rate affairs with diligence and prudence. 18 The court also cited the Texas
Supreme Court formulation of the business judgment rule which was
cited in the Brown case: the "negligence of a director, no matter how
unwise or imprudent, does not constitute a breach of duty if the acts of
the director were 'within the exercise of their discretion and judgment in
the development or prosecution of the enterprise in which their interests
are involved.' "19
Therefore, the Harrington court concluded that officers and directors
of five failed banks and the holding companies for those banks could not
be held liable for simple negligence, negligence per se, or breach of fidu-
ciary duty.20 Because the court concluded that Texas common law holds
officers and directors liable only for acts of gross negligence, which is the
same standard under section 1821(k) of Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),2' the court did not address
the issue of whether FIRREA preempts state common law actions.22 The
court held that under the Texas business judgment rule, officers and di-
rectors are liable only for gross negligence.23
In FDIC v. Wheat24 the Fifth Circuit rejected the FDIC's argument that
the business judgment rule did not preclude an action for negligence
against disinterested directors of a bank. In Harrington the court recog-
nized that "Wheat is open to divergent interpretations" but concluded
that the Fifth Circuit did not intend to overrule Gearhart.25 Several sub-
sequent cases have limited the Wheat decision further on other grounds.






19. Id. at 306 (citing Brown, 812 F. Supp. 724; Cates v. Sparkman, 11 S.W. 846, 849(Tex. 1889)).
20. Id.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989).
22. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. at 305 n.5.
23. Id. at 305.
24. 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
25. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. at 307.
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The court in FDIC v. Mijalis26 noted that Wheat failed to find error in the
trial court's failure to submit a jury instruction on FDIC's duty to miti-
gate since the FDIC had, in fact, mitigated to the extent legally possible.
However, Mijalis held that the Wheat decision would not be construed as
imposing a duty on the FDIC to mitigate. Instead, Mijalis held that the
FDIC was not subject to the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages
when it sues directors or officers in its corporate capacity to recover
losses sustained by an insolvent financial institution.27 In RTC v. Acton 28
the court held, as in Harrington, that the Texas common law requires
gross negligence for officer and director liability. Finally, FDIC v. Belli2 9
stated that Wheat should not be read as defining when the FDIC's cause
of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes. Belli disagreed with
the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that the cause of action accrues
when it comes into existence, rather than when the FDIC becomes re-
ceiver for a defunct bank. 30
2. Director and Officers Standard of Care
Resolution Trust Corporation v. Miramon3' involved a failed Louisiana
savings and loan association, the South Savings & Loan Association of
Slidell, Louisiana. In 1989, the RTC became the receiver for the failed
thrift. In August, 1992, the RTC brought suit against the former officers
and directors of South Savings, seeking to recover losses caused by the
officers' and directors' alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
gross negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims of negli-
gence and breach of fiduciary duty, contending that these theories failed
to state a claim on which relief could be granted. In response to the de-
fendants' motion for dismissal of the negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty allegations, the RTC asserted that federal common law survived
FIRREA. Accordingly, the RTC argued that it was allowed to maintain
its actions against the directors and officers based on simple negligence.
The district court disagreed with the RTC and found that FIRREA set a
federal standard of care of gross negligence, and further held that any
federal common law to the contrary was preempted.
On appeal, the Miramon court held that FIRREA establishes gross
negligence as the federal standard of care for directors or officers of fed-
erally insured deposit institutions and preempts the federal common
law. 32 The issue in Miramon was whether the RTC could sue directors or
officers of federally insured deposit institutions for simple negligence and
26. 15 F.3d 1314, 1323 (5th Cir. 1994).
27. Id. at 1324.
28. 844 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
29. 981 F.2d 838, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 841.
31. 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 1360-61.
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breach of fiduciary duty under the federal common law.33 The court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit in RTC v. Gallagher34 which concluded
that section 1821(k) of FIRREA preempted the federal common law and
that the sole cause of action against directors and officers under federal
law was for gross negligence.35 Upon considering the plain language of
section 1821(k), the Miramon court found that Congress did "speak di-
rectly" to the issue of "the federal standard of care for directors and of-
ficers of federally insured deposit institutions thus preempting any resort
to federal common law."' 36 The language of the statute states that "a di-
rector or officer ... may be held personally liable for monetary damages
in any civil action ... for gross negligence ... as such terms are defined
and determined under applicable State law."' 37 The Miramon court re-
jected the RTC's interpretation of the savings clause, which stated that
"[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corpo-
ration under other applicable law."'38 The court noted that the RTC's
interpretation of the savings clause would violate "the elementary canon
of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative. '39 The court noted that "it simply makes no sense
that Congress would establish a cause of action in one sentence and then
render it a nullity in the next."'40 The court found the RTC's arguments,
which were based on the statute's legislative history, insufficient to
change its conclusion.41 Therefore, the court held that FIRREA estab-
lishes gross negligence as the federal standard of care for directors or
officers of federally insured deposit institutions and preempts the federal
common law.42 The statutory retention of the RTC's rights under "other
applicable law" does not preserve the right to bring federal common law
actions for simple negligence.43
The court reserved judgment on whether FIRREA preempts state
common law standards that allow causes of action against bank directors
33. Id. at 1359. See also RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994). In Chapman,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the RTC's argument that they could assert simple negligence
claims against directors of federal institutions under state law and held that state law is
inapplicable to claims against directors of federally chartered institutions. Id. at 1123. The
court applied the Internal Affairs Doctrine, under which matters relating to the govern-
ance of a corporation are determined under the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation.
Id. at 1122.
34. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
35. Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1359-60.
36. Id. at 1360.
37. Id. at 1361 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11989)).
38. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989)).
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 1362.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1364.
43. Id. at 1359 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 11989)).
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and officers based on simple negligence. 44 At least two other circuits
have held that such suits are not pre-empted.4 5
In FDIC v. Harrington,46 previously discussed, the court also consid-
ered whether section 1821(k) of FIRREA creates a federal liability stan-
dard for officers and directors of federally-insured depository institutions.
The court reasoned that the statute requires a showing of gross negli-
gence or greater violations of the duty of care.4 7 The court in Harrington,
as in Miramon, addressed the last clause of the section which reads
"[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corpo-
ration under other applicable law."'48 The Harrington court, relying upon
the statutes' plain meaning, and on well-reasoned opinions from other
district courts and the Seventh Circuit, held that no federal common law
cause of action exists for the simple negligence of officers and directors.
49
In other words, FIRREA does not preserve a federal common law cause
of action against officers and directors for conduct less culpable than
gross negligence. 50
3. Fiduciary Duty to Customers
Another Texas court was asked to determine whether a bank owed a
fiduciary duty to its customers. In Crutcher v. Continental National
Bank51 the court followed the Fifth Circuit rulings and held that the bank
did not owe a duty to their former customers. The Crutcher court stated
that the relationship between a bank and its customers does not create a
special or fiduciary relationship, except in limited circumstances, which
did not exist in Crutcher.52 This suit was filed against the bank by two
former customers who alleged breach of fiduciary duty when the bank
released the customers' unrecorded liens in several trailers. The court
also held that the bank did not breach the common law duty to exercise
ordinary care, since it could not foresee or anticipate that another person
would engage in negligent, unlawful or criminal activity.
53
4. Notice of Claims Under Directors and Officers' Liability Policy
In FDIC v. Mijalis54 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court decision
from the Western District of Louisiana and held that general demands for
regulatory compliance made by the FDIC upon a bank did not qualify as
44. Id. at 1363 n.9.
45. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 448 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
516 (1992); FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2440 (1993).
46. 844 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
47. Id. at 304-05.
48. Id. at 303; Miramon, 22 F.2d at 1361.
49. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. at 304.
50. Id. at 305.
51. 884 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
52. Id. at 886.
53. Id. at 887.
54. 15 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994).
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"claims," within the meaning of a claims-made policy and that financial
information submitted by the bank during the loan renewal process did
not qualify as "notice" of potential claims under the insurance policy. In
reaching this conclusion, the court first addressed whether the FDIC's
communications to the individual defendants during the policy periods
were "claims" within the meaning of that term as used in the insurance
policies. The court pointed to its prior holding that "the determination of
whether a given demand is a 'claim' within the meaning of a claims-made
policy requires a fact-specific analysis to be conducted on a case-by-case
basis."' 55 The court noted that "a claim is clearly made when an outside
party files suit on a demand based on an act or omission of an officer or
director. '56 The court further noted that the policy at issue envisioned.
"claims" as being "closely related to legal obligations to pay money," and
therefore applied its definition of the term "claim" used in FDIC v. Bar-
ham: "a demand which necessarily results in a loss-i.e., a legal obliga-
tion to pay-on behalf of the directors. '57 Relying on Barham, the court
reasoned that the appropriate inquiry is whether the communications at
issue referred to demands that would necessarily result in losses to the
directors resulting from a failure to comply with the relevant banking reg-
ulations.58 The court concluded that most of the documents relied on by
the FDIC are easily dismissed since they fell outside of the Barham defi-
nition of "claim." 59 There was one "arguable exception" to this conclu-
sion: the FDIC did warn the members of the bank's board of directors
through a letter that it was considering recommending civil money penal-
ties under Federal Reserve Regulation 0.60 The court did not need to
decide whether this letter satisfied the narrow definition of "claim" estab-
lished in Barham because the court reasoned the insurance policies at
issue excluded from the definition of "loss" any "fines or penalties im-
posed by law."'61 Therefore, the court stated that "the threatened 'civil
money penalties' are clearly excluded from coverage under the poli-
cies." 62 Since the court concluded that Barham is controlling and that no
claims were made on the bank or its directors during the policy periods as
required under the relevant insurance policies, the court did not consider
whether the district court "correctly interpreted the policies not to re-
quire the insured to give notice to [the insurance company] of claims
made as a condition precedent to coverage. '63
The court next considered whether the insurance coverage was trig-
gered under the policy because the insureds gave written notice to the
insurance company during the policy periods of occurrences that might
55. Id at 1331.
56. Id
57. Id. at 1332; Barham, 995 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1993).
58. Mijalis, 15 F.3d at 1332.
59. Id. at 1333.
60. Id at 1333 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 215(b), (d) (regulating insider lending)).
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1334.
[Vol. 48
BANKING LAW
have given rise to claims being made against the insureds. More specifi-
cally, the FDIC argued that the bank's renewal application submitted
before the expiration of the 1983 policy disclosed the existence of the
cease and desist order, which the FDIC had previously used as "an occur-
rence that subsequently gave rise to the claims asserted" against the di-
rectors.64 The insurance company (International) responded by stating
that the documents relied upon by the FDIC were not legally sufficient to
comprise notices of potential claims and that "non-specific communica-
tions merely disclosing that events have occurred do not satisfy the re-
quirement of notice of potential claims."' 65 International relied on the
Fifth Circuit's Barham opinion and on McCullough v. Fidelity & Deposit
Company.66 International also pointed toward the cases relied upon in
Barham and McCullough, which construed insurance policies such as the
ones at issue in Mijalis to require specific notices from the insured to the
insurer in order to trigger "notice of potential claims" coverage. 67 The
court affirmed its prior holding in McCullough that "notice of an institu-
tion's worsening financial condition is not notice of an officer's or direc-
tor's act, error, or omission." 68 The McCullough court also held that "the
proper focus of the district court's inquiry is whether the insured has ob-
jectively complied with such a notice provision, and not whether the in-
surer has subjectively drawn inferences that potential claims exist from
the materials submitted by the insured."'69 Despite subtle differences be-
tween the insurance policy in Mijalis and those in the cases relied upon,
the court refused to conclude that the notice of potential claims clause
was materially different from those involved in Barham and McCullough.
The policies at issue in Mijalis required the individual defendants to give
International "written notice as soon as practicable 'of any occurrence
which may subsequently give rise to a claim being made against the In-
sureds in respect of any... Wrongful Act' done or alleged to have been
done by the insureds while acting as directors or officers of the Bank."'70
The court stated that subjective inferences elicited from general informa-
tion are irrelevant to the question of adequate notice.71 Additionally, ev-
idence of the insurance company's subjective knowledge was also
irrelevant.72
5. Deposit Insurance
In Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. FDIC73 the Fifth Circuit
reviewed a United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1335.
66. 2 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 1993).
67. Mijalis, 15 F.3d at 1335.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing McCullough, 2 F.3d at 113 (emphasis omitted)).
70. Id. at 1336.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. 21 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 1994).
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denial of a motion for summary judgment of the FDIC. The Fifth Circuit
held that section 1821(f)(4) of FIRREA which placed claims involving
deposit insurance within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts of
appeal applied retroactively; that section 1821(f)(4) of FIRREA imposing
the sixty-day time limit on requests for review of final determinations by
the FDIC did not apply retroactively; that the petition for review was not
untimely; and that the FDIC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in de-
ciding the coverage dispute.74 In Hartford Casualty, the insurance com-
pany sued the FDIC seeking to recover $492,000 in deposit insurance.
The issues which arose on appeal were whether the Fifth Circuit had ju-
risdiction over Hartford's appeal; whether Hartford's claim against the
FDIC was filed in a timely manner; if the FDIC acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in determining that the certificates of deposit belonged to
Hartford; and whether, under various equitable principles, the FDIC's
offset of the six certificates of deposits against the debts owed was wrong-
ful.75 With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit cited its
prior decision in Nimon v. RTC76 where the court determined that 12
U.S.C. section 1821(f)(4) placed claims involving deposit insurance within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals. In order to
clarify its basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit addressed
the question of whether section 1821(f)(4) applied retroactively to the
present case and concluded that it in fact did.77 The court pointed to-
wards a recent United States Supreme Court case which "clarified the
circumstances in which a new statute which itself does not explicitly state
whether it applies to pending cases should be applied retroactively. '78
The Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products79 decided that cer-
tain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroac-
tively to pending cases. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court
endorsed "the traditional presumption against applying statutes affecting
substantive rights, liabilities, or duties to conduct arising before their en-
actment. '80 However, the Supreme Court also stated that, regardless of
the general presumption against statutory retroactivity, "in many situa-
tions, a court should 'apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision.' "81 Generally, the situations involved procedural changes to
the existing law, including statutes which merely change jurisdiction.82
Such a circumstance does not take away any substantive rights but rather
changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. 83 The Fifth Circuit also
pointed towards its own precedents which have held that "amendments
74. Id at 700-06.
75. Id at 700.
76. 975 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1992).
77. Hartford Casualty, 21 F.3d at 700.
78. Id.
79. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
80. Id. at 1504.
81. Id. at 1501 (citations omitted).
82. Hartford Casualty, 21 F.3d at 700.
83. Id. at 701.
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to statutes which affect procedural or remedial rights generally apply to
pending cases, where such change does not deprive a party of its 'day in
court.' "84 The court noted that it had retroactively applied 12 U.S.C.
section 1819(b)(2), which permits the FDIC to remove cases in which it is
a party to federal court, to pending cases.85 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that "[s]ection 1821(f)(4) changes the forum which hears deposit insur-
ance disputes; it does not alter any substantive rights of the parties nor
does it deprive any party of its day in court."' 86 Therefore, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that section 1821(f)(4) applied retroactively to govern Hartford,
thereby granting the Fifth Circuit jurisdiction in the appeal.87
The Fifth Circuit next considered the FDIC statute of limitations argu-
ment, which maintained that Hartford did not timely petition for review
of the FDIC's deposit insurance determination. 88 The FDIC relied upon
12 U.S.C. section 1821(f)(5), which states: "Any request for review of a
final determination by the Corporation shall be filed with the appropriate
circuit court of appeals not later than 60 days after such determination is
ordered. '89 The FDIC argued that the sixty-day time limit began to run
in the present case on the effective date of FIRREA, August 9, 1989.
According to the FDIC, since Hartford did not file its suit until June 24,
1991, such filing was untimely. The court noted that, in contrast to its
decision to retroactively apply other sections of FIRREA, retroactive ap-
plication of section 1821(f)(5) in the present case would "extinguish
claims which were valid before the statute's effective date and deprive
Hartford of a forum, even though it acted properly under law existing at
the time its claims arose." 90 The court held that to begin running the
statute of limitations period from the date of FIRREA's enactment
would be "manifestly unjust," and would violate the holding in Bradley v.
School Board,91 since it would "infringe upon or deprive a person of a
right that had matured," and would impose "unanticipated obligations...
upon a party without notice or an opportunity to be heard."
92
The court next reviewed the insurance coverage dispute by reviewing
the FDIC-C under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Fifth Circuit
noted that it must affirm the FDIC-C's determinations unless they are
"found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law."'93 Hartford, as the appellant, had the
burden of proving that the FDIC's determination was arbitrary and capri-
84. Id at 701; NCNB Texas Nat'l Bank v. P & R Inv. No. 6, 962 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir.
1992).
85. P & R Inv. No. 6, 962 F.2d, at 519.




90. Id. at 702.
91. Id.; 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
92. Id.; Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
93. Hartford Casualty, 21 F.3d at 704 (citations omitted).
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cious. 94 The court noted that it would be deferential to an administrative
agency's interpretations of its own regulations.95 In reviewing the FDIC's
actions, the court concluded that the FDIC did not act arbitrarily or ca-
priciously in arriving at its decision. 96
Lastly, the court considered Hartford's offset claims. Hartford argued
that the FDIC's offset of the six certificates of deposit against the debt
owed was wrongful and asked the court to impose a constructive trust or
in the alternative to grant some similar type of equitable relief.97 The
court noted, however, that Hartford's equitable claims were based on ac-
tions taken by the FDIC-R, rather than the FDIC-C.98 Because the
FDIC-R had been dismissed in Hartford pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment, and because the appeal related only to Hartford's insurance claims,
the court stated "the offset claims are not open. Under the dual capaci-
ties doctrine, the FDIC-C may not be held liable for acts committed by
the FDIC-R, i.e., the FDIC acting in one capacity is not subject to de-
fenses or claims based on its acts in other capacities." 99
In First American Bank v. RTC00 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a final
determination of the Resolution Trust Corporation and ruled in favor of a
bank stating that the RTC had abused its discretion by denying federal
deposit insurance coverage for an investment by the bank. 1 1 In April
1989, the bank purchased a $98,000 certificate of deposit from Spindletop
Savings Association (Old Spindletop). A few months later Old Spin-
dletop failed and was placed into receivership. First American Bank sub-
sequently purchased a $99,000 certificate of deposit from the newly
chartered institution, Spindletop Savings Association, F.A. (New Spin-
dletop). In June 1990, New Spindletop failed and was placed into receiv-
ership. The RTC then sold both of the Spindletop certificates of deposit
to First City Texas-Beaumont, N.A. In June 1990, First American Bank
redeemed one of the certificates of deposit. First City, however, refused
to honor the other certificate of deposit.
First American Bank submitted a claim to the RTC through its admin-
istrative procedures, but the RTC declined to pay, taking the position that
no coverage existed. The Fifth Circuit rejected the RTC's argument that
the bank, through its own fault, had deposited more than $100,000 in a
single institution and under 12 U.S.C. section 1818(q) was uncovered with
respect to amounts over $100,000.102 Finding that the RTC's argument
was "untenable," the Fifth Circuit construed section 1818(q) to mean ex-
actly what it said: that any assumed term deposit shall be accorded sepa-
94. Id.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 705.
97. Id. at 706.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 1992)).
100. 30 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 645.
102. Id. at 648.
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rate deposit insurance during the statutory grace period.'0 3 The court
interpreted the word "separate" as used in section 1818(q) to mean
"apart from and in addition to" any other deposit insurance that may or
may not exist at the time of assumption.1' 4 The court concluded that the
insurance on the first certificate of deposit was apart from and in addition
to the coverage applicable to the second certificate of deposit because it
was a new time deposit made at the assuming institution after the as-
sumption of Old Spindletop's liabilities.' 0 5
6. "Whistleblower Clause Under FIRREA"
In Ellis v. NCNB Texas National Bank'0 6 a former employee filed suit
against a bank alleging that he was fired because he talked to the FDIC
about possible wrongdoing at the bank. The employee argued that the
bank had violated the FIRREA "whistleblower clause.' 0 7 Finding FIR-
REA's whistleblower statute to be analogous to the burden of proof rules
established in Title VII retaliation cases, the court applied the same stan-
dards and held that the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.10 8 Once the plaintiff meets its burden of proof, the defendant
is afforded the opportunity to rebut the presumption of retaliation by
showing its actions were motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons.109 The court stated that it was
persuaded that the proper balance can be struck by allowing the
plaintiff who raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the be-
lievability of an employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to
present his case to the factfnder and by tailoring jury instructions
and questions to anchor a finding of pretext necessarily in a finding
of unlawful discrimination." 0
In this case, however, the court concluded that the former employee had
not met this standard and therefore the bank was entitled to summary
judgment."'
7. Defenses
a. Mitigation of Damages
In Mijalis, discussed previously,1 2 the court also addressed the affirma-
tive defense of mitigation of damages. Specifically, Mijalis addressed
whether the mitigation of damages defense is inapplicable to the FDIC in
suits against officers and directors of failed financial institutions.1 3
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis omitted).
105. Id.
106. 842 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a) (Supp. 11989).
108. Ellis, 842 F. Supp. at 249.
109. Id. at 247.
110. Id. at 249.
111. Id. at 249 and 251.
112. 15 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 1323.
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Mijalis held that the "FDIC is not subject to the affirmative defense of
failure to mitigate damages when it sues former directors and officers in
its corporate capacity to recover losses sustained by an insolvent financial
institution and covered by the national insurance fund."" 4 Mijalis relied
upon public policy arguments which prohibit defendant directors and of-
ficers from asserting such a defense against the FDIC, because risks of
error in judgment by FDIC personnel should be borne by the directors
and officers who were wrongdoers in the first instance rather than by the
National Insurance Fund. Furthermore, Mijalis reasoned that the mitiga-
tion of damages defense should not be applied against the FDIC because
the conduct of the FDIC should not be subjected to "judicial second
guessing," and because the FDIC does not owe a duty to the failed finan-
cial institutions or their former directors and officers." 5 Another ap-
proach relied upon by Mijalis was "to view the FDIC's conduct in
managing failed banks as insulated from affirmative defenses such as mit-
igation of damages by the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 11 6 Specifically, the Mijalis court followed the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in FDIC v. Bierman." 7 In Bierman the Seventh Cir-
cuit relied both upon policy considerations that favor liberating the FDIC
from the duty to mitigate damages and the discretionary function excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FrCA)."18 The policy considera-
tions included: (a) the risk of errors in judgment by FDIC personnel
should be borne by the directors and officers who were wrongdoers in the
first instance rather than by the national insurance fund; (b) the FDIC
should not be subjected to judicial second-guessing; and (c) the FDIC
owes no duty to failed financial institutions or to their former directors
and officers. 119 The Bierman court took note of the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in United States v. Gaubert,20 where the Court concluded
that exempting the FDIC from the affirmative defenses of contributory
negligence and mitigation of damages was consonant with the purpose of
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. In sum, the Bierman
court held that "the discretionary exception to the FTCA and the lack of
a duty to the wrongdoers... prevent the assertion of affirmative defenses
against the FDIC.'1 2' The Mijalis court noted that some district courts
within the Fifth Circuit have arrived at different decisions from the
Mijalis decision. 122
114. Id. at 1324.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 2 F.3d 1424, 1438-41 (7th Cir. 1993).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988).
119. 2 F.3d at 1424-38.
120. 499 U.S. 315, 326 (1991) (holding that actions taken by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board in supervising a savings and loan at the day-to-day operational level could
come within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA).
121. Bierman, 2 F.3d at 1441.
122. Mijalis, 15 F.3d at 1323.
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b. Federal Statute of Limitations
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
cently held that the federal five-year statute of limitations applies broadly
to administrative proceedings initiated by federal agencies. 123 3M Com-
pany v. Browner involved an Environmental Protection Agency proceed-
ing to assess civil money penalties against 3M Company for violation of
the Toxic Substances Control Act. The court held that the five-year pe-
riod begins to run on the date the violation occurs, regardless of when the
agency discovers the violation.' 24 Clearly, this case will have a significant
impact on the bank regulatory agencies. The ruling would substantially
alter the financial exposure of many institutions, as well as former bank
officers, directors and counselors with regard to pending or contemplated
agency actions for alleged wrongdoing that occurred more than five years
ago.
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's request for rehearing
on May 9, 1994. After receiving an extension to file an appeal, the Justice
Department decided not to appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The implication for bankers and their lawyers is that if 28 U.S.C. section
2462 is construed as applying in bank regulatory actions, civil money pen-
alties assessed against bankers for wrongdoing that occurred more than
five years ago must be dismissed under section 2462. Questions remain as
to how broadly the decision will be applied to bank regulatory actions,
including whether it will apply to punitive actions.
B. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
1. Lien Avoidance
Lenders should be aware that a trustee appointed in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding has broad powers that include lien-avoidance. In
In re Maddox125 the Fifth Circuit rejected a creditor's argument that a
debtor may not use 11 U.S.C. section 522(f) to avoid nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interests in property that is exempt under Texas
law. The court held that Owen v. Owen126 overruled In re McManus.127
Therefore, the debtor can rely on 11 U.S.C. section 522(f) to avoid non-
possessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in property exempt
under Texas law. The creditor also argued that the Chapter 13 trustee did
not have standing to move for lien-avoidance. The court rejected this
argument and held that a Chapter 13 trustee does have standing pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. section 1302, which gives Chapter 13 trustees broad powers
that include the power to move for lien-avoidance when they have an
interest in the asset.128
123. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 1462.
125. 15 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1994).
126. 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
127. 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982).




Under the rule established in Greathouse v. Charter National Bank-
Southwest129 secured creditors in Texas bear the burden of pleading and
proving that the disposition of collateral was conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner. The Court of Appeals of Texas enforced this rule in
Gordon & Associates, Inc. v. Cullen Bank/Citywest, N.A..130 The trial
court in Gordon granted Cullen Bank a summary judgment against
Gordon & Associates in an action to recover a deficiency caused by the
failure of the net proceeds of the sale of a dragline, loader and backhoe to
fully satisfy Gordon's indebtedness on two promissory notes. On appeal,
the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that the bank failed to ade-
quately prove, for summary judgment purposes, that it had satisfied the
requirements of section 9.504 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code
(Vernon 1991) and denied the bank's motion for summary judgment due
to the existence of a material fact question concerning commercial rea-
sonableness and notice.1 31 The appellate court explained that, pursuant
to Texas Business and Commerce Code section 9-507(2), certain nonex-
clusive circumstance exist in which a disposition is presumptively com-
mercially reasonable. These circumstances include a recognized market
for the type of merchandise at issue, a usual manner of sale in such mar-
ket, evidence of current prices in the market at the time of sale, estab-
lished commercial practices among dealers in the merchandise or
creditor's committee or representative of creditors approval or judicial
approval prior to the disposition.132 The appellate court determined that
because Cullen offered no evidence that any of these factors applied to
the sale of the collateral, there was no presumption of commercial rea-
sonableness under section 9-507(2). 133 The court further determined that
the evidence failed to show that the expenses incurred for the sale were
reasonable or to show any accounting to the debtor for the proceeds of
the sale.' 34 The court noted that the purchase of the collateral by the
bank, when considered with the subsequent failure of the bank to notify
the debtor of the purchase, raised a question of fact as to whether the
bank had elected to retain the collateral in satisfaction of its debt under
section 9-505 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code1 35 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the bank was not entitled to summary judgment
and remanded the case for retrial.
In another court of appeals decision involving alleged lack of notice of
disposition, the bank received a more favorable outcome than in Gordon.
In Bray v. Cradle Co.136 the debtor, Bray, had secured its debt to the
129. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
130. 880 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
131. Id. at 96.
132. Id. at 96-97.
133. Id. at 97.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 98.
136. 880 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
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bank with a note receivable from a third party. The bank took possession
of the collateral note. When the bank failed, its successor directed the
third party note maker to make all future payments on the collateral note
directly to the holder instead of to Bray. Defaults occurred on Bray's
note to the bank and on the third party collateral note. The holder then
accelerated the third party collateral note. While the holder collected
only part of the unpaid balance of the collateral note, the holder nonethe-
less credited the debtor's note balance with the entire balance due on the
collateral note. The holder then sued the debtor for the remaining
deficiency.
The court rejected the debtor's claim that the holder had wrongfully
disposed of the collateral because there was no notice of disposition. Re-
lying on Cullen Frost Bank v. Dallas Sportswear Co., Inc.137 the court
reasoned that "intangible collateral" such as instruments, chattel paper,
or accounts can be liquidated under section 9.502 of Texas Business and
Commerce Code without notice to the debtor.138 The court noted that
section 9.502 only requires notice to the third party account debtor, not
the party obligated on the debt secured by the third party obligation.
139
The court also noted that collection from the third party account debtor
was not a "disposition" of the collateral, but merely realization of the
balance due on the cash flow of an existing obligation. 140 Such a realiza-
tion did not constitute a sale that must comply with the requirements of
commercial reasonableness under section 9.504.141 The court was careful
to note that, as in Cullen, the promissory note was "intangible collateral,"
not "general intangibles" as defined in section 9.106 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code. 142 While not discussed by the court, the bank
avoided a dispute over the issues of implied covenants of good faith or
commercial reasonableness by applying credit to the debtor's note in an
amount equal to the remaining unpaid balance of the third party collat-
eral note.
A Texas federal district court refused to impose upon a bank a duty to
dispose of collateral in FDIC v. Floyd.14 3 In Floyd the debtor executed a
note to a bank secured by stock in a corporation. The bank failed and the
FDIC was appointed as receiver. The debtor defaulted on payment of
the note. The FDIC failed to sell the stock and the stock later became
worthless. The FDIC sued the debtor to collect on the note. The debtor
argued that section 9.207 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code
placed the burden of proof on the FDIC to establish that it disposed of
the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 1' The court re-
137. 730 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987).
138. Bray, 880 S.W.2d at 816.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 819.
141. Id. at 819-20.
142. Id. at 816.
143. 854 F.Supp. 449 (N.D.Tex. 1994).
144. Id. at 452.
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jected the debtor's argument and held that since the FDIC did not dis-
pose of the collateral the question of proving a commercially reasonable
disposition was not an issue.145 While not discussed by the court, an argu-
ment could be made that by failing to sell the stock, the FDIC had elected
a strict foreclosure resulting in the application of the rule established in
Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.146
C. DEPOSIT AccouNTs
In Lee v. Gutierrez147 the court held that a depositor's individual retire-
ment accounts (IRAs) at an insolvent savings and loan association were
not "special accounts," but mere "general accounts" not entitled to prior-
ity in liquidation of the savings and loan's assets. 1' It is the responsibility
of depositors, not of an S&L, to decide how deposits are invested. 149
Quoting Hudnall v. Tyler Bank & Trust Co. 150 the court stated:
When money or its equivalent is deposited in a bank without any
special agreement, the law implies that it is to be mingled with the
other funds of the bank, the relation of the debtor and creditor is
created between the bank and the depositor, and the deposit is gen-
eral. In such a transaction the bank becomes the owner of the
fund.15'
The bank had a responsibility for the administration of the IRA account,
but was not responsible for the decline in the value of the depositor's
investment decision. Lee, again quoting Hudnall, further stated:
When, on the other hand, money or its equivalent is so deposited
with an accompanying agreement that the identical thing deposited
shall be returned, or that the same shall be paid out for a specific
purpose, the relation thus created is not that of debtor and creditor.
Such a transaction is a special deposit, and the bank is liable only as
bailee. In such a case the fund is a trust fund, the bank acquires no
title thereto, and is a mere trustee for the safe-keeping, return, or
disbursement of the fund, according to the special contract by which
the deposit is made. 52
The court held that "[t]he depositor who creates the IRA is both the
settlor and the primary beneficiary of the trust, and the funds deposited
constitute the corpus of the trust. IRAs are a unique type of trust in that
145. Id. at 453.
146. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982) (holding that where a buyer requested a creditor to
take back collateral in full satisfaction of debt, where the creditor took back the collateral
with no indication in the record as to whether it would do so, and where at some later date
the creditor determined that the collateral could not be economically repaired and scraped
the collateral, and then sued for a deficiency judgment, the creditor retained the collateral
in full satisfaction of the indebtedness, and therefore elected to be governed by section
9.505 of Texas Business and Commerce Code providing that a creditor may not sue for
deficiency after he retains the collateral).
147. 876 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ denied).
148. Id. at 385.
149. Id. at 386.
150. 458 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1970).
151. Lee, 876 S.W.2d at 385.
152. Id. (quoting Hudnall, 458 S.W.2d at 186).
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the settlor/beneficiary has the sole authority to determine how the trust
corpus is invested."'1 53 Again relying upon Hudnall, the court concluded
that "[t]he legal presumption is that money deposited with a bank in an
interest-bearing instrument is to be commingled with other funds at the
bank, creating a debtor/creditor relationship between the bank and the
depositor, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary."'51 4 The court
also relied upon regulations promulgated by the FDIC in reaching the
conclusion that IRA accounts should be treated as general deposits under
Texas law.' 55
In U.S. v. Hord,156 the court held that the mere act of opening a check-
ing account was not "execution of a scheme" to defraud the bank within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 1344(a)(1).157 However, the five depos-
its of bogus checks constituted execution of a scheme to defraud because
these were the events that triggered possible credit being given to the
defendant's account.158 The court also held that the deposit of the bogus
checks was a "false statement" under 18 U.S.C. section 1014.'1 9 Re-
jecting the defendant's argument that his entire course of conduct consti-
tuted one scheme to defraud, the court held that each deposit was a
separate "execution of a scheme" to defraud the bank.' 60
D. FORECLOSURES
1. The "Durrett Rule"
In a significant decision by the United States Supreme Court, the rule
established in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. 161 was over-
ruled. Since Durrett, bankruptcy trustees, or "debtors in possession,' 162
have often attempted to use the fraudulent transfer statutes to set aside
foreclosure sales. However, the United States Supreme Court has re-
cently put this practice to rest in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation.'63
The Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid "fraudulent trans-
fers."'164 To set aside a fraudulent transfer, the trustee must either show
that the transfer was made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or de-
153. Id
154. Id at 386.
155. Id at 387 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 330.13 (1993)).
156. 6 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1993).
157. Id at 280.
158. Id at 283-87.
159. Id at 286.
160. Id at 282.
161. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
162. A Chapter 11 debtor, or a "debtor in possession," has the rights and powers of a
bankruptcy trustee. See, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1107(a) (1988).
163. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 548; see also, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving a
trustee the power to avoid any transfer of property that is avoidable under applicable non-
bankruptcy law by a creditor holding an allowed unsecured claim). By this section, a bank-
ruptcy trustee can also invoke state fraudulent transfer statutes; for example, Chapter 24 of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
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fraud" a creditor of the debtor,165 or the trustee must show that the
debtor received less than a "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for
such transfer while the debtor was insolvent. 166 The issue of fraudulent
transfers has arisen in the context of foreclosure sales when the purchase
price at the foreclosure sale is less than the fair market value of the prop-
erty. In such an event, bankruptcy trustees have argued that the foreclo-
sure sale was for less than a "reasonably equivalent value" and should
thus be avoided as a fraudulent transfer.
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation the Supreme Court settled a
division among the federal courts of appeal and held that "reasonably
equivalent value" for foreclosed property is the price in fact received at
the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the state's foreclo-
sure law have been followed; that is, the sale was procedurally regular
and not collusive. 167 Prior to this decision, courts in Texas followed the
"Durrett Rule" set forth by the Fifth Circuit of Appeals in Durrett v.
Washington National Insurance Co.168 In Durrett, property valued at
$200,000 was purchased at a foreclosure sale for $115,400. The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the foreclosure sale would be set aside as a fraudulent
transfer noting that:
We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or appellate
court dealing only with a transfer of real property as the subject of
attack under section 67(d) of the Act,169 which has approved the
transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the
property.170
From this comment comes the "Durrett Rule" which required that any
foreclosure sale for less than seventy percent of fair market value be
voided as a fraudulent transfer.
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, however, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the "Durren Rule." This case involved the purchase of
a home at a foreclosure sale for $433,000 by Mr. Paul Osborne. The
home, which had been owned by a partnership entity known as "BFP"
was alleged to be worth over $725,000. The foreclosure sale was not col-
lusive and had been conducted in compliance with California law. Three
months later, BFP filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 11 and
brought an action against Osborne in its capacity as debtor-in-possession
to set aside the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer. In holding that
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); TEX. Bus. & Com. CODE ANN.§ 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1987).
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§§ 24.005(a)(2), 24.006(a) (Vernon 1987). Besides showing insolvency, the trustee can al-
ternatively show that the debtor became insolvent as a result of such transfer, that the
debtor was engaged in a business or transaction for which any property remaining with thedebtor was an unreasonably small capital, or that the debtor intended to incur debts that
would be beyond its ability to pay as they became due.
167. 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
168. 621 F.2d 201.
169. Current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
170. 621 F.2d at 203.
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the foreclosure sale could not be set aside as a fraudulent transfer, the
Supreme Court noted that:
[flraudulent transfer law and foreclosure law enjoyed over 400 years
of peaceful coexistence in Anglo-American jurisprudence until the
Fifth Circuit's unprecedented 1980 decision in Durrett. To our
knowledge no prior decision had ever applied the "grossly inade-
quate price" badge of fraud under fraudulent transfer law to set
aside a foreclosure sale.171
Thus, the Court concluded that "a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably
equivalent value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at
the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State's foreclo-
sure law have been complied with."'1 72 The holding in BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corporation is significant to Texas lenders who credit bids at fore-
closure sales, as well as other purchasers. The case eliminates the possi-
bility that the sale could be set aside in the event of a subsequent
bankruptcy filing by the borrower, so long as the sale is procedurally reg-
ular and otherwise complies with state law.
2. Constitutionality of Section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code
The Waco Appeals Court recently upheld the constitutionality of sec-
tion 51.003 of the Texas Property Code. Section 51.003 permits a debtor
to ask a court to determine a foreclosed property's fair market value as of
the date of foreclosure in order to determine whether the fair market
value exceeds the foreclosure sale price. 173 If the court determines that
the property's fair market value exceeds the sale price, the statute re-
quires that the excess be applied to any remaining deficiency. In Lester v.
First American Bank,174 the bank challenged the constitutionality of sec-
tion 51.003 claiming that it violated the contract clause of the Texas Con-
stitution. The court concluded that the contract clause does not prohibit
the legislature from protecting mortgagors from foreclosure sales which
will or may result in lenders collecting more than the amount owing on
the mortgage. 175 Accordingly, the court held that the contract clause of
the Texas constitution does not void section 51.003 on the ground that it
impairs the obligation of contract. 176
3. Notice
In Glauser v. State Farm Life Insurance Co.177 the court stated that for
a mortgagee to recover any deficiency remaining on the note, the mortga-
gee must prove four elements: (1) the amount due on the note at the time
171. 114 S. Ct. at 1764.
172. Id. at 1765.
173. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
174. 866 S.W.2d 361 (Tex App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
175. Id. at 367.
176. Id.




of the foreclosure; (2) that proper notice of acceleration was given; (3)
that a valid foreclosure sale was made; and (4) that it has given credit to
the mortgagor for the amount received at the trustee's sale and any other
legitimate credit.178 The court agreed that a note holder must notify the
maker of its intent to accelerate the note before exercising its right to
accelerate; however, the court refused to find that "proper notice of in-
tent to accelerate" constituted a fifth element of proof.179 The court con-
cluded in Glauser that the mortgagee had complied with all four
elements. Therefore, the mortgagee was entitled to the deficiency
judgment.
The court recognized that acts and conduct of the parties after the exe-
cution of the note do not violate the parol evidence rule.' 80 The court
further acknowledged that where the holder of the note is the payee and
not a holder in due course, the payee holds the note subject to all de-
fenses available in an action on a simple contract. 181 One such defense
may be that the written contract has been modified by a later oral agree-
ment.'82 The mortgagor in this case argued that there was an oral agree-
ment with the mortgagee in which the mortgagee agreed to release the
mortgagor from liability under the note or to bid the amount of the note
at the foreclosure sale in order to lessen the amount of the deficiency.
The court concluded that a fact question existed as to whether the mort-
gagor could prove the existence of the oral argument and reversed and
remanded on this issue.183
4. Ad Valorem Tax Liens and 28 U.S.C. Section 1825(b)(2)
In Matagorda County v. Law' 84 the Fifth Circuit held that the local
taxing authorities were not permitted to foreclose on property subject to
an FDIC lien without the FDIC's consent. The taxing authorities sought
a personal judgment against the debtor for taxes and penalties, and fore-
closure of its liens without the permission of the FDIC and without pre-
serving the lien the FDIC had acquired from the insolvent lending
institution, Bay City Bank & Trust Company. The state court entered a
summary judgment against the debtor, Russell Law, in favor of the taxing
authorities for delinquent taxes, penalties and interest and decreed the
existence of a lien to secure that sum. The court, however, denied fore-
closure of that lien absent consent of the FDIC, requiring that any fore-
closure be subject to the FDIC's lien. From that ruling the taxing
178. Id. at *4 (citing Thompson v. Chrysler First Business Credit Corp., 840 S.W.2d 25,
28 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ); Carruth Mortgage Corp.v. Ford, 630 S.W.2d 897,899(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ)).
179. Id. at *5.
180. Id. at *5 (citing Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 115 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); Dameris v. Homestead Bank, 495 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973, no writ)).
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id
183. Id. at *7.
184. 19 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1994).
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authorities appealed. The Fifth Circuit rejected the appellant's argument
that their ad valorem tax lien was superior to the consensual mortgage
lien acquired by the FDIC, holding that
the priority of the relative liens [was] not the determinative question
to be addressed. 185 The court determined that "[t]he decisive ques-
tion is whether or not the court below was correct in ruling that the
appellants' ad valorem tax lien could not be foreclosed without the
permission of the FDIC, regardless of the relative priority of the
liens."186
The FDIC contended that the court should give its Tax Policy State-
ment and Accompanying Legal Memorandum deference in interpreting
12 U.S.C. section 1825(b)(2). 187 The court, as in Irving Independent
School District v. Packard Properties,188 rejected this argument and de-
clined to accord deference to the FDIC's Tax Policy Statement and Legal
Memorandum because it found that the statute at issue in that case, sec-
tion 1825(b)(3), clearly compelled an interpretation different from the
FDIC's. 189 In determining whether to give such deference to the FDIC's
Tax Policy Statement and Legal Memorandum, the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the key issue of whether or not the statute at issue, section
1825(b)(2), is ambiguous. 190 Section 1825(b)(2) provides that "[n]o prop-
erty of the Corporation shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment,
foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the Corporation... ."191 This
court concluded, as in Irving Independent School District,192 that congres-
sional intent, as codified in section 1825, is clear and unambiguous in that
there was no need for an extraneous interpretation of the FDIC's Tax
Policy Statement nor its accompanying Legal Memorandum.193 The Fifth
Circuit followed a well established federal law in Matagorda County when
it concluded that the equitable interest of the lienholder constituted
"property" as used in section 1825(b)(2).
The court also rejected the appellant's argument that 28 U.S.C. section
2410 controlled the outcome of the case.194 The court concluded that sec-
tion 1825 was a more specific and recent statute which prevailed over
section 2410, a more general older statute. 95 The Fifth Circuit also re-
jected the taxing authority's argument that this suit relied on events oc-
curring before the 1989 enactment of FIRREA, therefore making its
application retroactive. The court determined that for purposes of prohi-
bition contained in the statute, it did not matter when the lien came into
185. Id at 218.
186. Id (emphasis omitted).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
188. 970 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1992).
189. Id at 220.
190. Id
191. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2).
192. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Packard Properties, 970 F.2d 58, 63 (5th Cir. 1992).
193. Matagorda County, 19 F.3d at 220.




existence, the attempted enforcement occurred in 1991 subsequent to the
enactment. 196 This was the triggering event that is prohibited by
FIRREA.197
The taxing authorities also asserted that the district court erred in hold-
ing that 12 U.S.C. section 1825 prohibits a foreclosure of the ad valorem
tax liens without awarding the tax authority's recovery against the FDIC
for the amount of value secured by the tax lien. The taxing authority
argued, in other words, that the FDIC has effectively "taken" the prop-
erty of the taxing authority without just compensation as required by
United States Constitution. The Matagorda court noted that the
Supreme Court had identified three "particularly significant" factors in
deciding whether just compensation under the Constitution is required:
1) the economic impact of regulation on the claimant, 2) the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations, and 3) the character of the governmental action. 198 In apply-
ing these factors to determine whether compensation by the government
is required to be made, the Fifth Circuit followed the principle that as
long as some strands remain in the bundle, the fact that the taxing author-
ities suffered economic loss did not create a taking.199 The taxing author-
ity, on the other hand, asserted that "the tax lien itself is the affected
property right. '200 They argued that the FDIC's power to delay foreclo-
sure made the entire lien worthless for the periods of delay and further,
made the entire lien completely worthless when the FDIC finally gave its
consent if the accumulation of debt (interest) on the property made it
unmarketable. Thus, the ultimate question concerning the court was
whether or not a delay in allowing the taxing authority to foreclose their
lien constituted a taking. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
[w]hile the operation of § 1825 creates a delay which impairs the
ability of the Taxing Units to collect on their tax lien, mere delay-at
least the period of delay experienced to this point-does not infringe
on Appellants' total "bundle" of rights to the point of creating a
compensable taking.201
The Fifth Circuit, in Donna Independent School District v. Balli,20 2 ad-
hered to the precedent followed in Matagorda County. In Donna the
court rejected the taxing authority's argument that the FDIC's liens were
subordinate to the tax lien and thus extinguished in a tax sale. The taxing
authority also asserted that the operation of section 1825(b)(2) amounted
to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court com-
mented that this was a "closer question." The court quoted Matagorda
County, noting that "[u]nmitigated delay, coupled with diminishment of
196. Id.
197. Id. at 222-23.
198. Id. at 223 (citing Penn Cent. RTansp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
199. Id. at 224-25.
200. Id. at 224.
201. Id.
202. 21 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1994).
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distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at some point, infringe on
the entire 'bundle' of rights enjoyed by the [taxing units] to the point that
a compensable taking occurs. '20 3
The court in Donna found that "[t]he delay in Matagorda County was
27 months; the FDIC acquired its liens in August of 1990 and the judg-
ment decreeing the tax liens was entered on November 10, 1992. We
characterized that period as 'approaching' the maximum permissible
without being a taking. '' 2°4 The court determined in Donna that the de-
lay in this case was significantly longer.20 5 The FDIC acquired the First
National Bank of Weslaco lien on February 20, 1987 and the Hidalgo
County Bank & Trust lien on July 27, 1989. Judgment decreeing the tax
liens was not entered until April 1, 1993. The court further stated that
[w]e would likely find a taking herein but for a critical distinction
between the facts of this case and those of Matagorda County.
There, the adjudged value of the property was $330,660 and the out-
standing balance on the notes underlying the FDIC lien was $891,000
plus interest. "As a practical matter," we found that the taxing units
could not sell the property with the FDIC lien in place. Here, by
contrast, the value of the property is $529,578 and the outstanding
balance on the Balli notes is $196,689.73 plus interest.2°6
The court concluded that "[u]nlike Matagorda County, the survival of the
FDIC liens does not prevent a tax sale. The causal connection between
the delay and the statutory protection accorded the FDIC's liens is signif-
icantly attenuated. We perceive no taking cognizable under the fifth




The cases in this Survey period 208 indicate a continuation of the trend
noted in the last Survey209 toward a conservative application of Texas
usury laws - although in most of the cases the party asserting the exist-
ence of usury found itself in the unenviable position of attempting to
overturn fact findings made by the court or the jury at trial. To the finan-
cial institutions good news arrived regarding insufficient fund charges. A
number of cases considered the Holley2 10 elements of a usury claim, and





208. Cases covered appear in volumes 857 S.W.2d through 883 S.W.2d, 990 F.2d
through 35 F.3d, and 832 F. Supp. through 861 F. Supp. Certain cases appearing in the
covered volumes were covered in last year's Survey and are not discussed.
209. Shawna P. Johannsen, Roy C. Snodgrass III & Patrick O'Daniel, Banking, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 683, 711 (1994).
210. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1982).
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there appears to be some inclination to limit the reach of Alamo Lumber
v. Gold Co.211
a. Alamo Lumber
For over ten years, the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Alamo Lum-
ber Co. V. Gold has created significant problems to counsel structuring
multi-party borrowing arrangements. The facts in Alamo Lumber were
reasonably straightforward and exemplify the expression regarding hard
cases and bad law. Addie Gold212 signed a note for $75,000 payable to
First National Bank of Pleasanton; the proceeds went to her son, Stetson
G. (Bubba) Reed. Plaintiff defaulted on that note, and the bank insti-
tuted foreclosure proceedings on property securing payment of the note.
At this time Bubba had an unpaid open account with Alamo Lumber
Company (Alamo). Bubba proposed that Alamo purchase Mrs. Gold's
note and extend the payment date on the condition that Mrs. Gold also
assume Bubba's open account obligation. Alamo did so, and Mrs. Gold
signed a note payable to Alamo in an amount equal to Bubba's open
account debt to Alamo plus certain other fees. The Texas Supreme Court
held that a "lender who requires as a condition to making a loan, that a
borrower assume a third party's debt, as distinguished from a require-
ment that the borrower pay another one of his own debts, must include
the amount of the third party's debt in the interest computation. '213
The first reported appellate decision which purported to address the
application of Alamo Lumber to guaranties came in 1991.214 Among var-
ious defenses asserted by guarantors was the contention that the require-
ment by the lender that the guarantors guarantee existing debt of an
individual as a condition to the bank's granting to a corporation another
loan constituted a violation of the rules set forth in Alamo Lumber. The
court of appeals held that by virtue of the guarantors' guaranty of the
debt of the individual, the guarantors did not "assume or pay" the debt
and, as such, were not entitled to step into the shoes of the obligated
individual.215 As phrased by the court, "[t]he application of usury as a
defense will be permitted only where a lender requires a borrower to PAY
or ASSUME a third party's debt as a condition to making a loan ....
The guarantors "were asked to guarantee, not assume or pay" the note.217
211. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
212. Plaintiff was described in the court of appeals' opinion as "a widow living.., on a
modest fixed income." Gold v. Alamo Lumber Co., 623 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1981, writ granted).
213. Alamo Lumber, 661 S.W.2d at 928.
214. Bank of El Paso v. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., 809 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1991, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds), 847 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1992).





Two years later the Austin Court of Appeals issued its opinion in
Moore v. Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon.218 The plaintiff sued his
creditor's attorneys2 19 asserting that the law firm, as an agent of the credi-
tor, violated Texas usury law by charging usurious interest in the making
of demand and filing of suit on the creditor's behalf seeking payment of a
note executed by the plaintiff and payment of debts of another individual
which were guaranteed by the plaintiff. The court assumed that the guar-
anty of the other individual's debt was required as a condition for the
extension of the loan to the plaintiff and that the demand letter sent by
the defendant law firm constituted a charge. 220 The court held that
Alamo Lumber did not apply because the plaintiff was "only required to
guarantee the subsequent loans to" the other individual.22' Citing T.O.
Stanley as a case where the court refused to extend the application of
Alamo Lumber to a guaranty, the Moore court held that "Alamo Lumber
does not apply to the immediate situation of a guaranty of another's debt
as a condition for a loan. '222
The next step in the succession occurred during this Survey period in
Sterling Property Management, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank National
Ass'n,22 3 which involved an appeal of a summary judgment granted in
favor of the bank on borrower's usury claims. Sterling Texas Contractor,
Inc. and Metro Draperies, Inc. each executed a renewal promissory note
payable to the bank, and each guaranteed payment of the other's renewal
note. Neither company had been liable on the other's debt prior to the
date the guaranties were executed.
For purposes of the bank's motion the district court assumed that the
bank had required the cross guaranties as a condition of the loan renew-
als granted to each of the note makers. The Fifth Circuit characterized
the dispute as being in essence "whether guaranties of payment, which
unconditionally and absolutely guarantee payment, are contingent liabili-
ties under Moore. '224 The guarantors' argument was that, as guarantors
of payment, they were primarily liable for the debt "just as if they had
assumed the debt. '225 The court disagreed and held that the fact that the
guarantor of payment was a primary obligor did not mean that its liability
was not contingent.226 As such, the guarantor did not "assume" the other
218. 850 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (discussed in last year's
Survey, supra note 209, at 716).
219. Plaintiff was presumably relying on Lupo v. Equity Collection Serv., 808 S.W.2d
122 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
220. Moore, 850 S.W.2d at 293-94.
221. Id
222. Id. at 294. It is not clear that the T.0. Stanley opinion in fact stands for the propo-
sition for which it was cited, and, in any event, the facts in TO. Stanley were significantly
different from those in the Moore case in that the guarantors in the T.O. Stanley case were
not borrowers with respect to any debt.
223. 32 F.3d 964 (5th Cir. 1994).





party's debt and, therefore, could not assert a claim of usury based on
Alamo Lumber.227
Wilgus v. Green228 presented a more straightforward analysis of the is-
sues presented by Alamo Lumber. The Greens owned and operated a
marina in Louisiana. In 1979, they sold the marina to four individuals,
the Smallwoods and the Evans, for cash and a note. The note was se-
cured by a mortgage and a vendor's lien. Thereafter, the purchasers
formed Evans-Smallwood, Inc. (Corporation) to operate the marina.
Over the next few years interest was paid on the note, but no principal
payments were made. Subsequently, the Smallwoods bought the Evans'
stock in the Corporation. After default, and under threat of foreclosure,
the Smallwoods and the Corporation signed a foreclosure settlement
agreement with the Greens which provided that, in return for forbear-
ance of foreclosure, the Corporation would pay all delinquent interest,
make two payments on the note, and pay attorneys' fees. TWo years
thereafter Wilgus purchased 600,000 shares of the Corporation from the
Smallwoods.
In September 1987 Wilgus made the August 1987 payment. The
Greens' attorney requested documents showing that the Corporation had
assumed the note (beyond the two payments agreed to be made pursuant
to the forbearance agreement) originally executed by the Evans and the
Smallwoods. The letter also advised Wilgus that, unless Wilgus paid the
note or showed he had an obligation on the note, the plaintiff would not
be required to give Wilgus notice before any foreclosure. Payments were
made by the Corporation in August and September of 1987, and a partial
payment was made in October 1987. However, each payment was late,
and plaintiff sent a notice of acceleration and demand for payment in full
to Wilgus individually and the Corporation. Ultimately, the Greens sued
Wilgus and the Corporation seeking payment due on the note for the
fourteen months Wilgus apparently operated the marina. Wilgus coun-
terclaimed asserting that the plaintiff charged usurious interest by de-
manding the note be paid by Wilgus or the Corporation.
Wilgus argued that in the foreclosure settlement agreement the Greens
required the Corporation to assume a debt owed by another (i.e., the Ev-
ans and the Smallwoods), and that such assumed debt constituted usuri-
ous interest under Alamo Lumber.229 In upholding a judgment n.o.v. in
favor of plaintiff, the court noted that the difference between this case
and Alamo Lumber was that there was no other loan to which the debt
required to be assumed could constitute interest.
227. Id. at 968. Neither T.O. Stanley, Moore, nor Sterling considered whether a claim
for receipt of usurious interest would arise upon payment under a guaranty although Ster-
ling involved the entry of a judgment in favor of a creditor on such a guaranty. Addition-
ally, the court in Sterling did not consider the issue raised in last year's Survey regarding
savings clauses and the triggering of usurious interest upon the occurrence of a contin-
gency. See supra note 209, at 717.
228. 882 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App.-'lyler 1994, writ denied).
229. Id. at 7.
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To fall under the rule of Alamo Lumber, Evans-Smallwood, Inc. had
to be a borrower when required to assume the debt of a third party.
There was no evidence that Green and Evans-Smallwood, Inc. were
in a lender-borrower relationship outside the single note in question,
which Evans-Smallwood, Inc. had to assume. 230
b. NSF Charges
The last Survey discussed the court of appeals holding that there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to determine whether insufficient funds
charges (NSF Fees) were interest. During this Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take
nothing against the bank on the usury cause of action. 231 In 1983, Tony's
Tortilla Factory, Inc. (Tony's) borrowed from First Bank $380,000 repay-
able over a five-year term and also established a $60,000 revolving line of
credit. In April 1984, Tony's started experiencing financial difficulties,
and by December 1984, its two checking accounts with the bank were
overdrawn by $72,000 and $16,000, respectively. During that same pe-
riod, 2165 checks for which there were insufficient funds had been writ-
ten, and the bank had imposed NSF Fees of $20 per check, totalling
approximately $47,000.232 In December 1984, a consolidating loan for
$500,000 was made and the balance in the checking accounts became pos-
itive. In 1986, Tony's defaulted on the debt to the bank, whereupon the
bank commenced foreclosure proceedings. Tony's sued the bank, assert-
ing, inter alia, that the NSF Fees were interest and, as such, were in excess
of the amount permitted by Texas law. The trial court directed a verdict
in favor of the bank on the usury claim. The court of appeals reversed
this portion of the judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to decide whether the NSF Fees constituted interest on a
loan.
The issue as phrased by the Texas Supreme Court was "whether a
bank's fee for checks drawn on an account with insufficient funds ['NSF
fee'] constitutes usury. ' 233 The court noted that fees for additional
charges supported by distinctly separate consideration are not interest
and thus do not violate Texas usury laws.234 It was undisputed that each
NSF Fee "was assessed as a processing fee for the additional work re-
quired in connection with handling the bad check," 235 the decision to im-
pose an NSF Fee was a separate decision from the decision of whether to
honor the bad check, and the same NSF Fee was charged to all customers
in any circumstance and had no relation to the amount of the check. The
230. Id at 8 (citation omitted). This is a variation of the point made at supra note 222 -
the guarantors in T.O. Stanley were not borrowers under any note.
231. First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1994).
232. The opinion does not explain the calculation of the fees.
233. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 877 S.W.2d at 285.
234. Id. at 287 (citing Texas Commerce Bank v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1984);
Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976); and Greever
v. Persky, 165 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1942)).
235. Id. at 287-88.
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court held there was separate consideration (an implied promise to repay
the advance) for the advance of the funds to cover the checks.236 The
NSF Fee was for separate consideration and as a matter of law did not
constitute interest.237
c. Elements of a Usury Claim
As established in Holley v. Watts238 the elements of a usury claim are
"(1) a loan of money; (2) an absolute obligation that the principal be
repaid; and (3) the exaction of a greater compensation than allowed by
law for the use of the money by the borrower. '239
In Catalina v. BlasdeP40 the Texas Supreme Court considered a floor
plan arrangement under which either Catalina or Blasdel could purchase
used cars for Blasdel's inventory. A car would be paid for by the typical
envelope draft containing the automobile title by which Catalina would
hold the title to cars so purchased. Floor plan fees of $60 per vehicle (for
vehicles costing less than $500) or ten percent of the purchase price (for
vehicles costing more than $500) were imposed. If a vehicle was not sold
within thirty days, a second floor plan fee calculated as described was
payable; and if a vehicle was not sold after sixty days, Blasdel paid one-
half of the principal plus a third fee. The full amount of the purchase
price was payable only if the vehicle was sold, lost, or stolen. The trial
court found in Catalina's favor. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and upheld the trial court's finding that the agreement
was not a usurious transaction.241 Where usury is not apparent from the
face of a contract, the issue of usury is a question of fact,242 and in light of
the findings of the trial court, Blasdel could not prevail if there was any
evidence inconsistent or contrary to the factual contention that the trans-
action was in fact a loan disguised as a device to evade the usury laws.243
The court stated that in Holley v. Watts,244 an absolute obligation to repay
was recognized as an essential element of "the usury provision there at
issue" but disclaimed reaching the issue of whether the legislature may or
236. Id. at 288.
237. Id.
238. 629 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1982).
239. Id. at 696.
240. 881 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1994).
241. Id. at 296.
242. Id. (citing Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942)).
243. Id. at 296-97. The court found that there was evidence to support the finding that
repayment of amounts advanced to purchase the automobiles was contingent. The court
noted that one factor considered by the courts in determining the existence of usury is
whether repayment of a debt is based on a contingency. Id. Since there was evidence to
support such a finding, there was no usury. This can be compared to the opinion in
Najarro v. SASI Int'l, Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002, 1010 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048
(1991) where the Fifth Circuit characterized "more recent Texas cases" as adopting a rule
that if there is any contingency by which a lender might receive usurious interest the note is
usurious.
244. 629 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1982).
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has provided for usury penalties under "other statutory provisions which
do not require an absolute obligation to repay. '245
Bexar County Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Swenson's Ice Cream Co. 246 in-
volved a suit by a franchisor and two of its subsidiaries (collectively,
"Swenson's") against a franchisee and two guarantors of the franchisee's
obligation to the franchisor (collectively, "BCIC"). BCIC alleged that
late payment fees of fifteen percent per annum provided under the
franchise agreement constituted usurious interest. A full month's late
charge at such rate was imposed if a royalty which was required to be
paid by the 15th day of a month was not paid by the 21st day of the
month. Citing cases involving late charges on lease payments and condo-
minium assessments, 247 the court held that the obligation to pay the
franchise fees did not constitute a loan of money but rather was consider-
ation for the purchase and use of a license.248 Thus, the first of the Holley
v. Watts elements249 was not satisfied. Additionally, there is no usury if
repayment of principal depends on a contingency.250 Since the payment
of the "principal" depended on a contingency and there was no lending or
credit transaction, there was no usury.251
In Ravkind v. Mortgage Funding Corp.252 the court considered a claim
brought by an attorney that a transaction structured as a sale of note
payments was in fact a loan of money. In 1978, Ravkind purchased land
on a thirty-year note which provided for a monthly payment of $770.56.
In 1980, he entered into a contract for deed under which the purchaser
agreed to make 240 monthly payments of $2,390.10 to Ravkind, who in
turn agreed to use $770.56 to make the monthly payments on the underly-
ing note. The contract for deed was nonrecourse to the "purchaser. '253
In 1986, Ravkind signed two documents in a transaction with Mortgage
Funding Corporation (MFC). MFC paid Ravkind $58,000 for the right to
receive the next sixty monthly payments due under the contract for deed
net of the payment Ravkind was to make on the underlying note. Ap-
245. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297 n.3. In its footnote, the court said that such an abso-
lute obligation was recognized as a "statutory element" under the usury provision there at
issue.
246. 859 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied).
247. Maloney v. Andrews, 483 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Potomac Leasing Co. v. Housing Auth. v. City of El Paso, 742 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied); Tygrett v. University Gardens Homeowners Ass'n, 687
S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Apparel Mfg. Co. v. Vantage
Prop., Inc., 590 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
248. Swenson's, 859 S.W.2d at 406.
249. There must be a loan of money. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982).
250. Swenson's, 859 S.W.2d at 407 (citing Pansy Oil Co. v. Federal Oil Co., 91 S.W.2d
453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd). But see Najarro v. SASI Int'l. Ltd., 904
F.2d 1002, 1010 (5th Cir. 1990).
251. Id at 407. "Interest" is defined in Chapter 1 of the Texas Credit Code as "the
compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money..." TEx.
REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1987). The 7Tgrett opinion holds that in
order for there to be a "detention," there must be a lending transaction between the par-
ties. Tygrett, 687 S.W.2d at 483.
252. 881 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
253. Id. at 204.
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proximately one year later, MFC sold forty-eight of the net payments to
Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation (Chrysler) for $60,386.
In 1987, the purchasers ceased making payments under the contract for
deed. Ravkind did not advise MFC of such default but continued to re-
mit the net amount which otherwise would have been owing. In 1989,
Ravkind made a prepayment in full to MFC and Chrysler. In 1990,
Ravkind sued MFC and Chrysler and alleged that the transaction was in
reality a $58,000 second mortgage loan to be repaid in sixty monthly in-
stallments of $1,619.54 each, with a fifteen percent prepayment pen-
alty.25 4 The allegations were that the interest paid was equivalent to a
rate of 20.25% per annum, which was in excess of the lawful ceiling in
effect at that time, and the fifteen percent prepayment charge was prohib-
ited by law. 255 Ravkind did not deny the execution or validity of the doc-
uments nor contend the documents failed to describe accurately the true
nature of the transaction or were a sham or subterfuge to avoid or evade
the usury laws.2 56 Instead, Ravkind asserted that the purchase agreement
on its face evidenced a loan; apparently he relied primarily on a "full
recourse" provision if certain payment obligations were not met and on
certain references to MFC and Chrysler as "second mortgagees." The
court held that the sale of a note at a discount does not constitute a
loan.2 57 The documents expressly and unambiguously showed that the
transaction was an assignment of rights to receive note payments
purchased at a discount, and that there was only a contingent obligation
by Ravkind to repay sums. Accordingly, Ravkind's usury claim fell short
since two of the three Holley elements could not be satisfied.
James v. Frame258 (Frame II) was the third chapter regarding a compli-
cated fraud scheme which ultimately demonstrated the vagaries of Texas
usury law. The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's imposition of
usury penalties against payees who were found to have been defrauded
by the maker of the notes involved. The Fifth Circuit had previously held
in Frame v. S-H, Inc. (Frame 1)259 that the transactions at issue were
structured identically to those which the court had held to be usurious in
Najarro v. SASI International, Ltd.2 60
In Frame I, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's entry of a judg-
ment against the note maker based on various abuses of the discovery
process but reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the is-
sue of damages. The claims involved were attempts by investors to re-
254. Apparently, the assignment agreement provided a fifteen percent prepayment
penalty in the event the sums under the note were paid in advance of the scheduled due
date.
255. The basis on which the prepayment penalty was allegedly prohibited was not speci-
fied by the court.
256. Ravkind, 881 S.W.2d at 206.
257. I (citing Redman Indus. v. Couch, 613 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
258. 6 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 1993).
259. 967 F.2d 194, 204 (5th Cir. 1992).
260. 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991).
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cover money they had allegedly advanced to defendant Frame in
connection with a scheme by Frame to defraud them. The investor would
advance funds to a Frame-controlled entity to be used for the purpose of
purchasing European gray-market perfume for import and sale in the
United States.261 The investor would transfer funds to a Frame entity.
Frame would acknowledge receipt of the funds by letter in which she
agreed to return the capital in six weeks, plus a sum equal to approxi-
mately three percent of the capital contribution. The sum was called a
commission. At the same time Frame provided the letter, she also pro-
vided a promissory note in the amount of the "capital contribution." The
note was due in six weeks and did not provide for any interest.262
The identical structure (involving some of the same defendants) had
previously been held usurious as a matter of law.263 The Najarro court
had held that even if payee's argument that the advance was intended to
be an investment rather than a loan were true, nevertheless the substance
of the transaction was a loan because there was an absolute obligation to
repay the principal.264 The Najarro plaintiffs/payees, citing Pansy Oil Co.
v. Federal Oil Co.,265 contended that because the commission payments
were contingent on there being a profit from the enterprise, such profit
should not constitute interest. The court noted that more recent Texas
cases seem to have adopted a contrary view and that more recent pro-
nouncements by the Texas Supreme Court seem to favor the view that a
contract is usurious as a matter of law if there is any contingency under
which a lender can receive more than the maximum rate permitted. 266
The Najarro court distinguished Pansy Oi 267 as well as other Texas cases
on the basis that in such cases the amount to be paid for the use of the
money was entirely uncertain, whereas, in the case presented to the Fifth
Circuit, there was a twenty-five percent return agreed to in the con-
tract.268 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the defendant
maker of the note should be estopped to assert usury because defendant
solicited the money and structured the transaction.269
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in its Frame I opinion directed the district
court to take into account the Najarro decision; it noted that the amount
which the payees could recover would be reduced by appropriate usury
penalties.270 Following remand, the district court applied the usury pen-
alties although the district court judge apparently felt that it was inappro-
261. Frame, 967 F.2d at 197.
262. Id.
263. Najarro v. SASI Int'l, Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1048 (1991).
264. Id. at 1007 (citing Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ); Maxwell v. Estate of Bankston, 433 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no
writ)).
265. 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd).
266. Najarro, 904 F.2d at 1010.
267. Pansy Oil, 91 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref 'd).
268. Najarro, 904 F.2d at 1010.
269. Id
270. Frame, 967 F.2d at 204.
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priate to apply usury penalties because "usury is not a valid counterclaim
when one sues on a note that is void by reason of common law fraud."271
The reason the district court apparently made such observation is not
clear; from the two Fifth Circuit opinions in this matter, it appears that
the fraud was committed by the maker of the note, not the payee, and
there does not appear to be any holding that the maker's liability on a
note executed by it should somehow be reduced by reason of its own
fraud.
d. Other Significant Usury Cases
The Survey period presented more "charging" cases. Thus, in People's
State Bank of Clyde v. Andrews, 272 the bank sent Andrews a demand let-
ter on a note which Andrews had not executed but which the bank al-
leged he had assumed. The bank then sued Andrews as well as the
original makers of the note. Andrews contended that the bank's demand
on and suit against him constituted the charging of usury. At trial, the
court instructed a verdict in Andrews' favor on the issue of his assump-
tion of the debt. The trial court also entered judgment that the bank had
charged Andrews interest in excess of the lawful amount and awarded
penalties of approximately $160,000.273
The court also entered judgment in favor of the bank against the origi-
nal makers. By the time of the appeal, the original makers had satisfied
the judgment. Since the debt had been paid in full, the court of appeals
held that the bank's appeal of the instructed verdict as to Andrews' liabil-
ity was moot. With respect to the usury claim, the court held that merely
sending a demand letter to a party cannot make a party an obligor on a
note.274 Since Andrews both maintained he was not, and had been found
not to be, liable on the note, as a stranger to the note he was not entitled
to an award of usury penalties. 275
The most creative charging allegation appeared in Pearcy Marine, Inc.
v. Acadian Offshore Services.276 Pearcy Marine, Inc. (Pearcy) sold a ves-
sel to Acadian Offshore Services, Inc. (Acadian). As part of the transac-
tion, Acadian delivered a $450,000 promissory note to Pearcy under
which no payments were due for approximately two years. Slightly over
one year after the execution and delivery of the note, Pearcy asked Aca-
dian to make an early payment on the note. Acadian agreed pursuant to
a letter agreement under which Acadian agreed to make a $75,000 pre-
payment on the promissory note in exchange for Pearcy's agreement to
271. James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1993).
272. 881 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, n.w.h.).
273. Id. at 521.
274. Id. at 522.
275. Id. See also O'Quinn v. Beanland, 540 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1976, no writ) (where the court declined to allow a party who avoided an obligation under
a note based on mental incompetency to assert a claim based on usury arising out of the
note); In re T.E. Mercer Rucking Co., 16 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that a
void debt could not be the subject of a usury claim).
276. 832 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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excuse any interest on the note from April 1, 1991, through February 22,
1992.277 Additionally, Pearcy agreed to "promptly and fairly resolve" all
sums owed under charters for two other vessels, either by immediate pay-
ment or by offset against the note. The sums so owed apparently totalled
approximately $400,000.
Pearcy contended the $75,000 payment by Acadian prior to the date it
was due in fact constituted a loan by Acadian to Pearcy, the $400,000
charges Pearcy agreed to resolve constituted interest on the $75,000 loan,
and the interest forgiven also constituted interest on the note.278 Pearcy
was required to prove that it received a loan of principal which Pearcy
had an absolute obligation to repay.279 There was no evidence from
which a conclusion to that effect could be drawn. As described by the
court, "Acadian no more became Pearcy's creditor than a homeowner
becomes the creditor of his bank when he pays off his mortgage early. '280
With respect to the $400,000 sum, the court analogized any advantages to
Acadian as legitimate charges for Acadian's right to relinquish its right
not to make an early payment.281 Even if the $75,000 advance payment
were a loan, the interest forgiven did not constitute interest on the
"loan;" it was simply a renegotiation of the original terms.282
With respect to the effect of the acceptance of the disputed $400,000
charges, should the $75,000 payment be treated as a loan, the court found
that if Pearcy were not obligated to pay the costs prior to the letter agree-
ment, the letter agreement itself did not impose such an obligation. If
Pearcy did owe these charges, then an agreement to pay the charges
could not constitute charging interest.28 3 The court concluded that Texas
courts would not so strictly construe the term "undisputed" as to make a
lender liable for insisting that a borrower pay debts which the lender in
good faith believes the borrower to be liable for as a condition of entering
into some other obligation; rather, the transaction should be viewed as
one akin to a settlement which is subject to speculative value.284
In D&S Kingsway Ventures v. Texas Capital Bank - Richmond285 the
bank sued the appellants to recover on a past due note. The debtor as-
serted usury. The first contention was that the bank's first amended peti-
tion constituted a charge of usurious interest because it did not reflect a
credit for sums received at a foreclosure sale. Appellants also contended
277. Pearcy estimated the interest it would have received but forgave was between
$17,000 and $20,000. Id. at 194.
278. Id. at 195, 197.
279. Id. at 196 (citing Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1982); Najarro v. SASI
Int'l, Ltd., 904 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 197 (characterizing such "charge" as the complement to a prepayment
penalty).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 198 (citing In re Casbeer, 793 F.2d 1436, 1446 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[t]here is no
usury when a borrower agrees to pay his undisputed prior obligations to the lender, as part
of the consideration for a new loan..
284. Id.
285. 882 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
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that the bank "received" usurious interest when it received foreclosure
sale proceeds but failed to credit them to the note. The court found both
claims without merit.286
As to the first amended petition, the court cited Carpet Services287 to
hold that the pleading did not constitute a charge. 288 The appellants then
contended that Second Amended Petition was an admission that the
bank received usurious interest and asserted that testimony in the record
showed that foreclosure sale proceeds were not applied to reduce note
principal. The court noted that no citations to the record were included,
and that in fact there was evidence to the contrary. The court found there
to be sufficient evidence to support the adverse finding on appellant's
usury claim.289
In Miller v. University Savings Ass'n 290 appellant Miller signed a guar-
anty in favor of University Savings Association (University) in conjunc-
tion with a loan by University to another entity (Borrower). Following
default by the Borrower on the loan, the creditor accelerated the note
and made demand on the guarantor to make the payment required under
the guaranty. The usury contention was that by seeking the entry of a
judgment charging Miller interest at the rate provided in the note guaran-
teed, when in fact he was only liable for interest at the legal rate of six
percent per annum, appellee charged usurious interest.
With respect to the specification of an interest rate, the court held that
the guaranty agreement incorporated the terms of the note, and that the
note itself provided for interest at the maximum lawful rate.291 Addition-
ally, the court noted that the guarantor's liability was limited to ten per-
cent of the principal and interest on the note and ten percent of the
attorneys' fees. 292
Another case decided during the Survey period which considered
whether a contract specified a rate of interest was Ocean Transport, Inc.
v. Greycas, Inc. ,293 which involved a counterclaim for usury by guarantors
who were sued by a lender for payment under their guaranties. 294 The
promissory note at issue in Greycas provided for payments in an amount
equal to a factor multiplied by the face amount of the promissory note,
the first installment being due on the date of the note and the subsequent
286. Id. at 575.
287. George A. Fuller Co. of Texas v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1992).
288. D&S Kingsway, 882 S.W.2d at 575. Apparently, appellants contended the First
Amended Petition constituted a charge because that pleading had been replaced by a Sec-
ond Amended Petition.
289. Id at 575.
290. 858 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
291. Id. at 36.
292. Id. at 37.
293. 878 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
294. The court did not address the standing of the guarantors to assert such a usury
claim. See Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 701 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, Griffin v. First Gibraltar Bank FSB, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992); Houston Sash and Door
Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
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179 installments being due on the same day of each month thereafter. 295
The jury found that the parties did agree to a calculable rate of interest.
Although the appellant and one other witness testified that the interest
rate could not be calculated because the first payment was due on the
date of execution and, therefore, was a loan for zero days, at least four
witnesses called by Greycas testified that they could so calculate the in-
terest rate.296 The court of appeals held that the trial court must neces-
sarily have determined the note to be ambiguous and therefore, the jury
was required to resolve the ambiguity. The court then found that there
was evidence to support the jury's finding.297
The appellants also argued that the past due rate of interest specified in
the note which was equal to the lesser of the maximum legal rate or five
percent in excess of Citibank's prime rate was incalculable as a matter of
law and, therefore, limited to six percent per annum. The court found
both to be specified rates which were agreed upon and referred to a
source which could be made certain by proof. There was testimony by a
witness as to what the overdue rate was, and the court held that such
overdue rate was not incalculable as a matter of law.298
Another attorney besides Ravkind 299 did not fare well in his attempt to
assert a usury claim.300 Although the precise nature of the usury claim
cannot be determined from the facts provided in the opinion, the court
held that a suit alleging that a note provided for usurious interest which
was brought five and one-half years after the first interest payment was
barred by the statute of limitations. 301 It cannot be determined from the
opinion whether the only usury claim asserted related to the first
payment.
The court declined to give a debtor two bites at a usury apple in El
Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Berryman3°2. Berryman sued El Paso Natural
Gas (El Paso) and El Paso Development Company (Development) for
usury in connection with a sale to him by Development. He asserted at
trial that El Paso was liable as the alter ego of Development and received
a directed verdict from the trial court on that issue. Berryman sought
only two times the usurious interest, and judgment to that effect was en-
tered. The court of appeals affirmed this part of the judgment but re-
versed and remanded as to the alter ego issue. After remand,
Development and Berryman settled, and the parties stipulated that this
satisfied in full Development's liability. Thereafter, Berryman filed new
pleadings against El Paso seeking additional usury penalties to which it
295. Greycas, 878 S.W.2d at 264.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 1d at 265.
299. Ravkind v. Mortgage Funding Corp., 881 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.). See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
300. Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1993, writ denied).
301. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987).
302. 858 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1993).
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otherwise would have been entitled had it sought them in the first suit.
The court held that El Paso's liability, if any, was at best only derivative
of Development's liability, and that by discharging Development's liabil-
ity, Berryman had no further claim against El Paso.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals 30 3 held that a lender did not vio-
late Chapter 3 of the Credit Code 3°4 in imposing a late charge calculated
as a percentage of the full monthly payment when only a portion was late.
The court found the lender's provision consistent with the Credit
Code.305 The court did not reach the question of the legality of the
lender's practice of "pyramiding" late charges - applying payments first
to unpaid late charges and the balance to the scheduled payment, the
effect of which was to make the debtor "perpetually in default on their
loan payments. '' 3°6 The trial court had found such practice not to violate
the Credit Code. The debtor had the burden of proof; the debtor did not
establish illegality as a matter of law; and there was not a sufficient basis
to overturn the trial court's fact findings.
Finally, both the Texas Supreme Court307 and the Fifth Circuit 30 8 held
that Article XVI, section 11 of the Texas Constitution applies only to
lending and credit transactions and does not apply to an award of pre-
judgment interest by a court.
2. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A. 30 9 the court was asked to de-
termine the propriety of the district court's judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on claims arising from the alleged breach of an oral loan agree-
ment. McMillan asserted breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded McMillan $2,658,778 on its
breach of contract claim and $1,800,000 on its bad faith claim. The jury
also awarded the bank $4,500,000 on its counterclaims, which sum repre-
sented the outstanding balance on its loan. On appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended, among other things, that the judgment n.o.v. was improper. The
court, however, did not undertake this inquiry because it concluded that
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine barred the plaintiff's claims arising from
the alleged breach of oral agreement as a matter of law. 310 The court
further noted that "the FDIC-Receiver, as it is urging the affirmance of a
favorable judgment that it inherited as an asset when it became receiver
of Mbank, may raise the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine as a defense for the
303. Allied Finance Co. v. Rodriguez, 869 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,
no writ).
304. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.01, et seq. (Vernon 1987).
305. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.15(5) (Vernon 1987).
306. Rodriguez, 869 S.W.2d at 573.
307. Sage Street Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1993).
308. Axelson, Inc. v. McEvoy-Willis, 7 F.3d 1230 (5th Cir. 1993).
309. 4 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 1993).
310. Id. at 368; cf Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing jury




first time on appeal."'311 Relying on D'Oench, Duhme and Beighley v.
FDIC,312 the court concluded, "[s]imply put, transactions not reflected on
the bank's books do not appear on the judicial radar screen either. '313
The plaintiff further alleged that D'Oench, Duhme did not bar their
claims because they did not lend themselves to a scheme or arrangement
whereby banking authorities would likely be misled. The court, however,
disagreed and held that the mere act of failing to properly record an oral
loan agreement satisfied D'Oench, Duhme's requirement that a borrower
engage in a misleading arrangement. 314
For guidance on how to avoid the imposition of, and liability for,
breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing, lenders should review
the facts in FDIC v. Perry Brothers, Inc.31 5 In Perry Brothers the court
recognized that
[w]hile the relationship between debtor and creditor alone does not
lend itself to a general imposition of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, Texas courts nonetheless recognize that a duty of good faith
and fair dealing may arise: (a) by agreement; (b) in particular cir-
cumstances, between the parties as a result of a long-standing, spe-
cial relationship of trust and confidence between them (although
mere subjective intent alone cannot so create the duty of good faith
and fair dealing); and (c) may arise when an imbalance of bargaining
power exists-at least when the defendant is responsible for the
imbalance.316
The court found that all three situations existed in Perry Brothers.31 7
Perry Brothers involved a variety store chain based in Lufkin, Texas,
which had a long-standing relationship with NationsBank of Texas, N.A.
In 1988 NCNB, predecessor to NationsBank of Texas, N.A., orally prom-
ised to renew at maturity, Perry Brothers' line of credit on the same
terms as those in the 1988 loan. When the loan matured in July, 1989,
however, NationsBank refused to renew the line of credit on the earlier
terms. Perry Brothers argued that because it had relied upon the lender's
earlier assurances to renew and further, because the lender had actively
discouraged Perry Brothers from pursuing alternative financing, it was
forced, under economic duress, to execute the 1989 loan documents on
terms different from those in the 1988 loan documents. The court agreed
with Perry Brothers and determined that the bank's actions "reflected
conscious, callous disregard for Perry Brothers' rights, interests and legiti-
mate expectations" and thus, constituted a breach of contract. 318 CoM-
311. McMillan, 4 F.3d at 368.
312. 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
313. McMillan, 4 F.3d at 368 (citing Bowen, 915 F.2d at 1015-16).
314. Id. at 369. The court noted that "[clontrary to the plaintiff's suggestion, the FDIC-
Receiver's knowledge of the alleged oral loan agreement is irrelevant under D'Oench,
Duhme."
315. 854 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
316. d. at 1259.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1256.
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paring Perry Brothers with Security Bank v. Dalton319 the court, while
recognizing that the general relationship between a borrower and its
lender does not by itself give rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing,
did nonetheless recognize that such an extraordinary relationship may
arise in unusual cases, and found that Perry Brothers was such an unusual
case.
320
In finding that an extraordinary relationship existed between Perry
Brothers and NationsBank, the court observed that NationsBank had ex-
pressly agreed to continue the special relationship developed between
Perry Brothers and its predecessor, First Republic Bank-Lufkin. Further-
more, because Perry Brothers relied upon NationsBank's promises, an
imbalance of bargaining power existed which the court found had been
exploited by the bank. The court concluded that because NationsBank
had promised to assume the role of its predecessor failed bank, the par-
ties had "an extraordinary banking relationship-one clearly marked by
the parties' shared trust.' '321 Of significance to the court's analysis was
the bank's knowledge that Perry Brothers had commenced a multi-year
restructuring of its operations and was extremely vulnerable until such
restructuring was completed. The bank's record consistently provided
that the 1989 line of credit was essential to Perry Brothers accomplishing
its restructure and staying in business.
The court found that NationsBank had a "hidden agenda" in its deal-
ings with Perry Brothers. The court found that the bank's dishonesty was
further evidenced by its affirmative assurances to Perry Brothers that the
bank would not set off the company's checking accounts while the parties
were engaged in workout negotiations, when in fact, at the same time the
bank was busy monitoring Perry Brothers' cash accounts and developing
a plan to set off so as to maximize its collections before year end. The
court concluded that NCNB's efforts to maximize its collections were
driven by "a yet-heightened, self interested quest to maximize its com-
pensation under a new, non-public agreement with the FDIC in July 1990;
and in particular by bank officers' desires to collect up to one third (1/3)
of their annual salaries in bonuses from the bank for accomplishing par-
ticularly large quantities of collections. '322 Based upon these facts, the
court concluded that Perry Brothers established its duty of good faith and
fair dealing claim.
319. 803 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied) ("The [Texas
Supreme] Court has consistently held.., that a duty of good faith is not imposed in every
contract, but [rather,] only in special relationships marked by shared trust or an imbalance
in bargaining power.") (emphasis added). Id
320. Id.; cf FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990).





In NCNB Texas National Bank v. Johnson323 the Fifth Circuit ruled
that state law fraud was barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. In
Johnson a development corporation borrowed $500,000 from a bank and
one of the shareholders signed a guaranty which covered the $500,000
note. This guaranty also contained a dragnet clause covering all other
indebtedness "of any kind or character" of the corporation to the bank.
The guaranty stated that it was to be "continuing, absolute, uncondi-
tional, and unlimited as to all indebtedness guaranteed. '324 Two other
shareholders had executed guaranties of $1.8 million and all three share-
holders had signed guaranties of a $700,000 note. When the development
corporation filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, suit was brought to enforce the
guaranties. The counterclaimant-appellant alleged, among other things,
that Sam Houston Bank misrepresented that the notes guaranteed by the
appellant would not be modified without his consent. However, the court
found that the appellant's guaranty plainly waived all rights to "notice of
extensions, renewals or rearrangements of [d]ebt, [notice] of release or
substitution of collateral.., and every other notice of every kind." 325 On
the face of the agreements, the specific terms of the guaranty controlled
and no representation to the contrary was recorded. The court noted that
there was nothing in the guaranty to indicate that it was limited to a sin-
gle transaction. Therefore, the court ruled that the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine barred the appellant's fraud claim.32 6
4. Tying Act/Violations of Bank Holding Company Act
NCNB v. Johnson also involved the issue of whether Sam Houston
Bank had violated the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. 32 7 The district court found that this counterclaim also was
barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.328 The court noted that in or-
der to prevail under the Bank Holding Company Act, Anderson must
show (1) that the banking practice in question was unusual in the banking
industry; (2) an anti-competitive tying arrangement existed; and (3) that
Sam Houston Bank benefitted from the practice. 329 The court noted that
in order to survive summary judgment, the guarantor must present evi-
dence sufficient to create a fact issue regarding whether the conditions
323. 11 F.3d 1260, 1269 (5th Cir. 1994).
324. Id. at 1263.
325. Id. at 1266.
326. Id. at 1269.
327. 11 F.3d 1260, at 1267; see also Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(c)
(1988).
328. The common law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is designed to protect the FDIC's
interest in assets it acquires as a receiver for failed banks. See Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1267
(citing Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1989)). Specifically, the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine bars defenses and claims by borrowers based on unrecorded agreements
with the failed bank. See Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1267 (citations omitted).
329. Id at 1268 (citing Bieber v. State Bank of Terry, 928 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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placed on the loan were unusual in the banking industry.330 The court
determined that the language of the note on which the guarantor relied
was facially neutral and would not have put the FDIC on notice that Sam
Houston Bank engaged in illegal tying.331 The court determined that
proof of tying would require evidence of terms or agreements outside of
the face of the document at issue. Thus, Anderson's tying claim was
barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.332
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. DLG Financial
Corp.3 3 3 involved a corporation, DLG Financial Corp. (DLG), engaged
in the business of buying discounted promissory notes and reselling them
for profit. In 1990, DLG entered into a letter agreement to purchase two
promissory notes from NCNB Texas National Bank, N.A. which was act-
ing on behalf of the FDIC. The two notes were executed by International
Bancorporation, Inc. and were secured by a pledge of all of the outstand-
ing common stock of International Bank, N.A. Pursuant to the security
agreement, if the notes fell into default, the noteholder had the right to
exercise all of the voting rights and corporate powers concerning the
pledged stock without having to foreclose the note.334 At the time the
notes were transferred to DLG, they were already in default. Shortly
thereafter, DLG was informed that its purchase of the notes and concom-
itant acquisition of the voting rights of the bank stock violated the Bank
Holding Company Act335 which generally prohibits an entity from be-
coming a bank holding company without obtaining prior approval from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. On appeal, the
court noted that by the express terms of the security agreement, the note-
holder could exercise all voting rights of the pledged stock upon default
under the notes. Since DLG obtained the notes already in default, DLG
immediately acquired the power to vote the stock and, therefore, ipso
facto, became a bank holding company under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act.336
DLG argued that even if it were a bank holding company, it was not
required to obtain Board approval because DLG previously contracted
for control of the bank stock in good faith, an exception to the require-
ment that approval be given by the Board. The court noted that the ap-
proval exception pertained to ownership or control of bank shares
acquired and securing a debt previously contracted for in good faith.337
When DLG purchased the notes, they were already in default giving




333. 29 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1994).
334. 1d at 996.
335. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
336. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d at 1003-04. A company becomes a bank holding com-
pany if, inter alia. it has the power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting security of a
bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
337. Id. at 1004 (emphasis the court's).
[Vol. 48
BANKING LAW
not one DLG had previously contracted for in good faith and the ap-
proval exception did not apply. 338 In making its decision, the court relied
on the interpretations of the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) with respect to an analogous exception under the
Change in Bank Control Act of 1978.339 In one such interpretation, the
OCC noted that in order for the good faith element of the exception to
be satisfied, "a lender must either make or acquire the loan secured by
bank stock in advance of any known default. '340
5. Conversion
In holding that sufficient evidence existed to find that a bank converted
the account of a depositor held for the benefit of third parties, the Texas
Court of Appeals in Mauriceville National Bank v. ZerniaP41 conducted
an evidentiary review of the following five considerations in order to de-
termine that an award of punitive damages was correct: (1) the nature of
the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved; (3) the degree of
culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and sensibilities of the par-
ties concerned; and (5) the extent to which such conduct offends the pub-
ic sense of justice and propriety.342 The court followed the standard
outlined in Alamo National Bank v. Kraus34 3 and developed in Transpor-
tation Insurance Co. v. Moriel.344 The court held that the bank knew or
should have known that funds in the particular account were for the ben-
efit of third parties, and that the bank had specific knowledge of the trust
nature of the account when it improperly "Razooed" 5 the balance of the
account. The court described the term "Razoo" as a "real" word mean-
ing "with influence of razzle-dazzle."'346 In the words of the court,
" 'Razoo' was also used colloquially, meaning, 'grab all you can, as quick
as you can.' ,,347 The court, considering the nature of the wrong, found
that there was a conversion. The court further considered the character
of the conduct involved and found that the bank knew that the third party
subcontractors had rights to the funds in the account. The court also con-
cluded that despite specific notice, the bank converted the funds and dis-
regarded the rights of the subcontractors. And, after applying the
evidence to the factors outlined in Kraus, the Zernial court held that
there was sufficient evidence to show that the bank wantonly disregarded
338. Id.
339. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3683 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
340. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d at 1004 (citing OCC Inter. Ltr. No. 451).
341. 880 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ granted), rev'd, 1995 WL 64162
(Tex. Feb. 16, 1995).
342. Id. at 289.
343. 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
344. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
345. Zemial, 880 S.W.2d at 291 n.1.




the rights of others.348 Therefore, the court concluded that the $200,000
punitive damage award was not legally excessive.
In Zernial, the jury affirmatively found that the conversion of funds
was done willfully, maliciously or with gross negligence. "Exemplary
damages have long been recoverable for conversion accompanied by
fraud or oppression, or by willfulness and malice."'349 The Zernial court
upheld the findings by the jury while exercising caution in light of the
recent Texas Supreme Court decision requiring appellate courts not only
to apply the guiding factors set forth in Kraus, but to definitively articu-
late an application of the evidence to the factors.350 Quoting Ellis County
State Bank v. Keever351 the court agreed that Moriel "should be applied
to a pending case in which a party has preserved the complaint that the
court of appeals failed to properly scrutinize a punitive damage
award. '352 The court concluded that in situations where punitive dam-
ages have been awarded, "the new focus for reviewing courts is upon in-
suring that such awards, 'are not grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensa-
tory damages.' ,,353
In a suit brought by a corporation, its shareholder and other businesses
against a bank for forcible entry, conversion and wrongful foreclosure, a
Texas court denied a bank's motion for summary judgment in Lighthouse
Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank.354 The bank contended that it was
entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law because the appellants
had no standing to sue because the only contractual relationship was be-
tween the bank and a defunct corporation. While the court held that the
bank was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, it also
concluded that, relying upon TEX. TAX CODE ANN. section 171.252(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1994), the corporation did not have standing to sue.355 In
addressing the attack on the repossession of the real property, the court
disagreed with the bank and concluded that the deed from the bank to
the appellant was not void for lack of a grantee. The court further noted
that even if the deed was void, that fact did not entitle the bank to forci-
bly enter the property.356 The court also concluded that the deed of trust
and security agreement did not sanction the bank's actions. The court
found that the security agreement allowed repossession of the personal
property only and that the deed of trust expressly stated that the bank's
remedy for non-vacation of the property was a lawsuit. The court af-
firmed that Texas law does not recognize "self-help repossession" of real
348. Id. at 291-92.
349. Id. at 289 (citations omitted).
350. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
351. 888 S.W.2d 790, 799 (1994).
352. Zernial, 880 S.W.2d at 292.
353. Id. (citing Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 28).
354. 889 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, writ requested).
355. Id. at 600 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 36.25 (Vernon 1987); TEX. TAX
CODE Arm. § 171.252(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
356. Id. at 601.
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estate.357 Therefore, because of the express language of the deed of trust
and security agreement, the court denied the bank's motion for summary
judgment.
In another conversion case, the bank fared better than in Zernial and in
Lighthouse. In Crutcher v. Continental National Bank,358 the court re-
fused to find the bank liable for conversion. The court found that the
mere taking and recording of a security interest in personal property
without exercising ownership or control over property other than the fil-
ing of a security interest cannot constitute conversion. Since the former
bank customers did not have ownership, possession, or the right to imme-
diate possession of the property covered by the unrecorded liens, the for-
mer customers could not maintain an action against the bank for
conversion.
6. Lender Liability Under the Farm Credit Act
Grant v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas359 involved the question of
whether the Farm Credit Act of 1971 and its amendment, the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987, provide a private cause of action.36° In 1983, Thomas
A. Grant, III and two other individuals purchased 37,000 acres of land in
Louisiana for about $36 million. Grant borrowed approximately half of
the purchase price from the Federal Land Bank of Jackson (FLBJ). In
exchange, Grant gave FLBJ a mortgage on 15,000 acres to secure the
debt. After a few years, Grant fell behind in mortgage payments and to
avoid foreclosure, Grant filed a lawsuit in 1986 against FLBJ and others
in which he asserted various lender liability claims.
In May of 1988, the Farm Credit Administration appointed REW En-
terprises (REW) as the receiver for FLBJ. In 1990, the district court
granted REW summary judgment for the amounts due on the loans and
recognized the mortgage. REW then conveyed its interest in the notes
and the collateral to the Farm Credit Bank of Texas (FCBT). Shortly
thereafter, FCBT seized the mortgaged property, selling the property at a
public auction in which FCBT purchased the land for $14 million. When
FCBT notified Grant in March 1992 that it intended to sell the property
and that Grant had a right of first refusal, Grant offered to settle FCBT's
claims against him by purchasing the property for $16,900,000. When
FCBT rejected this offer, Grant filed a lawsuit in Louisiana state court
against FCBT, REW and others seeking damages and a declaration of his
rights to the property. The case was removed to federal district court
where the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisi-
357. Id. at 603.
358. 884 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
359. 8 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1993).
360. Farm Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583, as amended by Agricultural




ana granted the defendants' motions for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and for summary judgment. 361
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that bor-
rowers do not possess a private cause of action under the Farm Credit
Act of 1971 and its amendment, the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. The
Fifth Circuit noted that its holding followed other circuits' decisions
which had previously addressed the issue. 362 Although the Fifth Circuit
did not explain the rationale for the circuits' unanimous stance on the
issue, the district court opinion stated that the courts had concluded that
the legislative history and the comprehensive administrative remedial
scheme of the Farm Credit Act and its amendment establish that Con-
gress did not intend to confer a private right of action under such acts. 363
F. DEPOSIT AccouNTs
1. Joint Accounts
In Regency Financial Corp. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. 364 one joint ac-
count holder brought suit against Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc for its al-
leged unauthorized disbursement of funds from a joint account. The
court reversed an earlier summary judgment granted in favor of the bro-
kerage company. The real issue was whether Kidder Peabody had au-
thority to disburse proceeds from the joint account to one joint owner of
the account. The court determined that the answer depended upon the
contractual arrangement between the brokerage company and the own-
ers of the account. 365 Relying upon Leinert v. Sabine National Bank,366
the court concluded that Kidder Peabody's liability for payment from the
joint account depended upon whether the account was an "and" account
or an "or" account. If the account had been an "and" account, the funds
would have been joint property and two signatures would be required to
draw a check or withdraw funds. If the account had been an "or" ac-
count, either party acting alone would have had the right or authority to
draw checks or otherwise act concerning the account. The court held that
a fact question existed and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.367
361. 8 F.3d at 296.
362. Id. (citing Saltzman v. Farm Credit Servs., 950 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1991); Zajac v.
Federal Land Bank, 909 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank,
902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990); and Harper v. Federal Land Bank, 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.
1989).
363. Grant v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 841 F. Supp. 186, 189 (W.D. La. 1992).
364. 879 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
365. Id. at 181.
366. 541 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
367. 879 S.W.2d at 184.
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2. Right of Survivorship
In another Texas Court of Appeals case involving joint accounts, the
court in Banks v. Browning368 followed the reasoning in Stauffer v. Hen-
derson369 where the court held that the terms of joint account cards were
clear and unambiguous, and clearly showed the husband and wife's intent
to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship. Since there was no
ambiguity on the face of the cards, no extrinsic evidence was admissi-
ble.370 As in Stauffer, the court in Banks held that the joint account cards
were sufficient to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship. 371
G. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
A number of cases during this Survey period addressed questions re-
garding a guarantor's liability. The Fifth Circuit predicted that the Texas
Supreme Court would hold that guarantors could waive their right to a
commercially reasonable default sale. The courts applied the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine in several instances to defeat guarantor's defenses to lia-
bility and also rejected application of the doctrine in at least one instance
where the guarantor ultimately defeated liability.
1. Comaker Liability
In FDIC v. Gilbert372 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana decision granting sum-
mary judgment to a successor to a failed bank. In Gilbert, the FDIC and
the then current holder of the note asserted an action against a comaker
to recover on a promissory note and guaranty. The Fifth Circuit held that
a comaker's liability would not be discharged based on a post-execution
alteration of the note's repayment provision that was initialed by the
comaker, and that the comaker was not entitled to reduction in his obli-
gation based on other comaker's settlements with the holder or on insol-
vency of the makers.373 Defendant Gilbert appealed the summary
judgment entered against him in favor of the current holder of the note,
Baton Rouge Bank and Trust Company. The Gilbert court affirmed the
lower court's application of Louisiana law governing the effect of settle-
ments reached with other makers on the note and the insolvency of an-
other maker.
Gilbert's defense to the note was based on his assertion that the note
was altered on its face, subsequent to its execution. He cited the 1975
version of the Louisiana revised statute section 10:3-407 (Louisiana's ver-
sion of section 3-407 of the Uniform Commercial Code) which provides
that "as against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
368. 873 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
369. 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990).
370. Banks, 873 S.W.2d at 765.
371. Id.
372. 9 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1993).
373. Id. at 397.
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course.. .alteration by the holder [of an instrument] which is both fraudu-
lent and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed
unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the de-
fense. . . . ,,374 The Fifth Circuit rejected this defense because, among
other reasons, the defense was barred by the federal D'Oench, Duhme
and the holder in due course doctrines.375 These doctrines "bar the asser-
tion of personal defenses to a note in cases where the FDIC has become
the holder of the note. '376 The court noted that Fifth Circuit precedent
establishes that alteration of a document after execution, on its own, does
not preclude the application of these doctrines.377 The court noted that
handwritten or typewritten changes to a printed document made by the
party or parties agreeing to the changes is a common practice in commer-
cial and banking transactions.378 According to the Fifth Circuit, to initial
such a change and then claim it as a defense to the note is a "classic
example of circumstances that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was created
to address, namely a 'scheme or arrangement whereby the banking au-
thority on which [the FDIC] relied in ensuring the bank was or was likely
to be misled.' 379 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Gilbert was
therefore liable on the note.
The Fifth Circuit also addressed Gilbert's claim that the district court
incorrectly applied Louisiana law when evaluating the effect of the settle-
ments with comakers in the discharge in bankruptcy of the obligation of
another comaker. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Gilbert was not enti-
tled to a pro rata reduction in his obligation under the note based on the
settlements or insolvency of the other makers.380 The court relied on
Louisiana state law precedent which stated that the nonsettling guarantor
was liable for the corporation's indebtedness up to the dollar limit set in
the guaranty and that a bank's release of the settling guarantor did not
affect the nonsettling guarantor's liability.381 The Fifth Circuit also relied
on its prior decision in GATX Aircraft Corp. v. MiV Courtney Leigh,382 in
which the court held that a guarantor was not entitled to an offset equal
to the virile shares of settling and bankrupt guarantors.383 The court con-
cluded by noting that it interpreted the language of the agreement in the
present case "to provide that each of the four maker/guarantors is liable
on the note for its full amount, and that the lender could settle with one
374. Id. at 394.
375. Id. at 395.
376. Id. at 395 n.2.
377. Id. at 395 n.3.
378. Id. at 395.
379. Id. (citing D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460 (1942)); see 9 F.3d
395 n.4.
380. Id. at 396.
381. Id.; see also First Nat'l Bank of Crowley v. Green Garden Processing Co., 387 So.
2d 1070 (La. 1980).
382. 768 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1985).
383. Gilbert, 9 F.3d at 396.
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maker without losing its right to pursue another maker for the remaining
balance on the note." 384
2. Defenses
In First City, Texas - Beaumont, N.A. v. Treece385 the court held the
guarantor liable on his guaranty despite several defenses raised by the
defendant. Between May 6 and June 18, 1987, Farmer's Discount Supply,
Inc. (Farmer's) executed and delivered three notes to First City National
Bank of Beaumont (First City), with the total indebtedness at $78,858.
When the president and operating officer of Farmer's died, the remaining
directors appointed the president's widow to continue operating the busi-
ness, but never elected her to the board nor granted her specific authority
to obligate Farmer's on any additional debt. The widow later refinanced
Farmer's debt and obtained additional loans from First City without the
knowledge of the board. On July 15, 1987, Farmers closed its business
and surrendered the collateral to First City. After it had been reorga-
nized with the assistance of the FDIC, First City filed suit against John H.
Kennamer, Jr., a stockholder of Farmer's and one of the guarantors, seek-
ing to recover the deficiency on the Farmer's notes by enforcing a provi-
sion of the guaranty which stated that the guarantor would be personally
liable for Farmer's debt even if the debt was not properly authorized.
The FDIC, as receiver for the failed First City, moved for summary judg-
ment against Kennamer and the court held that, as to its prima facie case,
summary judgment is proper because it proved that (i) the note and guar-
anty agreement were in existence and valid, (ii) the FDIC was the present
holder of the note, (iii) the maker had defaulted, and (iv) the guarantor
was liable under the guaranty agreement 386 Kennamer offered no evi-
dence to contradict the FDIC's prima facie case, but did assert a number
of affirmative defenses sounding in fraud in the inducement, fraud in the
factum, duress and lack of authority. The FDIC argued that whatever
Kennamer's affirmative defenses, they were barred as a matter of law by
the federal holder in due course doctrine, the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
and 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e).
In response to the FDIC's first argument that the guarantors's defenses
were barred by the federal holder in due course doctrine, the court held
that the FDIC cannot be a holder in due course in this case for two rea-
sons. First, a guaranty is a nonnegotiable instrument which is merely a
contractual obligation, and as a result, the FDIC cannot be a holder in
due course of guaranties acquired in a purchase and assumption transac-
tion.387 The court stated that guaranties are not chameleons and they do
not become negotiable simply because they have passed from a failed
384. Id at 397.
385. 848 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
386. Id. at 734.
387. Id at 735.
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institution to the FDIC.388 Second, the court argreed with Kennamer's
assertion that the federal holder in due course status is available to the
FDIC only when it acts in its corporate capacity, and found that in this
case the FDIC was merely acting as a receiver.389
The court held, however, that Kennamer's defenses were based on un-
written, unrecorded agreements, and such defenses are barred by the
common law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its statutory counterpart 12
U.S.C. section 1823(e). 390 As previously discussed in this article,
D'Oench, Duhme held that a person who has dealt with a failed institu-
tion may not rely on unwritten agreements with the bank as a defense to
the enforcement of a facially valid obligation.391 Furthermore, the court
held that section 1823(e) was intended to supplement D'Oench, Duhme,
not to replace or preempt it.392 The two are not mutually exclusive,
although they often lead to the same result. Thus, the FDIC may invoke
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, section 1823(e) or both to bar defenses
based on unwritten agreements. 393
Kennamer also alleged that First City forged the maker's signature on
the security agreement. Although fraud in the factum is an exception to
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, the court held that because the guaranty
agreement is not dependent on the presence of a valid security agree-
ment, the defense of fraud in the factum would not discharge Kennamer's
obligation to guarantee Farmer's debts.394
Finally, Kennamer argued that the alleged forged signature invalidated
not only the security agreement, but also his obligation to guarantee the
notes, based upon section 3.606(a)(2) of the Texas Business & Commerce
Code.395 However, the court held that the guaranty agreement which
Kennamer signed did not fall within Article 3 because Article 3 does not
apply to continuing guaranties which merely guaranty overall indebted-
ness rather than a particular note. This is because a continuing guaranty
is not an "instrument" as that term is used in Article 3 and therefore, the
guarantor is not a "party to the instrument" as Kennamer argued under
section 3.606. The rationale of this rule is premised on the difference
between a guarantee of a specific note and a continuing guaranty. Since a
continuing guaranty guarantees an overall indebtedness, a continuing
guarantor is obliged to pay the debts of the defaulting principal whether
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 736.
391. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
392. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 737.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 738.
395. Section 3.606 provides, in pertinent part, that "(a) [t]he holder discharges any
party to the instrument to the extent that without such party's consent the holder ... (2)
unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or
any person against whom he has a right of recourse." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.606(a)(2) (Vernon 1994).
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those debts are secured by collateral or not.396 Accordingly, the court,
having rejected all of the guarantor's affirmative defenses, granted the
FDIC's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of
the FDIC.397
As reported earlier, the court also enforced the guaranty in NCNB
Texas National Bank v. Johnson.398 On June 28, 1985, Quest Develop-
ment, Inc. (Quest) borrowed $1,828,000 from the National Bank of Fort
Sam Houston (Sam Houston Bank). Quest's three shareholders were
Frank Corte, Ben Johnson and Fred Anderson. Only Corte and Johnson
signed a guaranty for this Quest loan. On December 28, 1987, Quest bor-
rowed $519,000 from Sam Houston Bank and Anderson signed a guar-
anty covering the note as well as other indebtedness of "any kind and
character" of Quest to Sam Houston Bank. The guaranty Anderson
signed specified that it was to be "continuing, absolute, unconditional and
unlimited as to all the indebtedness guaranteed. '399 On August 9, 1985,
Quest borrowed an additional $700,000 from Sam Houston Bank and the
bank obtained personal guaranties from all three shareholders. Sam
Houston Bank subsequently became insolvent and the FDIC, as receiver,
transferred the bank's assets, including the Quest notes and guaranties to
NCNB Texas National Bank (NCNB) in late 1988. On August 7, 1990,
Quest filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. The district court granted summary judgment against
Anderson on the $1.8 million note, and Anderson appealed contending
that (i) he did not guaranty the $1.8 million Quest note, (ii) Quest's reor-
ganization proceeding barred any action against its guarantors, (iii) cer-
tain modifications made to the note during Quest's reorganization were
improper, and (iv) dismissal of his counterclaim under the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine was in error.
The court, however, rejected Anderson's arguments and held that An-
derson was liable under the express terms of the agreement he signed,
which expressly covered "all other indebtedness of any kind and charac-
ter", thereby encompassing Quest's $1.8 million note to Sam Houston
Bank. Citing FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing Co.,4°° the court stated
that in the face of such explicit and unequivocal language, free of any
ambiguity, it may not look to extraneous evidence of intent.4° 1
Anderson argued that the confirmed plan of reorganization barred the
FDIC's suit against him, under principles of res judicata and accord and
satisfaction, stating that there was no deficiency on the notes since the
reorganization plan expressly provided that the Quest loans will be fully
396. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 739 (citing Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Mar-
kowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529, 535 (W.D. Tenn. 1979)).
397. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 744.
398. 11 F.3d 1260 (5th Cir. 1994).
399. Id at 1263.
400. 837 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988).
401. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1265.
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repaid. Relying upon United States v. Stribling Flying Service, Inc.,402 the
court held that the discharge of a debtor in reorganization proceedings
does not affect a guarantor's liability.403 Section 524(e) of the United
States Bankruptcy Code provides that the "discharge of a debt of the
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property
of any other entity, for such debt. ''4°4 The court furthermore stated that
Anderson's theory would defeat the purpose of loan guaranties; after all,
a lender obtains guaranties specifically to provide an alternative source of
repayment in the event that the primary obligor's debt is discharged in
bankruptcy. In conclusion, the court stated that "[f]urther, there has
been no accord and satisfaction, simply because there has been no accord.
Reorganization proceedings are judicial, not contractual, even where a
secured creditor voluntarily participates. '40 5
Anderson also argued that modifications of the note made without his
written consent constituted breach of the guaranty agreement and thus
release him from liability. In response to such argument, the court held
that since Anderson and the other guarantors had plainly waived "notice
of extension, renewals or rearrangements of Debt, [notice] of release or
substitution of collateral,... and every other notice of every kind", 4°6 any
modification of the note did not affect the continuing obligations of the
guarantors where a guaranty's terms were plain and unambiguous. 407
An important lesson was learned by the guarantor in Bank One Texas
v. Morrison.40 8 Gary E. Morrison and others formed Triple M Drilling
Company (Triple M) in January of 1984, and in 1985 Triple M obtained a
$200,000 line of credit from MBank Houston, N.A. (MBank). Morrison
executed an unconditional personal guaranty in favor of MBank for that
line of credit, as well as for any debt incurred after the issuance of the
credit line, but the guaranty expressly provided that Morrison could uni-
laterally cancel at any time by giving written notice and thereby limit his
obligation to those sums previously borrowed by Triple M. Morrison
never sent such a notice to MBank; however, once the company began
generating receivables, MBank released the guaranty and sent a package
of loan documents to Morrison including the original $200,000 note and a
copy of the guaranty, conspicuously stamped "CANCELLED." When
Morrison's assistant contacted the bank requesting the original guaranty,
she was assured that the original was in MBank's "dead files" and was
therefore effectively cancelled. Triple M subsequently obtained a second
line of credit in the amount of $500,000, which was renewed and in-
creased to $750,000. All loan applications related to this second line of
402. 734 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988)).
403. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1266.
404. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988).
405. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1266 (citing R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487,
492-94 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977)).
406. Id.
407. Id
408. 26 F.3d 544 (5th Cir. 1994).
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credit expressly stated that there were no guarantors and that Morrison
did not guarantee this line and would have no personal liability. Numer-
ous additional MBank memoranda and official bank documents consist-
ently reflected that such loan was not guaranteed. Bank One Texas
National Association (Bank One), having acquired the $750,000 note
from the FDIC following MBank's insolvency, filed a lawsuit against
Morrison asserting the continued validity of the guaranty and seeking to
recover the balance of the $750,000 note. The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of Bank One, disregarding the jury's finding that the guar-
anty was not intended to apply to the $750,000 note, deeming that answer
to be irrelevant in the face of what it considered to be an unambiguous
guaranty contract.
On appeal, the court held that contract interpretation provisions are
irrelevant where, as here, there is a dispute over whether the guaranty
was even in existence as to the $750,000 note. Therefore, a fact issue
existed as to whether the parties agreed to cancel the guaranty - or at
the very least modify the contract to exclude the obligation at issue.
Moreover, the court stated that the indispensable, component loan docu-
ments reflected that the parties specifically agreed that the $750,000 obli-
gation was not guaranteed, presumably because the guaranty contract
was either cancelled or modified to exclude that note.40 9 The court con-
cluded that the jury properly determined that the parties did not intend
the guaranty to cover the line of credit at issue and the trial court's disre-
gard of this finding was in error. The court also rejected the application
of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine because even if the guaranty was in
MBank's "active files" other documents which indisputably were con-
tained in MBank's "active files" clearly reflected that the parties agreed
that the guaranty did not apply to the $750,000 obligation. 410 The lessons
learned: guarantors should always insist upon the return of the original
guaranty when it is cancelled by the lender and lenders should not at-
tempt to enforce a guaranty contract which its files clearly indicate has
been cancelled.
In Sonne v. FDIC,411 several guarantors attempted to avoid liability
under their guaranties alleging that there was "no meeting of the minds"
and that there had been a material alteration of the guaranty. Each guar-
anty provided that it guaranteed "the payment of that certain $2,646,000
promissory note dated as of October 3, 1986."'412 When the note was exe-
cuted, in a hand written provision, the amount of the note was increased
by $300,000. The guaranty was not so amended. The court held that the
guaranty contract was valid. The court reasoned that, although the lan-
guage in the guaranty limited the guaranty to the specific note, the fact
that the parties amended the amount of the note did not have the effect
409. Id at 548.
410. Id at 549.
411. 881 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994).
412. Id at 791.
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of releasing the guarantors.413 The court also considered it significant
that the guaranty contained a dragnet clause. The court found that the
guarantors had consented to the increased indebtedness.4 14
3. Waiver of Commercially Reasonable Sale
In Steinberg v. Cinema N' Drafthouse Systems, Inc.4 15 the Fifth Circuit
predicted that the Texas Supreme Court would hold that guarantors
could waive their right to a commercially reasonable default sale. In
Steinberg, the maker and the guarantors of a secured note alleged that
their liability under the note was discharged by the secured creditor's fail-
ure to give adequate notice of the sale of the collateral and failure to
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner.416
The Fifth Circuit examined the possibility of a guarantor waiving the
requirement of a commercially reasonable sale imposed by section 9-504
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Section 9-504(c) governs the
disposition of collateral after a debtor's default and requires that "[e]very
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place, and
terms of the sale must be commercially reasonable. ' 417 The Fifth Circuit
noted that, although the Texas Supreme Court had declined to rule on the
issue, Texas appellate courts had held that, for purposes of section 9-504,
"debtor" includes guarantors and, as a result, guarantors can assert sec-
tion 9-504 defenses such as commercial reasonability in a deficiency ac-
tion.418 However, no Texas case had addressed the issue, before the Fifth
Circuit in Steinberg, of whether a guarantor can waive his right to assert a
commercial reasonability defense.4 19 The Fifth Circuit concluded that it
could determine how the Texas Supreme Court would rule on the issue
based upon two lines of cases.4 20
The first line of cases concerns the timely notice defense under section
9-504. Section 9-504(c) requires that a debtor receive timely notice of the
sale of collateral. Various Texas courts of appeals and one Fifth Circuit
case had held that a guarantor cannot waive his right to timely notice.42'
The Texas cases based their holdings on section 9-501(c) of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code which states that a debtor may not waive
rights created by section 9-504(c). Although this line of cases appears to
support the conclusion that, based on section 9-501(c), a guarantor can-
413. Id at 792.
414. Id.
415. 28 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 1994).
416. Id at 24.
417. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9-504(c) (Vernon 1991).
418. Steinberg, 28 F.3d at 24-25.
419. Id at 25.
420. Id at 24-25.
421. Id. at 25; FDIC v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939, 948 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, no writ); Carroll v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 734 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d 684, 687(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Peck v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 704 S.W.2d
583, 586 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
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not waive the right to a commercially reasonable sale because the right is
a non-waivable right conferred by section 9-504, the Fifth Circuit's analy-
sis in Steinberg led to a different result.
The second line of cases which the Fifth Circuit cited involves the
"good faith" provision in section 1-203 of the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code. Section 1-203 requires parties to perform and enforce con-
tracts and duties in good faith. According to the Fifth Circuit, two cases
constitute the second line of cases: a Texas Supreme Court case, FDIC v.
Coleman422 and a Fifth Circuit case which applied Coleman's holding,
Clay v. FDIC.423 Coleman and Clay addressed whether a guarantor can
waive certain claims which were based on section 1-203's good faith re-
quirement. In Coleman, a guarantor alleged that section 1-203 required
the FDIC to liquidate collateral shortly after default. In response to the
guarantor's claims, the Texas Supreme Court held that, although the good
faith requirement must normally be met, the guarantors had waived their
good faith claim by not requiring the creditors to satisfy their debt from
the collateral.424
Applying the two lines of cases to the issue before the court in Stein-
berg, the Fifth Circuit stated:
We are convinced that the Texas Supreme Court would follow the
second line of cases .... [T]he requirement that a sale be made in
"good faith" is inextricably intertwined with the requirement that a
sale be "commercially reasonable.... ." In both situations, the possi-
bility of a court second-guessing a creditor's actions creates uncer-
tainty and discourages loans.4 25
The Fifth Circuit also concluded that, unlike the Courts of Appeals in
the first line of cases, the Texas Supreme Court would not apply section
9-501(c)'s prohibition against the waiver of section 9-504 rights to a guar-
antor's waiver of commercial reasonableness. 426 The Fifth Circuit based
this conclusion on the fact that, although Texas Business and Commerce
Code section 1-102(c) prohibits the disclaimer of the obligation of good
faith by agreement, Coleman and Clay did not apply this prohibition to a
guarantor. In the Fifth Circuit's opinion, section 9-501 and section 1-
102(c) are based upon the same rationales: both sections prohibit waiver
in order to serve certain economic interests such as the preservation of
collateral. According to the Fifth Circuit, a guarantor's involvement
reduces the importance of preserving collateral and increases the impor-
tance of considerations such as allowing the guarantor to determine his
best interest and facilitating the transaction.427
This decision raises an interesting issue. Courts have applied section 9-
501(3) to guarantors because the definition of "debtor" in section 9-
422. 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
423. 934 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1991).
424. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 710; Steinberg, 28 F.3d at 25.
425. Steinberg, 28 F.3d at 25.
426. Id
427. Id. at 25-26.
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105(1)(d) has been read to include "guarantors." If this is not the correct
application of section 9-105(1)(d), then why do guarantors have the rights
granted by section 9-504(3) in the first place?
In one final decision involving guarantor liability, the court in Marshall
v. Ford Motor Co.428 determined that sales by a successor via merger
were not covered by a guaranty contract because the guarantor could in-
sist on strict construction of the guaranty and the guaranty did not run to
successors.
429
H. D'OENCH, DUHME DOCTRINE
Lemaire v. FDIC430 involved an appeal of a lender liability action
against MBank Abilene for a breach of an oral loan promise. After the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial court rendered a judg-
ment on the verdict against MBank for approximately $69,000,000.
MBank then appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals for the 14th Dis-
trict. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing
judgment on the breach of contract claim; it also reversed and remanded
for retrial the fraud and tortious interference claims, and reversed and
remanded for retrial one DTPA claim but reversed and remanded take
nothing judgments on the remaining DTPA claims. The court also af-
firmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to all plaintiffs. There-
fore, the only portion of the appellant's judgment that remained intact
after the Texas Court of Appeals decision was the attorney's fees award.
The FDIC argued for the first time on appeal that the appellant's claims
were barred by the doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme & Company v. FDIC431
and that doctrine's codification in 12 U.S.C. section 1823. Citing Union
Federal Bank of Indianapolis v. Minyard432, the appellate court followed
the principle that since " 'the FDIC had neither opportunity nor occasion
to assert the D'Oench doctrine in the trial court,' we will ordinarily con-
sider this argument on appeal. '433
The appellants, relying upon Thurman v. FDIC,434 argued that when
federal regulators are appointed after entry of judgment they are not al-
lowed to assert D'Oench, Duhme for the first time on appeal.435 The
court, however, stated that the appellant's reliance on Thurman was mis-
placed. The court distinguished this case from Thurman in that the FDIC
was not seeking to enforce an asset that became void before the appoint-
ment of the FDIC as receiver. Instead, the FDIC was seeking to defend
from appellant's attack. The court acknowledged that in Thurman, it re-
fused to permit the FDIC to raise D'Oench, Duhme for the first time on
428. 878 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.).
429. Id. at 631.
430. 20 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 1994).
431. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
432. 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1990).
433. Lamaire, 20 F.3d at 656.
434. 889 F.2d 1441, 1447 (5th 1989).
435. Lemaire, 20 F.3d at 656.
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appeal to reverse a judgment that rendered assets void,436 however, the
court distinguished this case from Thurman and held that the FDIC is
permitted to raise the doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme on appeal to defend
against an attack on judgment.437 In applying the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine, the court concluded that the doctrine effectively barred all of appel-
lants' lender liability claims.438 As a result of all of the claims being
barred, the court denied the recovery of any attorneys' fees to
appellant.439
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine barred several counterclaims, including violation of anti-tying
provisions of the Bank Holding Act and state law fraud in NCNB Texas
National Bank v. Johnson, previously discussed. 440 Relying upon the
common law D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, which was designed to protect
the FDIC's interests in the assets it acquires as the receiver for failed
banks, the Court of Appeals held that the anti-tying claim and the fraud
claim both were barred.441 Relying upon NCNB Texas National Bank v.
King,"42 the court stated that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine bars defenses
and claims by borrowers based on unrecorded agreements with a failed
bank.443 In this case the court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
also protected NCNB and the FDIC corporate entity as assignees of the
FDIC receiver. 4" Relying upon Beighley v. FDIC445 the Fifth Circuit
held that the test for application of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is
whether the borrower "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement"
whereby banking authorities are likely to be misled. 4"
The Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, affirmed its disapproval of
the "innocent borrower" exception to the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine in
Dendinger v. First National Corporation."7 The FDIC, as receiver of
First National Corporation, was substituted as the defendant in two law-
suits brought against the bank prior to its insolvency. In the first lawsuit,
note makers sued the bank alleging that the bank's misrepresentations
had induced them to enter into the notes. The FDIC, while not disputing
the note makers claims, argued that the claims were barred by the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. The note makers disagreed and argued that
the doctrine was inapplicable because the notes were void and therefore,
the FDIC could not take title to a void note. The note makers also as-
436. Id
437. Id.
438. Id. at 657.
439. Id.
440. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1267-69.
441. Id at 1267.
442. 964 F.2d 1468, 1470 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992).
443. 11 F.3d at 1268.
444. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1268.
445. 868 F.2d 776, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1989).
446. Johnson, 11 F.3d at 1268; see also Bieghley, 868 F.2d at 784.
447. 16 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1994).
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serted that they were "innocent borrowers," and as such were entitled to
the exception to the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine." 8
The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the FDIC.449 The court found that any oral misrepresentation by the
bank constituted an unwritten "agreement" which did not bind the FDIC
under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.450 The court rejected the custom-
ers' claim to the "innocent borrower" exception, noting that the excep-
tion had been recently disapproved by the Fifth Circuit in FDIC v.
Payne.451 The court also rejected the customer's claim that the notes
were void because the bank had fraudulently induced them to execute the
promissory notes.452 The court concluded that the notes were merely
voidable, not void. 453 Therefore, the FDIC took valid title to the notes.
The court disavowed any inference in FDIC v. McClanahan454 that mal-
feasance was necessary in order for the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine to ap-
ply. The court concluded that the weight of authority in the Fifth Circuit
"militates against an 'innocent borrower's' defense. '455
In June 1994 the Fifth Circuit held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
barred liability of a failed bank and its subsidiaries for breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, misrepresentation and declaratory judgment. In Robinowitz
v. Gibraltar Savings456 the appellant asserted that the D'Oench, Duhme
doctrine applies only when a party is attempting to use an unrecorded
agreement as a defense to collection efforts by a receiver of a debt or
obligation. The court concluded that this argument was without merit. In
Robinowitz, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
applies in a case "with an affirmative claim, against FDIC-Receiver, with
no note whose terms are subject to a secret protocol. ' 457 The appellant in
Robinowitz further argued that no cases have held that D'Oench, Duhme
bars claims for breach of fiduciary duty where the fiduciary relationship
has been established. The appellant argued that a fiduciary relationship
in this case had been established because of certain partnership agree-
ments entered into between the appellant and the defendant. The court
rejected this argument in that claimant's claims were not based upon any
partnership agreement but were based on oral misrepresentations during
settlement negotiations.458
448. Id at 102.
449. Id. at 103-04.
450. Id at 102.
451. 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992).
452. 16 F.3d at 102.
453. Id.
454. 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Bell and Murphy & Assocs., Inc. v.
Interfirst Bank Gateway, N.A., 894 F.2d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895
(1990); Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1989).
455. Dedinger, 16 F.3d at 102.
456. 23 F.3d 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
457. Id. at 955; see also Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990); Bieghley v.




For the first time the Fifth Circuit was asked, in Robinowitz, whether
subsidiaries of protected institutions may assert defenses available under
D'Oench, Duhme.459 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, as the First,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit had previously concluded, the D'Oench,
Duhme defense is available to wholly-owned subsidiaries of an insured
institution.460 The court reasoned that "[f]ederal regulators have to 'rely
on a financial institution's records and its assets, such as wholly-owned
subsidiaries, to determine solvency for regulatory purposes.' "461 "They
must be able to examine the records of the subsidiary, as well as the par-
ent, especially since the subsidiary may constitute a major asset of the
parent. Such reliance is necessary to enable the federal regulators to per-
suade solvent banks to assume the accounts of the failed institutions. ''462
The court concluded that the district court was correct in extending the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine defense to the subsidiary in this case.463
Robinowitz also argued that since the RTC had knowledge of the side
agreement or secret promise, then D'Oench, Duhme did not apply.464
Robinowitz asserted that the RTC knew about his claim at least two years
before the RTC took over Gibraltar Savings. Relying upon Langley v.
FDIC,465 the Fifth Circuit followed the rulings of the Texas Supreme
Court that knowledge of the misrepresentation by the FDIC prior to its
acquisition of the note is not relevant to whether section 1823(e) applies.
The key factor in the application of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine contin-
ues to be whether the borrower "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement
whereby banking authorities are likely to be misled. ''466
Robinowitz also argued that the real estate partnership transactions at
issue were outside the traditional banking function and therefore not cov-
ered by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine. He relied on the recent Fifth Cir-
cuit decision in Alexandria Associates, Ltd. v. Mitchell Co.467 The court
rejected Robinowitz's argument and distinguished Alexandria from this
case on the basis that although the lender had a proprietary interest in the
459. Id at 956. See Alexandria Assoc. v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 598, 601 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993)
(choosing not to address issue).
460. lIt See Sweeney v. RTC, 16 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) (D'Oench, Duhme extends to
the financial interests of any wholly owned subsidiary of a failed institution); Oliver v.
RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) ("D'Oench doctrine extends broadly to cover
any secret agreement adversely affecting the value of a financial interest that has come
within the RTC's control as receiver of a failed financial institution" including the financial
interests of wholly-owned subsidiaries); Victor Hotel Corp. v. FCA Mortgage Corp., 928
F.2d 1077 (lth Cir. 1991).




465. 484 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1987). See also Bell & Murphy v. Interfirst, 894 F.2d 750, 753
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990).
466. Robinowitz, 23 F.3d at 956-57; Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990)
(quoting D'Oench); see also McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 368 (5th
Cir. 1993).
467. 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993) (Fifth Circuit declined to apply D'Oench, Duhme to the
commercial sale of partnership interests in a real estate development venture by a third
generation subsidiary of a failed institution).
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real estate at issue, its primary relationship with Robinowitz was as a
lender.4 68 Unlike the parent bank in Alexandria, which did not make any
loans on the project, Gibraltar Savings had made substantial loans to the
project which was the subject of their dispute. The court concluded that
D'Oench, Duhme did apply to bar Robinowitz's claim. 469
In First City Texas-Beaumont, N.A. v. Treece,470 discussed previously,
the district court affirmed that section 1823(e) was intended to supple-
ment D'Oench, Duhme, not to replace or preempt it.471 The court fur-
ther stated that section 1823(e) and D'Oench, Duhme are not mutually
exclusive, although they often lead to the same result.472 Thus, the FDIC
was permitted to invoke the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, section 1823(e)
or both to bar defenses based on unwritten agreements.4 73 In response to
Kennamer's affirmative defenses the district court held that each of them
was barred by both the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and section 1823(e),
and the FDIC was entitled to judgment on these issues. The court re-
jected Kennamer's assertions that section 1823(e) and the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine could not operate as defenses to the lack of authority,
fraudulent inducement or duress affirmative defenses. 474 The court, in
rejecting these contentions, held that fraud in the inducement is barred
by D'Oench, Duhme and section 1823(e) to the same extent as other un-
recorded agreements.4 75 The court also held that because of D'Oench,
Duhme and section 1823(e), Kennamer could not rely upon Treece's lack
of authority to avoid his obligations under his guaranty agreement.4 76
While acknowledging that some courts have held that defenses based on
economic duress fall outside the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and section
1823(e), the court rejected this minority view and held that duress is
barred by D'Oench, Duhme and section 1823(e). 477 The majority of
courts, including one case affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, have held that
economic duress is barred to the same extent as other personal
defenses.478
Kennamer also attempted to characterize First City's conduct as fraud
in the factum. The court agreed that fraud in the factum is an exception
468. Robinowitz, 23 F.3d at 957.
469. Id.
470. 848 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
471. Id. at 737; see also FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[ilt
has not been suggested that the enactment of § 1823(e) ... preempted the common law
rule of D'Oench, Duhme."); FDIC v. Hoover-Morris Enter., 642 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating that both § 1823(e) and D'Oench, Duhme are available to the FDIC).




476. Id at 737.
477. Id. at 738. Supporting the minority position, see, e.g., RTC v. Ruggiero, 756 F.
Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
478. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 738; see also FDIC v. Gettysburg Corp., 760 F. Supp. 115
(S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd without opinion, United Bank v. Gettysburg Corp., 952 F.2d 400
(5th Cir. 1992); Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1989); FSLIC v. Maio, 736
F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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to the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.479 The court rejected Kennamer's ar-
gument, however, stating that this defense was still "Duhmed" for two
reasons.480 There was simply no evidence that the instrument in question
was a forgery and, more importantly, even if the security agreement was a
forgery, it would not relieve Kennamer's obligation under his guaranty
agreement. Nothing in the guaranty agreement discharged Kennamer's
obligation if the security agreement was in some way defective. 481
On January 24, 1994 the United States Supreme Court denied review in
three unpublished federal appeals court rulings including the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision in Fennell v. Federal Deposit In-
surance Corp.482 In Fennell, the Fifth Circuit rejected claims by borrow-
ers of a failed bank that they were not liable on several promissory notes.
In a suit by the FDIC against the borrowers to recover the outstanding
amounts, the borrowers claimed they and the bank had modified the loan
agreement. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the FDIC's argument that
D'Oench, Duhme barred the borrowers defense based on an unwritten
agreement with the lender.
I. MISREPRESENTATION BY BANK
Roberts v. United New Mexico Bank at Roswell483 involved two broth-
ers, Donald and Joe Roberts, who owned an Oregon-based plant research
company that grew coriander and other spices. The Roberts brothers
contacted United New Mexico Bank at Roswell and inquired about the
availability of certain property owned by the bank in the Dell City, Texas
area. TWo bank employees told Joe Roberts that the farm consisted of
"very good land [with] very good water" and provided the Roberts broth-
ers with a written appraisal of the farm prepared for the bank which de-
scribed the farm as being "highly productive" with "good" quality well-
water.484 The Roberts brothers eventually decided to lease part of the
farm and attempted to grow three coriander crops. The coriander plants,
however, died before maturity each time and after the last crop died, the
Roberts brothers sued the bank alleging that the salt content of the soil
and the well-water caused the crops to fail. Evidence at trial established
that the three wells on the leased land contained between 3000 and 4000
parts per million (ppm) of salt, as contrasted with "good" wells in the
Dell City area which, on average, contained only 1700 ppm of salt and
"average" wells contained between 2500 and 2700 ppm. The trial court
jury found that the statements made by the bank as to the land's produc-
479. 848 F. Supp. at 738; see also McLemore v. Landry, 898 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 966, 111 S. Ct. 428, 112 L.Ed. 2d 412, Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d
1523, 1527, n.6.
480. 848 F. Supp. at 738.
481. Id
482. 114 S. Ct. 926 (1994). See also Maxwell v. First National Bank of Maryland, 114 S.
Ct. 920 (1994); Gracey v. Day, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994).
483. 14 F.3d 1076 (5th Cir. 1994).
484. Id at 1077.
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tivity and quality of the water supply constituted both fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentations and awarded the Roberts brothers their out-
of-pocket costs. On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected the Bank's argu-
ment that the statements were merely opinions and found that the state-
ments made about the water quality constituted actionable statements of
fact about the present condition of the land. 85
Under Texas law a plaintiff may recover for fraud upon establishing
that: (1) a material representation was made; (2) it was false when made;
(3) the speaker knew it was false, or made it recklessly without knowl-
edge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the speaker made it with
the intent that it should be acted upon; and (5) the party acted in reliance
and suffered injury as a result.486
The bank further argued that even if it did make any representations as
to the farm's soil and water quality, those representations were true state-
ments as to the farm's average water and soil quality.As7 The court re-
jected this argument noting that it was within the province of the jury to
find that the bank's representations were designed to create a substan-
tially false impression which is actionable under Texas law. 48 The bank
also asserted that there was no reliance by the Roberts brothers as a re-
sult of their being coriander experts. The court, however, concluded that
where the misrepresentation went to the nature of the land and its water
and not to any matter specifically related to coriander, the reliance was
not barred as a matter of law simply because one of the Roberts brothers
had substantial experience with the production of coriander.48 9
The bank also argued that the purchasers were aware of facts that
should have put them on "reasonable inquiry" as to the condition of the
property and its ground water.490 The court considered that "[in Texas, a
plaintiff's 'failure to inspect or to investigate will not defeat an action in
fraud [because t]he defrauded party is entitled to rely on the fraudulent
parties representations.' "491 The court did note, however, that " 'knowl-
edge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to conduct
further inquiry to clarify a misimpression or reveal a misrepresentation
can be deemed equivalent to knowledge of the truth.' -492 Relying upon
485. Id at 1079. See Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. v. First Nationwide Bank, 873
F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1989); Gibraltar Say. v. L.D. Brinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1301
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).
486. Id. at 1078. See also Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American
Business Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1185 (5th Cir. 1993); Boggan v. Data Sys. Network
Corp., 969 F.2d 149, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1992).
487. Id. at 1079.
488. Id. (citing State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 681 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agreement of the parties); Commonwealth Mortgage, 873 F.2d at
865; Blanton v. Sherman Compress Co., 256 S.W.2d 884,887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953,
no writ)).
489. Id at 1080.
490. Id.
491. Id (citing Kerrville HRH, Inc. v. City of Kerrville, 803 S.W.2d 377, 385 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
492. Id at 1080 (citing Gibraltar, 860 F.2d at 1303).
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Holmes v. P.K. Pipe and Tubing, Inc.,493 the court held that this duty of
inquiry "'extends only to those matters that are fairly suggested by facts
that are actually known, rather than circumstances that merely arouse
suspicion in the mind of a reasonably prudent person.'" Viewing the evi-
dence in that light, and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to
the Roberts, the record evidence indicated that "the Roberts did not pos-
sess knowledge of facts sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to
conduct further inquiry. '494
That bank also asserted that because the Roberts had undertaken their
own investigation regarding the leased property, they were barred as a
matter of law from alleging any reliance upon the bank's representations.
The court rejected this argument because such an assertion was too
broad. The rule applied by the court was "'. . . that one cannot recover
for fraudulent representations when he knows the representation is false,
or when he has relied solely on his own investigation rather than on the
representations of the other party.' "495 After reviewing the record the
court found that the evidence presented at trial supported the jury's ver-
dict that the Roberts relied on the bank's misrepresentations and not
solely on their inspection of the property.496 The court also rejected the
bank's final argument that the Roberts failed to present evidence that the
coriander crop failed as a result of the water problem.
4 97
In Dendinger v. First National Corporation,498 previously discussed,
Duane Dendinger, and other named plaintiffs, executed promissory notes
payable to or held by First National Bank of Covington, Louisiana
(FNB), for the purpose of purchasing shares of stock. The plaintiffs filed
suit against FNB seeking rescission and money damages under federal
and state law for such notes. After FNB was declared insolvent, the
FDIC, as receiver for FNB, was substituted as the party-in-interest to de-
fend all claims asserted against FNB. The FDIC filed counterclaims
against many of the plaintiffs to recover the amounts due on their notes.
The plaintiffs alleged that their obligations on the notes were not enforce-
able due to material misrepresentations by FNB that prompted their exe-
cution of the notes and purchase of the stock. On appeal from a
summary judgment granted to the FDIC, the FDIC did not dispute the
factual allegations made by appellants regarding the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the promissory notes. Rather, the FDIC ar-
gued that despite any alleged illegality attendant to the execution of the
notes, appellants did not have a defense to FDIC recovery under the doc-
trine set forth in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,499 and that doctrine's
493. 856 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993); see also Lang v. Lee,
773 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
494. Roberts, 14 F.3d at 1080.
495. Id at 1081. See also Bernstein v. Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 850 S.W.2d 694, 713
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
496. Id.
497. Id. at 1081-82.
498. 16 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1994).
499. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
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codification in 12 U.S.C. section 1823(e). The court held that appellants
were barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine from asserting any of their
defenses against the FDIC and, citing their earlier decision in FDIC v.
Payne,500 stated that the "wholly innocent borrower" exception to the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was disapproved. 501 The court specifically re-
fused to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in FDIC v. Meo,502 which
allowed a good faith borrower to assert the defense of failure of consider-
ation against the FDIC because he was "a completely innocent party." 50 3
The court further held that the appellants' assertion that FNB fraudu-
lently induced them to execute the promissory notes was a defense that
made the notes merely voidable, and therefore title to the notes properly
passed to the FDIC (the FDIC does not take title to void obligations). 5 4
Furthermore, the court held that the principles it announced in Kilpatrick
v. Riddle505 controlled this case. In Kilpatrick, the court concluded that
(1) an oral misrepresentation by a lender to a borrower, whether in viola-
tion of federal securities law or not, constituted an unwritten "agree-
ment" that did not bind the FDIC under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine,
and (2) a voidable interest was transferable whether or not the FDIC
knew of the misrepresentation or fraud which produced the
voidability.5 06
In another previously cited case, Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Savings,50 7
the Fifth Circuit held that Robinowitz's claim of the bank's oral misrepre-
sentation was barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine.508 In Robino-
witz, Daniel Robinowitz, in 1983, approached Gibraltar Savings for
financing and ultimately entered into several partnerships with subsidiar-
ies of Gibraltar Savings for the purpose of developing the Galleria pro-
ject, a multi-use development in Metairie, Louisiana. By 1986, serious
disputes had developed between the parties, and eventually Robinowitz
agreed to sell his interests in the project for $3.5 million and also entered
into a Settlement and Mutual Release agreement with Gibraltar Savings
and its related subsidiaries. Robinowitz later sued Gibraltar Savings for
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation and declaratory judg-
ment for allegedly fraudulently inducing him to sign the release and mis-
representing their true plans regarding the Galleria project in order to
induce him to sell his interest in the project for a price well below the real
value. In 1988, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. However, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
for trial. Then, on October 30, 1989, the RTC was appointed receiver for
Gibraltar Savings and removed the state court action to federal district
500. 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992).
501. Dendinger, 16 F.3d at 102.
502. 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974).
503. Dendinger, 16 F.3d at 102.
504. Id. at 101.
505. 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 954 (1991).
506. Dendinger, 16 F.3d at 102.
507. 23 F.3d at 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
508. Id at 955-56.
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court. The RTC subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that Robinowitz' claims were barred by the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine and related statutes. The district' court granted defend-
ant's motion, holding that because Gibraltar Savings' misrepresentations
did not appear in the Settlement and Mutual Release agreement or on
any document on file with Gibraltar Savings, Robinowitz had "lent him-
self to a scheme or arrangement whereby banking authorities are likely to
be misled." 509 Robinowitz appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Robinowitz as-
serted several arguments as to why D'Oench, Duhme should not apply to
this case, including the argument that the doctrine did not apply to bar
claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The court, citing Langley v. FDIC,510
held that Robinowitz's claim is analogous to one for fraudulent induce-
ment which is barred by D'Oench, Duhme.511 As previously discussed,
the Supreme Court in Langley held that an oral misrepresentation re-
garding the nature of investment property was sufficient to constitute an
"agreement" within the meaning of section 1823 and that even if the mis-
representation was fraudulent, section 1823 still barred a claim based on
such misrepresentation unless it met the recording requirements. The
court held that Robinowitz' claim that an oral misrepresentation fraudu-
lently induced him to enter the settlement agreement, like the Langley's
claim that the bank's oral misrepresentation regarding the property in-
duced them to borrow funds, was also barred by D'Oench, Duhme.512
J. FEDERAL HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOcrRINE
The federal holder in due course doctrine, adopted in FDIC v.
Payen,513 allows the FDIC and RTC, as receivers for failed financial insti-
tutions to acquire holder in due course status under federal common law
even though they cannot meet the technical requirements under state
law. During the Survey period, two different courts applied the doctrine
and reached, what appear to be, irreconcilable results.
In the first case, the FDIC asserted the holder in due course doctrine to
defeat defenses raised by the guarantors.514 This lawsuit began as a sim-
ple suit to enforce guaranty agreements against several defendants to col-
lect the deficiency from a series of notes. Subsequent to filing suit, the
plaintiff bank went into receivership, one defendant declared bankruptcy,
another failed to answer, another was dismissed, and the case was eventu-
ally removed to federal court. John H. Kennamer, Jr., the remaining de-
fendant, asserted affirmative defenses sounding in fraud, duress and lack
of authority against the FDIC. The FDIC argued that "it is a 'holder' of
both the notes and the guaranty agreement and therefore, because Ken-
namer's defenses are personal defenses, they are barred by the federal
509. Id. at 954.
510. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
511. Robinowitz, 23 F.3d at 955.
512. Id.
513. 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992).
514. First City, Texas-Beaumont, N.A. v. Reece, 848 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
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holder in due course doctrine. 5 15 Kennamer disagreed and argued that
the FDIC was not a "holder" because the guaranty agreement was not a
negotiable instrument. Therefore, he argued, the FDIC was subject to
both real and personal defenses against enforcement of the guaranty
agreement. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas court held that "[t]he FDIC cannot be a holder in due course not
only because the guaranty agreement is non-negotiable, but also because
the FDIC is acting in its capacity as receiver in this action, rather than in
its corporate capacity. '516 Relying upon Gunter v. Hutcheson,517 the
court further held:
The FDIC is permitted to avail itself of the federal holder in due
course doctrine when it acts in its corporate capacity pursuant to a
purchase and assumption transaction .... In essence, the doctrine
provides the FDIC with 'a complete defense to state and common
law fraud claims on a note acquired by the FDIC in the execution of
a purchase and assumption transaction...... The FDIC must take
the instrument for value, in good faith and without actual knowledge
of the alleged fraud at the time it enters into the purchase and as-
sumption transaction.... The FDIC may become a holder in due
course even in situations where it acquires the notes on guaranty af-
ter litigation involving them has already begun. 518
The court agreed with Kennamer's argument that the guaranty agree-
ment was not negotiable and therefore, the FDIC could not be a holder
in due course under federal common law. Because of this non-negotiabil-
ity, the court held that the FDIC cannot be a holder in due course of
guaranties acquired in their purchase and assumption transactions.51 9
The court followed the principle that federal holder in due course status
is available to the FDIC only when it acts in its corporate capacity.520
The court held that it was undisputed that the FDIC was acting in its
capacity as receiver for the collecting bank in this action. Because the
FDIC was acting in its capacity as receiver, rather than in its corporate
515. Id. at 735.
516. Id.
517. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). In a note to the
Treece decision the court determined that there was some question as to whether, and to
what extent, Gunter had been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 735 n.4.
The court cited FDIC v. Whitlock, 785 F.2d 1335, 1339 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1986) (questioning the
wisdom of Gunter and its application to the case). But see FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251(5th Cir. 1988) (granting the FSLIC rights of a holder in due course for negotiable instru-
ments acquired in a purchase and assumption transaction, but without explicitly adopting
Gunter). Despite this uncertainty, the court noted that Gunter has been followed by sev-
eral district courts. See Sunbelt Say. FSB v. Amercorp Realty Corp., 730 F. Supp. 741(N.D. Tex. 1990).
518. Treece, 848 F. Supp. at 735 (citations omitted).
519. Id. (citing Sunbelt Say. v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v.
Payne, 973 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1992)).
520. Id. at 736; see also Montross, 923 F.2d at 353; FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251,
1256 (5th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Byrne, 736 F. Supp. 727, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (the federal
holder in due course doctrine "does not protect ... one who assumes [the failed institu-
tion's] liabilities . .").
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capacity, federal holder in due course status was not available to bar the
defendant's affirmative defenses. 521
In the second case, however, the Houston Court of Appeals reached a
different conclusion when the RTC asserted the federal holder in due
course doctrine to defeat a lack of notice defense. In Burns v. Resolution
Trust Corp.,522 the court, in reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, held that all claims of lack of notice, includ-
ing the breach of contract claim, were barred by the federal holder in due
course doctrine. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the
federal holder in due course doctrine did not apply because the assump-
tion agreement and loan modification agreement in question were not
negotiable instruments. 523 The court concluded that the notes underlying
the assumption and modification agreements satisfied the requirements
for a negotiable instrument according to the laws of the states of Texas
and Colorado.524 The court rejected the appellant's contention that the
subsequent agreements pertaining to the obligation to pay taxes on the
property rendered the agreements non-negotiable because they no longer
contained an obligation to pay a sum certain.525 The court also affirmed
its holding in NCNB Texas National Bank v. Campise526 where the same
court previously rejected a lack of notice defense in a deficiency suit by
applying the federal holder in due course doctrine. In Campise, the court
determined that the borrower's claim that he failed to receive notice of
the sale of collateral was a personal defense, barred by the federal holder
in due course doctrine.527 The court concluded that its decision in
Campise applied in this case and held that Bums' claims were barred by
the federal holder in due course doctrine.5 28 The opinion in Burns does
not include a discussion of the Treece decision.
The results in Treece, as it applies to the FDIC, and in Burns, as it
applies to the RTC, appear to be irreconcilable. The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, in FDIC v. Trans Pacific Industries, Inc.529 may have resolved the
issue when it held that the holder in due course doctrine did not defeat
the chairman of the board's agency defense because the FDIC did not
acquire the promissory notes as part of a purchase and assumption.530 In
view of the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Trans Pacific, it is not likely that the
ruling in Burns will withstand appeal.
521. Id.
522. 880 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
523. Id. at 153.
524. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Vernon 1968); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4-3-104(1) (West 1989)).
525. Burns, 880 S.W.2d at 153.
526. 788 S.W.2d 115, 118-19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
527. id. at 154 (citing Canpise, 788 S.W.2d at 118-19 (add'l citation omitted)).
528. Id.
529. 14 F.3d 10 (5th Cir. 1994).




In an action by a buyer of bank stock brought against the bank presi-
dent and the FDIC, the Fifth Circuit held that the bank president dis-
proved as a matter of law at least one essential element of the buyer's
causes of action.531 The court, in determining whether the district court
had abused its discretion, concluded that the district court's finding that
the buyer's suit was wholly frivolous and should not have been brought
was sufficient to explain why the award of the bank president attorney's
fees was the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purposes of Rule
11.532 The court held that the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the bank president because, by the buyer's own ad-
mission, there was no agreement between himself and the bank president,
and they never discussed the purchase of the bank stock, meaning that
there could be no agreement whatsoever between the two parties.533 Ad-
ditionally, the buyer failed to prove that he relied upon any representa-
tion, communication or statement by the bank president when he
purchased the bank stock, meaning the buyer could not prove his cause of
action for common law or securities fraud. Additionally, the court ruled
that the buyer could not prove that the bank president's conduct consti-
tuted grounds for rescission pursuant to section 33 of the Texas Securities
Act.53 4 Lastly, the buyer failed to prove his claim for negligent misrepre-
sentation because reliance is an element for such cause of action.535 With
respect to the Rule 11 sanctions, the court held that the district court's
order adequately met the requirements for appellate review set out in
Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc.536 Such requirements are as follows:
(i) enter specific factual findings;
(ii) indicate in the record all the factors it considered in choosing
the attorney's fee award as a sanction;
(iii) state in the record which alternative sanctions, if any, it also
considered; and
(iv) explain why the sanction it imposed was the least severe sanc-
tion adequate to serve the purposes of Rule 11.537
The court stated the following relevant policy concerns underlying Rule
11: "[o]n the one hand, Rule 11 sanctions are designed to deter frivolous
lawsuits. Sanctions also insure, to a large degree, that victims of frivolous
lawsuits do not pay the expensive legal fees associated with defending
such suits .... [o]n the other hand, Rule 11 only authorizes 'reasonable'
fees, not necessarily actual fees."'538 Therefore, the Granader court held
531. Granader v. McBee, 23 F.3d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1994).
532. Id. at 122-24.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 123.
535. Id.
536. 959 F.2d 521, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1992).
537. Id.
538. Granader, 23 F.3d at 124 (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866,
879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Rule 11
sanctions against the plaintiff.
When drafting affidavits for clients, attorneys should keep in mind the
holding in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright. 39 The Fifth Circuit held that
attorneys could not be sanctioned for preparing a draft affidavit that in-
cluded statements not previously discussed with the affiant, because the
statements were not shown to be knowingly false and the affiant was
warned to consider them carefully.54° In Bright, counsel to the RTC at-
tempted to persuade the officer that the additions to her statements were
supported by the facts. The officer, however, did not agree. The district
court sanctioned the attorneys for "tampering with" or attempting to
"manufacture" evidence. The Fifth Circuit reversed based on the lack of
bad faith which is required for the district court to impose sanctions.- 1
A federal appeals court recently reinstated a suit against former direc-
tors of a failed bank stating that the trial judge went too far in dismissing
the case to punish lawyers for the FDIC.5 42 The FDIC claimed that seven
former directors of Capital National Bank of Fort Worth, Texas wrong-
fully approved twenty-one loans that resulted in more than $2.8 million in
losses to the bank. The trial judge dismissed the FDIC's claims against
five of the directors as a sanction for an FDIC lawyer's failure to abide by
an earlier order that directed the FDIC to respond to interrogatories.
While acknowledging that the FDIC's actions were sanctionable, the Fifth
Circuit relied upon Coane v. Ferrara Pan Candy Co.5 43 and concluded
that ". . . taking all circumstances of this case into account, we conclude
that the FDIC's conduct did not exhibit the degree of delay or contumacy
that justifies the dismissal of its claims." 544
L. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
1. Statute of Limitations and Adverse Domination
a. Adverse Domination
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a Fifth Circuit decision
applying Texas law of adverse domination.5 45 In FDIC v. Dawson546 the
FDIC, as receiver for a failed bank, brought an action against former
directors and officers of the bank alleging that the bank had incurred sub-
stantial losses as a result of their conduct. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment for
the directors and officers based on the fact that the claims lapsed before
the FDIC was appointed receiver. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that:
539. 6 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1993).
540. Id. at 342.
541. Id.
542. FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1383 (5th Cir. 1994).
543. 898 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990).
544. Conner, 20 F.3d at 1381.
545. FDIC v. Dawson, 114 S. Ct. 2673 (1994).
546. 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993).
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(i) state law governed the claim that the statute of limitations was
tolled by the adverse domination doctrine,5 7
(ii) the FDIC had to show only that the majority of the board mem-
bers were wrongdoers during the period it sought tolling for the ad-
verse domination doctrine to apply,5"
(iii) the majority of the directors did not have to be named as de-
fendants for the doctrine to apply, 549 and
(iv) the directors had to be more than negligent for the doctrine to
apply.550
The FDIC presented two arguments for reversal: first, it argued that
the statute of limitations was tolled during the tenure of the corporate
wrongdoers under the doctrine of adverse domination; and, second, it ar-
gued that the district court erred in applying the tort statute of limitations
to its claim based on the director's oath of office instead of the longer
statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. With respect to
whether the district court applied the correct statute of limitations to the
FDIC's claims, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that FIRREA has been inter-
preted "not to revive stale state law claims acquired by the FDIC.
' 551
One of the cases the Dawson court relied upon in making this assertion
was FDIC v. Shrader & York.552 The Fifth Circuit pointed to Shrader &
York's holding that "a legal malpractice claim brought by the FDIC was
time-barred because the Texas statute of limitations had expired before
the FDIC was appointed receiver. '553 According to the Fifth Circuit, the
district court applied the correct analysis to the FDIC's claims, as it first
decided whether the claims had expired under Texas law prior to the
FDIC being appointed receiver. 554 With respect to whether the two-year
statute of limitations for tort or the four-year limitations period for a
breach of contract claim should apply, the Fifth Circuit stated that "there
is no substantial question regarding this issue; the law in this circuit is
long-settled that claims based upon an oath of office sound in tort.
555
For this proposition, the court relied upon McNair v. Burt.
556
With respect to the adverse domination issue, the court addressed sev-
eral preliminary issues. First, the court applied the de novo standard of
review.557 Next, the court addressed whether to apply federal or state
law with respect to the FDIC's assertion of the adverse domination doc-
trine. The Fifth Circuit refused to follow Farmers & Merchants National
Bank v. Bryan,55 8 which held that when the FDIC brings a claim against
547. Id. at 1309.
548. Id at 1313.
549. Id at 1311.
550. Id
551. Id at 1306-07.
552. 991 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1993).
553. Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1307.
554. Id
555. Id. at 1307 (citation omitted).
556. 68 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1934).
557. Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1308.
558. 902 F.2d 1520, 1522 (10th Cir. 1990).
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the directors of a failed bank, the trial court should "borrow" the appro-
priate state statute of limitations and apply it to the FDIC's claims. 559
The Bryan court also held that the issue of equitable tolling was governed
by federal law, despite the borrowing of the state statute of limitations.560
Therefore, the Bryan court adopted the adverse domination doctrine as
part of the federal common law of the Tenth Circuit and then applied it to
the FDIC's claims.561 The Dawson court stated that the Bryan court
"misread the current law regarding the proper source of tolling rules for
federal courts that borrow a state statute of limitations." 562
After determining that Texas law governs the application of the ad-
verse domination doctrine in this case, the court next addressed the doc-
trine itself. Specifically, the court focused on three questions:
(i) How completely must the wrongdoers dominate their corpora-
tion in order to trigger adverse domination tolling?
(ii) Must a plaintiff relying on the adverse domination doctrine sue
all allegedly culpable directors?
(iii) How culpable must a director's conduct be before he will be
considered a "wrongdoer" within the meaning of the adverse domi-
nation doctrine? 563
The court compared the "complete domination" test, under which the
plaintiff seeking to toll the statute under adverse domination must show
"full, complete and exclusive control in the directors or officers charged,"
to the "majority test" which provides that the plaintiff need not show that
the wrongdoers completely dominated the corporation, but rather must
show only that a majority of the board members were wrongdoers during
the period the plaintiff seeks to toll the statute. 564 Relying on FDIC v.
House565 and Allen v. Wilkerson,566 the court followed the "majority"
version of the adverse domination doctrine. 567
With respect to whether a plaintiff seeking to toll the statute of limita-
tions under the adverse domination doctrine must sue all allegedly culpa-
ble directors, the Fifth Circuit again followed the Allen decision. Allen
demonstrated that "a plaintiff may sue only a minority of the board and
still assert adverse domination to toll the statute of limitations under
Texas law."' 568 In applying the Allen decision, the court noted that the
district court incorrectly assumed the adverse domination doctrine could
not apply since the FDIC sued less than the majority of the board of
directors.5 69
559. Id at 1522.
560. Id at 1522-23.
561. Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1308-1309.
562. Id at 1309.
563. Id
564. Id. at 1309-10 (citations omitted).
565. 736 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
566. 396 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
567. Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1310.
568. Id. (citing Allen, 396 S.W.2d at 500-01).
569. Id at 1311.
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The Fifth Circuit noted that Texas case law provides little guidance on
the issue of whether Texas law allows the plaintiff to establish the adverse
domination doctrine by proving that a majority of a corporation's direc-
tors were merely negligent. The court noted that "no Texas case comes to
light in which the adverse domination doctrine has been invoked based
on the mere negligence of a majority of a corporation's directors. ' 570 As
a result, the Fifth Circuit looked to the law of other jurisdictions in order
to predict how a Texas court would rule on this issue. The Fifth Circuit
stated that it did not believe Texas courts would extend the adverse domi-
nation doctrine to cases where the wrongdoing by the majority of the
board amounts to mere negligence.5 71 As.a result, after surveying several
states' laws, the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law, a corporate plain-
tiff cannot "toll the statute of limitations under the doctrine of adverse
domination unless it shows that a majority of its directors was more than
negligent for the desired tolling period." 572 In light of these findings, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment findings for
the defendants.5 73
b. Statute of Limitations
In Ketcham v. First National Bank of New Boston, Texas,574 reported
earlier in this Survey article, one issue raised by Ketcham in her appeal
from the district court's take-nothing summary judgment was whether a
two-year or four-year statute of limitations applied to her claims against
the bank.575 It was agreed by both sides that the date on which the rele-
vant transactions occurred was on or about December 16, 1986. Suit was
filed May 8, 1990. Thus, if the two-year limitation period applied, then
Ketcham's suit would be barred. Ketcham's allegations, the court con-
cluded, sounded in fraud and therefore a four-year limitations period was
applicable under Texas law.576 Ketcham's suit, therefore, was not time-
barred.
The court in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Acton577 held, in light of Daw-
son, that it should reverse its own earlier ruling applying the three-year
federal statute of limitations to alleged tortious acts by the directors and
apply the two-year statute of limitations period instead.578 In reaching
this conclusion, the Acton court noted that the state statute was not tolled
by the extension of the doctrine of adverse domination to cases in which
the wrongdoing by a majority of the board amounts to mere negligence
rather than gross negligence. 579
570. Id.
571. Id at 1312.
572. Id at 1312-13.
573. Id. at 1313.
574. 875 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
575. Id at 755.
576. Id at 755; see also TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986).
577. 844 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
578. Id at 317.
579. Id.
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Similarly, in FDIC v. Benson,5 80 the defendants contended that their
claims were time-barred before the plaintiff, the FDIC, took over the in-
solvent bank; therefore, the FDIC as an assignee was unable to assert its
claims of negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se and breach of
duties of obedience, care and loyalty. The FDIC alleged that limitations
had not expired because the statute should have been tolled by the equi-
table doctrine of adverse domination.581 The Benson court applied the
two year statute of limitations under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code Annotated section 16.003 (Vernon 1986) to each of the FDIC's
claims.5 82 If the claims would have been time-barred at the time the
FDIC Receiver acquired the claims, the claims cannot be revived by the
acquisition.5 83 The threshold issue was whether the statute of limitations
period had expired before the FDIC, as receiver, was appointed and took
over the failed bank. 584 In addressing this issue, the court, again relying
upon Dawson, followed the Texas rule that the tort statute of limitations
begins to run when the tort is committed unless there has been fraudulent
concealment or unless a statute exists to the contrary.5 85 The Benson
court followed Dawson and affirmed that Texas does recognize the ad-
verse domination doctrine for purposes of equitable tolling of limitations.
Relying upon Dawson, the court held that the adverse domination doc-
trine did not apply to toll the statute of limitations on the negligence
claim.586 With regard to the claims other than negligence, the issue be-
came whether the FDIC was able to show that the majority of the board
of directors was more than negligent in failing to supervise the loans and
was actively involved in ultra vires conduct or fraudulent concealment of
wrongdoing, so as to avoid the business judgment rule. The court con-
cluded that the business judgment rule precluded the FDIC's simple neg-
ligence claims that were not already barred by limitations.5 87 With
respect to the allegations ,of self-interest, knowing participation in wrong-
doing, fraud, concealment, abdication, and violations of statutes and reg-
ulations, although the FDIC had failed to submit proof to raise a genuine
issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment, the court denied
the defendants' motion for summary judgment at least until the expira-
tion of the discovery deadline of June 11, 1994.88
A Fifth Circuit decision involved a suit filed by the RTC against three
former directors in RTC v. Seale,5 89 which alleged that loans were made
580. 867 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
581. Id. at 519.
582. Id at 518.
583. Id (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938)).
584. Id. at 519 (citing, FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 220-27 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994); FDIC v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (S.D. Tex.
1990)).
585. Benson, 867 F. Supp. at 519 (citing Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1312).
586. Id
587. Id. at 521.
588. Id. at 524-25.
589. 13 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1994).
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involving regulatory violations and grossly negligent investments. The
trial court held that the state statute of limitations barred the suit. The
RTC appealed, arguing that FIRREA revived claims barred by state stat-
ute of limitations, that the general federal statute of limitations applied
instead, and that the state statute of limitations was tolled because of ad-
verse domination. The court rejected the arguments of the RTC and held
that the suit was barred by the state statute of limitations because FIR-
REA could not revive claims that had already lapsed prior to the passage
of FIRREA.5 90 The court also ruled that the RTC failed to meet its bur-
den of proof in asserting adverse domination. Therefore, the state statute
of limitations was not tolled. In response to the rulings in Dawson and
Seale, the FDIC and the RTC asked the legislators to pass legislation to
assure enough time to litigate against former directors and officers of
failed financial institutions. On September 29, 1994, Congress approved
legislation amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act.591 Section 201(a) of the new legislation provides:
Section 11(d)(14) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1821 (d)(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
(C) REVIVAL OF EXPIRED STATE CAUSES OF ACTION.-
(i) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any tort claim described in
clause (ii) for which the statute of limitations applicable under
State law with respect to such claim has expired not more than 5
years before the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or
receiver, the Corporation may bring an action as conservator or
receiver on such claim without regard to the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations applicable under State law.
(ii) CLAIMS DESCRIBED.-A tort claim referred to in clause
(i) is a claim arising from fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in
unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct resulting in substan-
tial loss to the institution..
A similar law was passed in section 201 (b) as it relates to section
21A(b)(14) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act.5 92
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp.593 Carney and Fisher, after being
sued in Texas state court by the RTC, countersued the RTC in federal
court and pursuant to their first amended petition, sought (1) a declara-
tory judgment as to matters in controversy in the state court case; (2)
injunctive relief for denial of due process; (3) monetary damages for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) injunctive relief and
590. It at 853.
591. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338.
592. Id. (amending 12 U.S.C. 1441a(b)(14) (Supp. V 1993)).
593. 19 F.3d 950 (5th Cir. 1994).
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monetary relief for tortious interference with prospective contractual re-
lations.594 The RTC moved to dismiss Carney and Fisher's claims on the
following grounds: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted; and (3) pendency of a
state court action which would resolve all issues between the parties.595
The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Carney and Fisher's claims for monetary damages because FIRREA
precluded assertion of such claims against the RTC until Carney and
Fisher had exhausted their administrative remedies.596 The district court
therefore dismissed Carney and Fisher's claims for monetary judgment.
The district court dismissed Carney and Fisher's claims for injunctive re-
lief pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 597
On appeal, Carney and Fisher alleged that the district court erred in
determining that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over their
claims for monetary damages.598 After concluding that, under a relation
back theory, Carney and Fisher filed their claims for monetary damages
before the RTC was appointed receiver, the Carney court addressed the
issue of whether a claim for monetary damages filed prior to the RTC's
appointment as receiver is subject to FIRREA's jurisdictional bar, i.e.,
that courts do not have jurisdiction over suits for monetary damages until
the plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies.
Following the case law from other circuits on the issue, the court deter-
mined that courts continue to have subject matter jurisdiction over claims
for monetary damages when such claims are fied before the RTC is
named as receiver.599 The court further concluded, as other circuits had
done, that a claimant could not simpltaneously pursue its judicial reme-
dies and administrative remedies under :FIRREA and concluded that
FIRREA creates a "scheme under which courts will retain jurisdiction
over pending lawsuits-suspending, rather than dismissing, the suits-
subject to a stay of proceedings as may be appropriate to permit exhaus-
tion of the administrative review process as it pertains to the underlying
claims." 6oo
With respect to injunctive relief, the court followed its reasoning in
Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp.6° 1 and determined that if Carney and
Fisher were attempting to enjoin the RTC from exercising one of its au-
thorized powers or functions, then section 18210) of FIRREA would de-




598. Id. at 954.
599. Id. at 955; (citing Brady Dev. Co. v. RTC, 14 F.3d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1994); Mar-
quis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (1st Cir. 1992); Rosa v. RTC., 938 F.2d 383, 392 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991)).
600. Id at 956; (citing Marquis, 965 F.2d at 1154); see also Guidry v. RTC, 790 F.Supp.
651, 653 (E.D. La. 1992); In re FDIC, 762 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D. Mass. 1991).
601. 996 F.2d 99, 102-04 (5th Cir. 1993).
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prive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.602 Relying upon
Ward, the court concluded that only if the RTC were engaging in activity
outside its statutory authority would the district court have jurisdiction.6°3
In their petition, Carney and Fisher sued to enjoin the RTC from (1)
making statements that Carney and Fisher converted funds or were liable
for the conduct of one of the corporate defendants and (2) from engaging
them in the state court action.6°4 The RTC argued that such relief would
prevent it from exercising its statutory authority to "collect obligations
and money due" and to "preserve and conserve the assets and property
of" a failed financial institution.605 The court agreed that the RTC was
acting within its statutory authority and held that the district court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Carney and Fisher's claims for in-
junctive relief.60 6
Regarding the district court's jurisdiction over Carney and Fisher's
claims for declaratory relief, the court noted that Carney and Fisher re-
quested a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the claims and actions of
the RTC were claims for which Carney and Fisher had no individual lia-
bility.607 The court stated it was clear that Carney and Fisher were at-
tempting to enjoin the RTC from including them in the state court lawsuit
under the guise of a declaratory judgment.608 Therefore, the same rea-
soning applicable to Carney and Fisher's request for injunctive relief was
equally applicable to Carney and Fisher's request for a declaratory judg-
ment.6°9 Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Carney and Fisher's
claim for a declaratory judgment.
The Fifth Circuit followed its ruling in Carney in Whatley v. Resolution
Trust Corporation610 when it held that because subject matter jurisdiction
is tested as of the time of the filing of the complaint, district courts presid-
ing over actions properly filed prior to the appointment of a receiver con-
tinue to be vested with jurisdiction.611 The court explained that the
situation differs when the receiver is appointed before the filing of an
action against a failed financial institution. The court stated that this cir-
cuit and others addressing the issue have interpreted section 1821 (d) of
FIRREA to mean that "a separate scheme exists for the disposition of
lawsuits filed pre-receivership. ' '612 The court concluded that claims based
602. Camey, 19 F.3d at 956.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B)(ii) and (iv) (Supp. 1 1989).
606. Id. at 956-57.
607. Id. at 958.
608. Id.
609. Id
610. 32 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
611. Id. at 907.
612. Id. at 908.
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on valid federal jurisdiction when filed, may be affected only through the
stay provision detailed in paragraph 12 (A)(ii) of section 1821(d). 613
The court, however, took exception with the lack of notice provided to
the claimants by the RTC. The court stated that
[t]here is an added odious dimension when the receiver, with full
knowledge of the pending lawsuit, foregoes a request for a stay and
waits until the time for the administrative claims process has expired
to appear in court requesting dismissal because of the plaintiffs' sup-
posed failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the eyes of the
claimant-especially one who receives no actual notice of the admin-
istrative process-his lawsuit is awaiting disposition: the receiver,
having intervened and been substituted as party defendant, ostensi-
bly joins him in awaiting a hearing on the merits. In reality, how-
ever, the receiver lies in ambush, awaiting expiration of the
administrative deadline so that it may dispose of the claim without
consideration of its merits. We neither find nor assign any such in-
tent to Congress in its enactment of FIRREA.614
The court, therefore, held that "with regard to actions filed before the
receivership, the receiver may opt either for the judicial route, by al-
lowing the action to continue, or it may choose the administrative pro-
cess, by moving for a stay within 90 days of its appointment. '61 5
Judge Duh concurred with the majority and added that the RTC's fail-
ure to mail notice was also dispositive because (1) the receiver lacked the
authority to determine the claim under section 1821 (d)(3)(A), and (2)
the Due Process Clause required that notice be mailed to a claimant
known to the receiver by virtue of his, having filed suit against the institu-
tion before the appointment.of the receiver. 6.16 Judge Duh6 considered
that for such a claimant, publication of notice was "constitutionally
infirm. '617
In a decision rendered by the Fifth Circuit two weeks following the
Whatley decision, the court followed its own decision in Whatley. The
court held that "where the receiver fails to give notice of any other claims
procedure, it must consider any pending law suits [sic] in the administra-
tive process or forego the administrative process and proceed with the
law suit."' 61 8 The court was also persuaded by the claimant's argument




615. Id. at 910. Since the RTC did not timely move for a stay, it was deemed by the
court to have chosen to proceed with the pending litigation.
616. Id. at 910-11.
617. Id. at 911.
618. Greater Slidell Auto Auction, Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge,
La., 32 F.3d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1994).
619. Id. at 941.
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3. Applicable Interest Rate on Note of Failed Institution
In FDIC v. Massingill620 the Fifth Circuit was asked to determine
whether the FDIC had properly applied the prime rate of the bank which
had acquired promissory notes providing for an unascertainable interest
rate of a defunct bank. The two promissory notes were payable to the
order of Moncor Bank, N.A. (Moncor), located in Hobbs, New Mexico.
According to the terms of the first note in the amount of $360,000, the
interest rate was to be a "variable rate equal to 1/2% per year above
Bank's Base Lending Rate. Bank's Base Lending Rate is the rate set
from time to time by Bank, below which loans will not usually be
made. '621 Massingill and the other note makers defaulted on both notes.
The second defaulted note was eventually renewed with the unpaid prin-
cipal balance bearing interest at the annual rate of interest equal to two
percent above Moncor's Base Lending Rate. On August 30, 1985,
Moncor Bank was declared insolvent and the FDIC was appointed as
receiver. United Bank of Lee County, New Mexico (United Bank) ac-
quired both notes from the FDIC. In determining the amounts of the
installment payments owed with regard to the two notes, United Bank
substituted its prime rate of interest for Moncor's Base Lending Rate.
Shortly thereafter, the FDIC reacquired the notes and continued to rely
upon the prime rate of United Bank in order to compute the accruing
interest. After default had occurred on both notes, the FDIC filed suit
against Massingill for the outstanding balances due upon both notes. The
trial court awarded the FDIC the outstanding principal remaining upon
both notes, interest calculated in accordance with the prime rate of
United Bank, and attorneys' fees.622
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that since the parties to the notes
agreed upon an applicable rate of interest, article 5069-1.03 of Texas Re-
vised Civil Statutes Annotated (which provides for interest at a rate of six
percent per annum when no specific rate of interest is agreed upon by the
parties) does not apply, but unfortunately, due to the unanticipated fail-
ure of Moncor, the rate agreed upon between the parties could no longer
be applied.623 Citing FDIC v. Blanton,624 the court stated that Texas law
provides that a specific prematurity interest rate continues after maturity
when the contract is silent as to postmaturity interest.625 Since no provi-
sion for postmaturity interest appeared upon the face of the notes, the
court must determine whether the prematurity rate is ascertainable and,
if so, must utilize that rate.626 The court then compared Moncor's "Base
Lending Rate" against "prime rate", which is defined in Black's Law dic-
tionary as "the most favorable interest rates charged by a commercial
620. 24 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 1994).
621. Id. at 771.
622. Id. at 773.
623. Id. at 780.
624. 918 F.2d 524, 532 (5th Cir. 1990).




bank on short-term loans to its best (i.e., most credit worthy custom-
ers)," 627 and concluded that if there is any difference between the two
rates, such difference would reasonably render the base rate higher than
the prime.628 Therefore, the court decided that, in this case, use of
United Bank's prime rate by the FDIC is a permissible, reasonable alter-
native which, if it does differ from Moncor's Base Lending Rate, more
likely than not errs in favor of Massingill. 629
4. Federal v. State Statute of Limitations
While the trend has been developing in Texas, as well as other jurisdic-
tions,630 to permit the use of the federal statute of limitations, some fed-
eral district courts have not been following this trend. The court in
Wamco III, Ltd. v. First Piedmont Mortgage,631 in discussing the similar
role of the RTC, failed to follow the reasoning of Bledsoe. Also, in Farm
Credit Bank v. Firemans Fund Ins. 632 the court failed to apply Bledsoe to
a situation where a bargained for contractual statute of limitations was in
conflict with the federal six-year statute of limitations.
The issue of whether an assignee from the FDIC or RTC can use the
six-year federal statute of limitation in actions to collect on instruments
purchased from the agencies rather than be limited to the shorter limita-
tions periods permitted by state law may finally have been settled in
627. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 813 (6th ed. 1990).
628. Massingill, 24 F.3d at 780.
629. Id. at 781.
630. See John Krahmer, Trend Emerging For Use Of Federal Limitations Period, TEx.
BANK LAw., Apr. 1994, wherein Krahmer indicates that the trend is emerging to permit
assignees to use the federal statute of limitations. According to Krahmer,
... decisions in Florida, Kansas and Texas seem[s] to indicate a trend has
emerged to permit an assignee of such paper to use the federal limitations
period instead of being restricted to shorter time periods. In Cadle Company
II, Inc. v. Stamm, -So.2d-, 1994 WL 30317, 19 Fla L. Weekly D295 (Fla.
App. 1 Dist., Feb 07, 1994)(Opinion not yet released for publication), the
Florida Court of Appeals (1st Dist) held that an assignee from the FDIC
could utilize the six-year limitations period allowed under 12 U.S.C. sec. 1821
(d)(14). In Cadle Company II, Inc. v. Lewis, 254 Kan. 158, 684 P.2d 718
(Kan., Dec. 1993), the Supreme Court of Kansas reached the same result and
reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals which had concluded the state limita-
tions period controlled....
Id.
Krahmer's analysis concluded that in all of these decisions, the courts attempted to bol-
ster the value of the assets sold by the FDIC by preserving claims that would otherwise be
lost by shorter limitation periods, by emphasizing public policy goals of protecting an as-
signee with a longer limitations period.
These decisions seem to leave Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Tallman, 852 P.2d 1310
(Colo. App., Oct. 22, 1992), cert. granted, as a lonely outpost adopting a state
limitations period instead of the federal period, If the case law trend is any
indication, it seems likely the Colorado Supreme Court will overrule that
decision at the same time in the (possibly near) future.
Id. Krahmer appears to have been correct as to his prediction of how the Colorado
Supreme Court would treat Tivoli. Tivoli was reversed by Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Bumann,
870 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1994).
631. 856 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1994).
632. 822 F. Supp. 1251, 1257 (W.D. La. 1993).
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Weatherly v. Federal Debt Management, Inc. ,633 where the United States
Supreme Court denied review of the Texas Supreme Court decision per-
mitting the use of the federal statute of limitations.
In two recent cases, consolidated on appeal to the Texas Supreme
Court, the court held that the six-year limitations period set forth in 12
U.S.C. section 1821(d)(14) applies to actions brought by purchasers of
assets from the FDIC to recover on those purchased assets. 634 In addi-
tion, the court held that the limitations period applies retroactively to
claims in existence on August 9, 1989.635 The cases were consolidated to
resolve a conflict among appeals courts.
In Weatherly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas held
the state's four-year statute of limitations applied. In Thweatt, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the six-year limitation period set forth in 12
U.S.C. section 1821 (d)(14) applied. 636 In both Thweatt and Weatherly,
purchasers who acquired assets of failed banks from the FDIC sued the
borrowers to collect on delinquent promissory notes. On appeal to the
Texas Supreme Court, the defendants argued the six-year limitations pe-
riod of FIRREA applied only to actions brought by the FDIC, and not
those brought by the FDIC's successors in interest. The defendants fur-
ther argued that the statute of limitations does not apply retroactively to
claims arising before FIRREA's enactment in 1989.
Relying upon the Fifth Circuit ruling in FDIC v. Bledsoe,637 the Texas
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled that the FDIC's succes-
sors in interest are entitled to the same benefits under the common law
maxim that "[a]n assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor. '638 The
court stated that "[i]f the FDIC's statute of limitations did not enure to
the benefit of its transferees, the market value of notes and other assets in
the hands of FDIC would be diminished, thus hindering this statutory
purpose. '639 With regard to the issue of retroactive application of the
statute, the court determined that the limitations period applies retroac-
tively to causes of action in existence when FIRREA was passed. 64°
Although the Weatherly court chose the federal statute of limitations,
an expired state statute of limitations will not be revived by application of
the federal six-year statute of limitations.
633. 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
634. Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994); Federal Debt. Mgmt. v. Weatherly,
883 S.W.2d at 171.
635. Id at 178.
636. Thweatt, 888 S.W.2d 735, 728 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992).
637. 989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1993).
638. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d at 174.
639. Id.





In First American Bank & Trust v. Texas Life Insurance Company641
the bank's loan was secured by an assignment of a life insurance policy.
Pursuant to the terms of the loan documents, the debtor remained obli-
gated to pay the insurance premiums due on the policy. The bank re-
quested that the insurance company notify the bank prior to termination
of the policy. Despite notice from the insurance company to the insured
the premiums were not paid and the policy was terminated. After the
accidental death of the insured, the bank filed suit against the insurance
company claiming that it was not notified of the termination of the policy,
and it was entitled to the proceeds thereof. The court, applying Louisiana
law, rejected the bank's argument that it was entitled to notice stating
that the language of the applicable statute required notice only be sent to
"the person whose life is insured or the assignee of the policy."'642 Since
the insurance company had complied with the provisions of the statute, it
was not liable to the bank.64 3 The bank also alleged breach of contract by
the insurance company. Relying on a prior contract, the bank claimed
that the insurance company was required to notify the bank of the termi-
nation of the policy. The court held that at most this would afford the
bank a one year extension of coverage. 6 " The claim, however, was not
made until three years after the policy had expired. Therefore, the court
concluded that the insurance company was not liable to the bank.
b. Mobile Homes
A tough lesson was learned by a party, who thought they were secured,
when one Texas court has recently addressed the proper method of
perfecting a security interest in a mobile home in Giese v. NCNB Forney
Banking Center.645 As a general rule, a security interest in a mobile
home is perfected by notation on the certificate of title pursuant to the
provisions of Texas' Manufactured Housing Standards Act.6 " As in
Giese, when the mobile home is affixed to real estate, questions concern-
ing whether real estate or certificate of title provisions control the proper
method of perfection. In Giese, Purchaser A purchased and received a
"clean" certificate of title to a mobile home. Purchaser A affixed the
mobile home to real estate and added various improvements. Purchaser
A later sold the mobile home and financed the sale herself. To secure her
loan, she filed a deed of trust and financing statement in the county real
estate records. She also delivered a "clean" certificate of title to Pur-
chaser B. Purchaser B subsequently borrowed money from the bank and
641. 10 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1994).
642. Id. at 336 (emphasis in original).
643. Id. at 337.
644. Id. at 337-38.
645. 881 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994).
646. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
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used the mobile home as collateral. The bank noted its security interest
in the mobile home on the certificate of title. Following a default by Pur-
chaser B, the bank foreclosed on the mobile home asserting a priority
interest therein.
The court held that as long as a certificate of title on the mobile home
was outstanding, perfection of a lien in the mobile home by filing in the
real estate records was ineffective. 647 The court determined that the
proper method to perfect a security interest in a mobile home when a
certificate of title exists is by notation thereon, regardless of whether the
mobile home is affixed to realty. 648 Recording in the real property
records is the proper method of perfection only after the certificate of
title has been surrendered and canceled by the issuing authority. Since
the bank was the only party which had properly perfected, its liens had
priority.
c. Annuity Contracts
Annuities and the rights of the annuitants are being offered more often
as collateral security. Some lenders are confused about how to perfect
because no one is sure how an annuity contract should be categorized
under the Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In In re New-
man649 the court concluded that a provision in the annuity contract negat-
ing any liability of the insurance company to an assignee until the
insurance company had received notice of the assignment precluded de-
livery of the contract (coupled with an indorsement or assignment) as an
effective transfer of rights under the Texas Business and Commerce Code
definitions. 650 Possession of the certificate alone did not convey the right
to receive payments.651 The Fifth Circuit in Newman also held that annu-
ity contracts are not instruments under Article 9.652 Since annuities did
not fit into any other category, the court concluded that they must be
"general intangibles". 653 Interestingly, the court did not consider the pos-
sibility that an annuity is excluded from Article 9 as an interest in "insur-
ance" under section 9-104(g).
Subsequent to Newman, the United States Supreme Court, reversing
and remanding a Fifth Circuit decision, answered the question of whether
annuities are properly classified as "investments," or "insurance," at least
for purposes of the National Bank Act.654 On August 8, 1989, Nations-
Bank of North Carolina, a national bank, sought permission from the
Comptroller of the Currency to sell fixed and variable annuity contracts
647. Id. at 781.
648. ld
649. 993 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1993).
650. Id. at 95.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 94.
653. Id. at 94-95.
654. Nations Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810
(1995)(the opinion consolidates two cases-NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Life
Ins. Co. and Ludwig v. Variable Life Ins. Co.).
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through its wholly-owned subsidiary NationsBanc Securities. Nations-
Bank proposed to sell the annuity contracts as an agent for various life
insurance companies in cities with more than 5000 inhabitants. On
March 21, 1990, the Comptroller of the Currency issued an opinion letter
approving NationsBank's proposed sale of annuities, finding that the sale
of annuities was within the power of the National Bank Act.6 55 The
Comptroller reasoned that " '[a]s part of their traditional role as financial
intermediaries, banks have broad powers to buy and sell financial invest-
ment instruments as agents for customers... [and] [a]lthough annuities
have historically been a product of insurance companies, they are primar-
ily financial investments.' "656 The Comptroller concluded that the au-
thority to broker annuities was within "the business of banking" under 12
U.S.C. section 24, subdivision seventh. Challenging the Comptroller's ap-
proval of NationsBank's proposed sale of annuities, the Variable Life In-
surance Company (VALIC) filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of
Texas seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.657
Valic argued that NationsBank's proposed sale of annuities violates 12
U.S.C. section 92, which prohibits national banks from selling insurance
products in towns with a population larger than 5000.658 The Comptroller
and NationsBank argued that NationsBank could sell annuity contracts in
towns with populations greater than 5000 because annuity contracts are
not "insurance" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. section 92, but are al-
lowable as "incidental" financial products under 12 U.S.C. section 24(7).
The district court affirmed the Comptroller's approval of the proposed
annuities sale 659 and VALIC appealed to the Fifth Circuit.660
655. Variable Annunity Life Insurance Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir.
1994) reh'g denied, Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 13 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 1994);
cert. granted, Ludwig v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994); rev'd and
remanded, NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810
(1995).
656. Id. at 1297.
657. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991); rev'd
by Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied,
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 13 F. 3d 833 (5th Cir. 1994); cert. granted, Ludwig
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994).
658. Section 92 provides in relevant part that:
[N]ational banks, located and doing business in any place the population of
which does not exceed five thousand inhabitants, as shown by the last pre-
ceding decennial census, may, under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the agent for any fire,
life, or other insurance company authorized by the authorities of the State in
which such bank is located to do business in such state, by soliciting and
selling insurance and collecting premiums on policies issued by such
company....
Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 753 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1926)). The 1952
edition of the U.S.C. omitted this provision and added a note explaining that Congress had
repealed it in 1918. 12 U.S.C. § 92 note (1952). Although successive editions of the U.S.C.
have all carried over the same note, both Congress and the courts have on occasion acted
as if section 92 has remained in force. See United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. In-
dependent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2176 (1993).
659. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (1991).
660. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (1993).
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TWo statutory provisions are at the heart of the dispute. Section 24,
subdivision seventh of the National Bank Act permits national banks to
engage in the business of banking and "all such incidental powers as shall
be necessary." 661 Section 92 of the same Act allows national banks lo-
cated and doing business in small towns to act as agents in the sale of life
insurance.662
The case really involved three main issues:
(i) whether annuities are insurance products for the purposes of
the National Bank Act;
(ii) whether section 92 of the National Bank Act acts as a limitation
on national banks' insurance powers (as the Fifth and Second Cir-
cuits have held), or whether it is an additional grant of power; and
(iii) whether annuities sales are incidental to the business of banking
under 12 U.S.C. 24, subdivision seventh.
Relying upon its prior ruling in Saxon v. Georgia Association of In-
dependent Insurance Agents, 663 the Second Circuit's ruling in American
Land Title Association v. Clarke,664 and legislative history,665 the Fifth
Circuit and held that both fixed and variable annuity products are "insur-
ance", at least for bank regulatory purposes, and that national banks can
sell annuities only under their "small town" insurance powers enumer-
ated under the National Bank Act.666 The court also stated that annuities
have historically been insurance products, and not investment vehicles as
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had concluded.667 The
Fifth Circuit later denied a motion to rehear the case.
Four judges dissented from the Fifth Circuit decision for reasons that
the panel had not accorded due deference to the Comptroller's reason-
able statutory interpretations.668 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari669 and held that "[tihe Comptroller's conclusion that
brokerage of annuities is an 'incidental powe[r]... necessary to carry on
the business' "670 was a reasonable statutory interpretation. The court
deferred to "the Comptroller's reasonable determination that 12 U.S.C.
section 92 is not implicated because annuities are not insurance within the
meaning of that section. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals of the Fifth Circuit [was] reversed. ' 671 The Supreme Court agreed
661. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
662. See supra note 658.
663. 399 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1968) (reversing the Comptroller's ruling that na-
tional banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insurance regardless of the
size of the city in which they are operating).
664. 968 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2959 (1993) (reversing Comptrol-
ler's directive allowing national banks to act as agents for title insurance companies in
cities with a population over 5000).
665. VALIC, 998 F.2d at 1299.
666. Id. at 1300.
667. Id at 1300-01.
668. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clark[e], 13 F.3d 833, 837-838 (CA5 1994).
669. 114 S. Ct. 2161,(1994).





with the Comptroller's construction of the section 24, subdivision seventh
authorization of "incidental powers... necessary to carry on the business
of banking. ' 672 The Court also considered the second sentence of section
24, subdivision seventh as presupposing that banks had authority not cir-
cumscribed by the five specifically listed activities. 673 In reaching its con-
clusion, the Court found that
modem annuities, though more sophisticated than the standard sav-
ings bank deposits of old, answer essentially the same need. By pro-
viding customers with the opportunity to invest in one or more
annuity options, banks are essentially offering financial investment
instruments of the kind congressional authorization permits them to
broker. Hence, the Comptroller reasonably typed the permission
NationsBank sought as an "incidental powe r].. necessary to carry
on the business of banking". 674
By accepting the Comptroller's view that, for purposes of the National
Bank Act, annuities are properly classified as investments, not insurance,
the Court did not reach the question urged by VALIC of whether section
92, by negative implication, precludes national banks located in places
more populous than 5000 from selling insurance.675 The Court also deter-
mined that it was reasonable for the Comptroller to classify fixed and
variable annuities together, despite the fact that fixed annuities more
closely resemble insurance. 676
As a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in VALIC, the
Fifth Circuit, on March 21, 1995 vacated its mandate and remanded to the
district court for entry of judgement in favor of the Comptroller of the
Currency and NationsBank of North Carolina. 677
The question still remains whether annuities, for purposes of Article 9
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, will be classified as insurance
or general intangibles. The United States Supreme Court, in VALIC, did
not address this issue or discuss Newman. The court, however, did ac-
knowledge that ". . . a characterization fitting in certain contexts may be
suitable in others. ' 678 Due to the uncertainty regarding the proper way
to perfect a security interest in an annuity contract, lenders would be wise
to take possession of the annuity contract, file a UCC-1 covering the an-
nuity as a general intangible and otherwise comply with the requirements
of state law and perfect in the same manner as one perfects an assignment
of a cash surrender life insurance policy-by notifying the insurance com-
pany of the security interest.
The outcome of this case will have far reaching implications for both
the banking and insurance industries. Despite the final decision of the
672. Id. at 814.
673. Id. at 814.
674. Id. at 815.
675. Id
676. Id. at 817.
677. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5744 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 1995).
678. Id. at 816.
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courts, the battle over the sale of insurance and insurance-like products
will continue for some time.
6. Consumer Credit Code
In Allied Finance Company v. Rodriguez679 the Texas Court of Appeals
held that a retail installment contract clause containing an insurance no-
tice was not conspicuous and therefore was in violation of the Consumer
Credit Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The clause in ques-
tion, entitled "Insurance Notice and Agreement," provided that the in-
surance obligation on the security for the loan could be satisfied by the
borrowers' pre-existing insurance policies. Unaware of the terms of this
provision, the borrowers obtained additional insurance which they al-
leged caused them to be delinquent in their loan payment. The court
found that the contract terms regarding the insurance requirement was
not conspicuous because it was not written in a manner such that a rea-
sonable person in the borrowers' position ought to have noticed it. Even
though the title might have been conspicuous, the lender was also re-
quired to make the individual clauses within the section conspicuous so
the borrowers would be aware that their existing insurance could be used
to satisfy the insurance requirement. 680 As a result of this ruling, banks
should review their consumer loan contracts to ascertain whether they
are in compliance with this ruling.
7. Commercial Paper
In FDIC v. Trans Pacific Industries, Inc. ,681 discussed earlier, the Fifth
Circuit had occasion to apply the provisions of section 3.403(2)(b) of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code to the interpretation of a promis-
sory note. In Trans Pacific, W. K. Robbins, Jr., chairman of the board of
Trans Pacific Industries, Inc. (Trans Pacific), executed two promissory
notes payable to the bank. These promissory notes were preprinted
forms which contained a block on the top left comer listing "Borrower(s)
name(s) and addresses" and three signature blocks; each signature line
bore the designation "Borrower." Trans Pacific was the only borrower
identified in the name and address block in both notes. The names Trans
Pacific Industries, Inc. and W. K. Robbins, Jr. were typed in two of the
three signature blocks on each note. The trial court was asked to deter-
mine whether Robbins had any liability on the notes after default oc-
curred. The court granted summary judgment for the lender against
Trans Pacific and Robbins.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, applying section 3.403(b)(2) of
the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 682 The court explained that
679. 869 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
680. Id. at 571.
681. 14 F.3d 10 (5th Cir. 1994).
682. Section 3.403(b) provides as follows:
(b) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
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even though no specific language announced that Robbins signed the
notes in a representative capacity, that capacity was clear from the faces
of the instruments and in the context of business expectations.683 First,
Trans Pacific was the only entity listed in each borrower identification
block. Secondly, a corporation is normally bound with the signature of
an officer authorized by the corporation to sign on its behalf. And third,
lenders commonly require a personal guaranty from an individual corpo-
rate officer of a closely held corporation before lending its funds. When
they do, the officer must sign the instrument twice as maker: once on
behalf of a corporation and once for himself.684 Taking all of these facts
into account, the court reasoned that any noteholder would easily recog-
nize that he had signed exclusively on the corporation's behalf.
8. Consumer Credit Reports
The San Antonio Court of Appeals of Texas recently refused to find a
bank liable for mere negligent reporting to credit reporting bureaus be-
cause the bank was qualifiedly privileged to report information to credit
reporting bureaus. 685 The court further held that since no evidence of
malice was found in the bank's actions, the privilege was maintained.686
In a case of first impression in the federal circuit, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Fair Credit Reporting Act allows a department store to obtain a
customer's credit history before deciding whether to accept his check in
payment for a purchase.687
9. Ship Mortgage Act Does Not Preempt DTPA Claims
In Ocean Transport, Inc. v. Greycas, Inc.688 the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals answered the question of whether the Ship Mortgage Act 689
preempts state deceptive trade practices act claims surrounding the struc-
ture and closing of a loan. The debtor in Ocean Transport, along with
three guarantors, borrowed funds for the purchase of two ocean-going
barges. The loan was secured by a preferred ship mortgage on each of
the barges. After the debtor defaulted, the barges were sold by the se-
(1) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person rep-
resented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative
capacity;
(2) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is per-
sonally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does
not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the
instrument does not name the person represented but does show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 3.403(b)(2) (Vernon 1994).
683. Trans Pacific, 14 F.3d at 12.
684. Id
685. Lomas Bank USA v. Flatow, 880 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ
denied).
686. Id. at 53.
687. Estiverne v. Sak's Fifth Ave., 9 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 1993).
688. 878 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
689. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1975) (recodified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-31307 (1988)).
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cured party at a foreclosure sale pursuant to the Ship Mortgage Act. The
creditor then sued the guarantors for the deficiency. Recognizing that
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction under section 954 of
the Ship Mortgage Act for in personam actions to recover deficiencies, 690
the guarantors argued that the state four-year limitations period had run.
The court agreed that the state four-year statute of limitations applied.
The court concluded, however, that two of the three guarantors failed to
prove the limitations period had run with respect to the claims against
them. 69 1
10. Trust Provisions
In In re Shurley692 a debtor exchanged some property for a beneficial
interest in a trust which contained both spendthrift and discretionary pro-
visions. The debtor then attempted to exclude the property from the
bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Texas held that the debtor's contribution to the trust defeated the trust's
spendthrift and discretionary provisions as to the debtor's interest.693
The court reasoned that a debtor ought not be able to tie up his own
property in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his credi-
tors from reaching it.694 The court further held that the amount the credi-
tors could reach was the maximum amount which the trustee could
distribute for the debtor's benefit and was not limited to the total amount
of the debtor's contribution to the trust.695 The court also stated that the
beneficial interest was not an inheritance under section 541 (a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code despite the pour-over provisions of the two wills since
the trust was created inter vivos.696
11. Imputation of Knowledge
In O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC697 the Supreme Court was asked to
address the question of whether a law firm sued for malpractice by the
FDIC, as receiver of a failed savings and loan, can assert state law de-
fenses against the federal agency. In O'Melveny, the FDIC, as receiver
for a failed savings and loan, sued the former counsel of the savings and
loan for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty stemming from
such counsel's advice and services rendered with respect to public offer-
ings. The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia granted the law firm's summary judgment motion based on the fact
that the FDIC stood in the shoes of the savings and loan to whom the
wrongdoing of the insiders was attributed so as to preclude any claims
690. Ocean Transport, 878 S.W.2d at 266.
691. Id. at 268.
692. 171 B.R. 769 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
693. Id. at 781-82.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 784-86.
696. Id. at 787.
697. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
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against the law firm. 698 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded holding that the officers inequitable conduct, even
if attributed to the savings and loan, was not imputed to the FDIC so as
to preclude a legal malpractice action. 699 Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Supreme Court of the United States held that:
(1) California law rather than federal law, governs imputation of
corporate officers' knowledge of fraud to the corporation asserting
the cause of action created by state law;
(2) California law, rather than federal law, applied to whether
knowledge of fraudulent conduct by the savings and loan officers
could be imputed to the FDIC suing its receiver; and
(3) even if FIRREA was inapplicable to the instant receivership
which began prior to the effective date of FIRREA, the judicial crea-
tion of a special federal rule of imputation with respect to the FDIC
would not be justified without any significant conflict with federal
policy or interest in use of state law.700
The central issue in O'Melveny was whether "in a suit by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation as a receiver of a federally insured bank,
it is a federal law or rather a state law rule of decision that governs the
tort liability of attorneys who provided services to the bank."'701 The
O'Melveny Court stated that "there is no federal general common law,"
and recognized that the "remote possibility that corporations may go into
federal receivership is no conceivable basis for adopting a special federal
common law rule divesting states of authority over the entire law of im-
putation. ' 70 2 The Court concluded that California law rather than fed-
eral law governs imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged
negligence, regardless of whether California chooses to follow the "ma-
jority rule. '703
The next issue addressed by the O'Melveny Court was whether "the
California rule of decision was to be applied to the issue of imputation or
displaced, and if it is applied it is of only theoretical interest whether the
basis for that application is California's own sovereign power or federal
adoption of California's disposition. ' '704 The Court stated that in answer-
ing this question it would not contradict an explicit federal statutory pro-
vision, nor would it adopt a court made rule to supplement a federal
statutory regulation which is comprehensive and detailed. 70 5 The Court
concluded that "matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presuma-
bly left subject to the disposition provided by state law."'706 The Court
noted that "uniformity of law might facilitate the FDIC's nation-wide liti-
698. Id.
699. 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992).
700. Id. at 2054.
701. Id. at 2051.
702. Id. at 2053 (citations omitted).
703. Id.
704. Id. at 2053-54.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 2054.
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gation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state research and reducing un-
certainty - but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified
as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in 'federal common
law' rules. '70 7 The Court further noted that the respondent failed to
identify a specific conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
use of state law. 70 8 The Court concluded that "this is not one of those
extraordinary cases in which the judicial creation of a federal rule of deci-
sion is warranted. ' 70 9 The Court left it to the Ninth Circuit to resolve
what California law provides, as the parties were in agreement that if
state law does govern it would be that of California.710
12. Setoff
In FDIC v. Perry Brothers, Inc.711 the Federal District Court ruled that
a depositor has a right to "contemporaneous notice" of a bank setoff ac-
tion. While the court recognized that giving proper notice of a bank's
intention to exercise its right of setoff would impair the effectiveness of
legitimate banking setoffs, it also believed that giving a post-setoff notice,
even one day after the setoff is exercised, exposes the depositor to risks of
additional harm from dishonored checks. After balancing the interests of
the banks against the interests of the depositors, the court held that at
least contemporaneous notice is required.712 Nothing in the opinion indi-
cated that written notice would be required.
In re AppeP13 focused on a bank's common law right of setoff. In this
case, Thomas Appel, was a debtor of Citizen State Bank, but he also
maintained four deposit accounts with the bank. Appel filed for Chapter
7 bankruptcy and shortly thereafter his bankruptcy trustee contacted the
bank and requested that it turn over the amounts in the four deposit ac-
counts. In compliance with the request, the bank prepared four cashier's
checks but, prior to the bank's delivery of the checks to the trustee, the
bank's attorney advised the bank of its right of setoff and that such right
was dependent upon the bank's possession of the funds. The bank there-
upon refused to deliver the checks to the trustee and filed a Motion for
Relief from Stay which would allow it to execute its right of setoff.
In its analysis, the court noted that a payee of a cashier's check has no
interest in the check until it is delivered.714 Thus, the court determined
that since the bank never delivered actual possession of the cashier's
check to the trustee, the mutuality of debt between the bank and Appel
707. Id. at 2055 (citation omitted).
708. Id.
709. Id. at 2056.
710. h.
711. 854 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
712. Id. at 1269.
713. 166 B.R. 624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994).
714. Id. at 625.
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still existed and thus the bank's common law right to setoff was not
extinguished.715
At issue in Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank716 was whether a bank may
offset funds in a common non-testamentary trust account against a debt
the settlor-trustee owes the bank. In Soto, Lorenzo and Nora Soto
opened a trust account for their daughter of which they were the trustees.
Mr. and Mrs. Soto had the right, acting together, to revoke the trust and
withdraw the funds. When Lorenzo Soto's account at the bank became
overdrawn, the bank applied the money in the trust account to offset Mr.
Soto's overdraft. Nora Soto then sued the bank on theories of deceptive
trade practices, breach of bailment and conversion.717 The sole issue on
appeal was whether a bank may offset revocable trust funds against a
debt of its depositor, who is the trust's settlor.
The trust created by the Sotos was a revocable inter vivos trust also
known as a tentative or "Trotten" trust after the famous New York
case.718 Unable to find any Texas case law on point, the court looked to
outside authorities, all of which indicated that revocable savings account
trusts are subject to the claims of the settlor-trustee's creditors. 719 The
court also looked to the Restatement Second of Trusts section 58 which
states that the creditors of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a
tentative trust can reach that person's interest since he has such extensive
power over the deposit as to justify treating him as in substance the un-
restricted owner of the deposit.720
The court reiterated the established rule that banks have a common
law right to offset and apply a depositor's general deposit to an indebted-
ness the depositor owes the bank on another account.721 The court also
noted that banks may not offset trust account funds in which the true
owner is not the depositor.722 The court noted that when a bank has
actual or constructive knowledge that funds are held in trust for another,
who is the true owner, it may not seize and retain the funds held in trust
in order to offset a debt of the depositor.723 The court stated, however,
that National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank724 and related
cases, contemplated trust accounts in which the true owner was the bene-
ficiary and not a tentative trust in which the true owner was the settlor-
trustee. The court noted that the Sotos' desire to accumulate funds for
their daughter's education did not make the account a deposit for a spe-
cific, special purpose, rather, it was general funds owned by the Sotos and
715. Id. at 625-26.
716. 868 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd).
717. Id. at 401.
718. Id at 402.
719. Id (citations omitted).
720. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 58, cmt. d (1959)).
721. Id. First Nat'l Bank v. Winkler, 139 Tex. 131, 161 S.W.2d 1053, 1056 (1942).
722. Id.; see also Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348
S.W.2d 528, 529 (1961).
723. Id. at 403.
724. 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1961).
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available to the Sotos' creditors. 725 Based on the foregoing, the court
held the tentative trust account to be subject to the bank's right to offset
such funds against other debts of the settlor-trustees. 726 Soto makes clear
that its holding does not "denigrate tentative trusts," as its decision "has
nothing to do with the rights of beneficiaries or creditors after the settlor
has died. ' 727 Rather, the court acknowledged the reality that "the owner
of the funds in a tentative trust is the settlor/trustee as long as he lives,
not the beneficiary. '728
In Boyd v. American Bank of Commerce at Wolfforth729 Kay Boyd exe-
cuted two promissory notes payable to American Bank of Commerce, the
payments of which were secured by her checking account at the Bank and
by her car.730 Both notes were due and payable upon demand, but if no
demand was made, the notes would become due on January 6, 1992.
Each note contained an identical provision stating that the bank had the
right of setoff in the event of Boyd's default under the notes. In Septem-
ber 1991, a bank officer was told by Boyd that she would pay off the
notes. When Boyd had not done so by October 7, 1991, the bank exer-
cised its right of setoff against Boyd's checking account.73' Boyd there-
upon sued the bank for wrongful setoff.
The court analyzed the language of the notes which provided for setoff
only in the event of a default by Boyd. 732 The court determined that,
according to the terms of the note, the bank could not exercise its right of
setoff unless the debt had matured or Boyd was insolvent.733 In seeking
summary judgment, the bank had relied upon Boyd's waiver of demand,
as provided for in the notes, as a predicate to exercising its setoff. The
court noted that the language of the notes clearly manifested the inten-
tion that Boyd's default must occur before the bank was authorized to
offset her account without a demand for payment of the notes.7 3 Thus,
Boyd's waiver of demand did not negate a default as a condition prece-
dent to the bank's right of setoff without a demand for payment. 735 Since
there was no default and no demand for payment, the bank's offset was
wrongful. 736 The bank attempted to argue on appeal that its contractual
remedies were available because the notes matured when the bank officer
believed the prospect of payment was impaired. Since the bank did not
move for summary judgment on that ground, summary judgment could
725. Id. at 403.
726. Id. at 404.
727. Id at 403.
728. Id
729. 872 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
730. Id at 30.
731. Id. at 31.
732. Id. at 30.
733. Id. at 32.





not be upheld on appeal on a ground not addressed in the motion for
summary judgment. 737
II. LEGISLATION
A. HOME EQUITY LENDING
In response to the Fifth Circuit decision in First Gibraltar, FSB v.
Morales,738 Congressman Henry V. Gonzales of San Antonio proposed
an amendment to the pending interstate banking and branching legisla-
tion739 which had the effect of overturning the First Gibraltar ruling. On
September 29, 1994, Congress passed the legislation having the effect of
nullifying the regulation issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision. 740
Public Law 103-328, title I, section 102(b)(4)(D) provides in relevant
part:
(f) STATE HOMESTEAD PROVISIONS.-No provision of this
Act or any other provision of law administered by the Director shall
be construed as superseding any homestead provision of any State
constitution, including any implementing State statute, in effect on
the date of enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, or any subsequent amendment to
such a State constitutional or statutory provision in effect on such
date, that exempts the homestead of any person from foreclosure, or
forced sale, for the payment of all debts, other than a purchase
money obligation relating to the homestead, taxes due on the home-
stead, or an obligation arising from the work and material used in
constructing improvements on the homestead.
The amendment has the effect of overruling the federal pre-emption of a
state law in Texas that prohibits lenders from making certain home equity
loans. Specifically, the amendment overturned the Fifth Circuit decision
in Morales. In Morales, the Fifth Circuit held that federal law preempts
the Texas homestead law to the extent that Texas law prohibits certain
types of home equity lending by federal savings associations and finance
companies.74'
B. FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In addition to the home equity amendment to the interstate branching
bill, an amendment was passed which resulted in the federal statute of
limitations pre-empting state statute of limitations for gross and inten-
tional misconduct. In response to the ruling in FDIC v. Dawson,742 the
FDIC and the RTC asked the legislators to pass legislation to assure
enough time to litigate against former directors and officers of failed fi-
nancial institutions. On September 29, 1994 Congress approved legisla-
737. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
738. 19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1994).
739. H.R. 3841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
740. Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
741. Morales, 19 F.3d at 1039-1053.
742. 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993).
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tion amending the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Revised
Statutes of the United States, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.743
Section 201(a) of the new legislation provides:
Section 11(d)(14) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1821 (d)(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
(C) REVIVAL OR EXPIRED STATE CAUSES OR AC-
TION.-
(i) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any tort claim described in
clause (ii) for which the statute of limitations applicable under
State law with respect to any such claim has expired not more than
5 years before the appointment of the Corporation as conservator
or receiver, the Corporation may bring an action as conservator or
receiver on such claim without regard to the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations applicable under State law.
(ii) CLAIMS DESCRIBED.-A tort claim referred to in clause
(i) is a claim arising from fraud, intentional misconduct resulting in
unjust enrichment, or intentional misconduct resulting in substan-
tial loss to the institution.
A similar law was passed in section 201(b) as it relates to section
21A(b)(14) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act.744
C. DEPRIzIO REFORM
On October 12, 1994, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994.745 One of the significant provisions of this bill overturned the infa-
mous Deprezio case 74 and its progeny, which expanded preference expo-
sure from ninety days to one year for secured creditors in which the loan
is guaranteed by a corporate insider. The Act amends section 550 so that
an avoidable transfer to a non-insider lender, made in the extended pref-
erence period, is not recoverable from the lender, notwithstanding that
an insider guarantor may have benefitted. The legislative history that ac-
companied the bill made it clear the congressional determination to clar-
ify that non-insider transferees should not be subject to the preference
provisions beyond the ninety-day period.747
743. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994; Pub. L. No.
103-328, § 201, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
744. 12 U.S.C. 1441a(b)(14) (1988).
745. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
746. Levitv. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprezio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186
(7th Cir. 1989).
747. Artha Management Inc. v. Lehigh Say. Bank, 174 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994).
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